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NUCLEAR WEAPONS, HUMAN SECURITY, AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW
VED P. NANDA1
I. INTRODUCTION
The end of the Cold War did not remove the threat nuclear weapons pose to
human civilization. The danger of mistaken or inadvertent nuclear launching
cannot be discounted, nor is there a fail-safe device to ensure that terrorists will not
get ahold of nuclear weapons or will not use them if acquired. Numerous experts
point to a causal relationship between nuclear weapons and international and
national insecurity. A broadened concept of national security includes human
security and nuclear weapons are unquestionably a main source of the people's
insecurity. The role of international law is to provide a framework for nuclear
disarmament, a prerequisite for human security.
President Barack Obama called the future of nuclear weapons in the Twenty-
first Century an issue that is "fundamental to the security of our nations and to the
peace of the world," in his remarks at Prague, Czech Republic, on April 5, 2009.2
Calling nuclear weapons the "most dangerous legacy" of the Cold War, he
emphasized the infinite consequences of a nuclear weapons explosion in any major
city "for our global safety, our security, our society, our economy, to our ultimate
survival," stating "clearly and with conviction America's commitment to seek the
peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons."3 In his words, "as the
only nuclear power to have used a nuclear weapon, the United States has a moral
responsibility to act."
4
A U.S. president's commitment that America "will take concrete steps
towards a world without nuclear weapons .. .[,] will reduce the role of nuclear
weapons in our national security strategy, and urge others to do the same[, and]
will begin the work of reducing our arsenal" 5 is indeed a promising development.
Just a few days before this, on April 1, President Dmitriy Medvedev of the Russian
1. John Evans Professor, University of Denver, Thompson G. Marsh Professor of Law and
Director, International Legal Studies at the University's Sturm College of Law. I am grateful for the
summer research grant from the Sturm College of Law which assisted me in part in completing this
essay.
2. President Barack Obama, Remarks at Prague, Czech Republic (April 5, 2009) available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-offie/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-ln-Prague-As-
Delivered/.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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Federation and President Obama discussed nuclear arms control and reduction
issues and issued the following joint statement:
As leaders of the two largest nuclear weapons states, we agreed to work
together to fulfill our obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and demonstrate leadership in
reducing the number of nuclear weapons in the world. We committed
our two countries to achieving a nuclear free world, while recognizing
that this long-term goal will require a new emphasis on arms control
and conflict resolution measures, and their full implementation by all
concerned nations. We agreed to pursue new and verifiable reductions
in our strategic offensive arsenals in a step-by-step process, beginning
by replacing the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with a new, equally-
binding treaty. We are instructing our negotiators to start talks
immediately on this new treaty and to report on results achieved in
working out the new agreement by July.
6
These developments place the issue in the forefront of the international
attention.
Thus, I consider it timely to discuss this topic with the next section briefly
reviewing the destructive force of nuclear weapons and their utility as instruments
of war. This will be followed by a quick look at the new concept of human
security. Next, I study the illustrative action the world community-international
organizations, especially the United Nations, nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs), and individuals-has thus far undertaken to eliminate nuclear weapons.
The next section, which precedes the conclusion, discusses the role of international
law in the elimination of nuclear weapons.
II. THE DESTRUCTIVE FORCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THEIR MINIMUM
UTILITY AS INSTRUMENTS OF WAR
A. The Destructive Power of Nuclear Weapons.
Obviously there is no lack of awareness about the death and destruction
nuclear weapons cause. The human misery associated with the dropping of atomic
bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki in early August 1945 is vividly captured in
the accounts of horrific, ghastly scenes witnessed by medical and rescue workers.'
6. Joint Statement by President Dmitriy Medvedev of the Russian Federation and President
Barack Obama of the United States of America (April 1, 2009) available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/Joint-Statement-by-President-Dmitriy-Medvedev-of-the-
Russian-Federation-and-President-Barack-Obama-of-the-United-States-of-America.
7. As one example, a young medical worker's described the scene in the aftermath of the
bombing in Hiroshima as follows:
I looked around me. Even though it was morning, the sky was dark as twilight.
Then I saw streams of human beings shuffling away from the center of the city.
Parts of their bodies were missing. Their eyes had been liquefied. They had
blackened skin, and strips of flesh hung like ribbons from their bones. There was
an awful stench in the air; the stench of burned flesh. I can't describe that smell,
but it was like broiled fish.
VED NANDA & DAVID KRIEGER, NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE WORLD COURT 37 (1998) [hereinafter
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This was the beginning of the nuclear era.8  In his testimony before the
International Court of Justice, the Mayor of Nagasaki described the bomb's effects
on his city:
Nagasaki became a city of death where not even the sounds of insects
could be heard. After a while, countless men, women and children
began to gather for a drink of water at the banks of nearby Urakami
River, their hair and clothing scorched and their burnt skin hanging off
in sheets like rags. Begging for help, they died one after another in the
water or in heaps on the banks. Then radiation began to take its toll,
killing people like a scourge of death expanding in concentric circles
from the hypocenter. Four months after the atomic bombing, 74,000
were dead and 75,000 had suffered injuries, that is, two-third[s] of the
city population had fallen victim to this calamity that came upon
Nagasaki like a preview of the Apocalypse.
9
In 2005 then Secretary-General Kofi Annan reminded the world of the
destruction in Hiroshima and Nagasaki and warned that a nuclear catastrophe in
any city would create chaos, as
[t]ens, if not hundreds, of thousands of people would perish in an
instant, and many more would die from exposure to radiation. The
global impact would also be grave .... Hard-won freedoms and human
rights could be compromised .... And world financial markets, trade
and transportation could be hard hit, with major economic
consequences. This could drive millions of people in poor countries into
deeper deprivation and suffering.l
0
B. The Minimum Utility of Nuclear Weapons as Instruments of War
Equally important, many security experts have argued that nuclear weapons
have minimal utility as instruments of war and that their continued possession has
a negative effect on the maintenance of regional and global security. 1 To
NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE WORLD COURT]. A rescue worker described the scene he witnessed:
In corpses near ground zero the eyeballs were blown outside their heads. The
skin was a black tinged yellowish brown, and very dry; it was clear that these
persons had died in agony. Many corpses were found at places where there
was water -- rivers, old wells, cisterns, ponds, and the like. People who did not
die instantly had, it appears, exerted themselves to the limit in their search for
water.
Id.
8. Barely three weeks before the U.S. dropped its first atomic bomb on Hiroshima, it had
conducted its first ever atomic detonation in the desert a few miles from Los Alamos, New Mexico, at a
site called "Trinity" on July 16, 1945. J. Robert Oppenheimer, head of the scientific team for the U.S.
atomic bomb program, remarked that at the time of the explosion the following words from the ancient
Hindu text, the Bhagavad Gita, flashed through his mind: "I am become Death, the destroyer of
worlds." Id. at 29.
9. Id. at 40.
10. Kofi Annan, Address to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference (May 2,
2005) available at www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=1427.
11. See generally Marianne Hanson, Nuclear Weapons as Obstacles to International Security, 16
2009
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illustrate, in a 2005 article,12 Robert S. McNamara, U.S. Secretary of Defense
under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, recalled that in 1983 he had decided to "go
public" with some information that he "felt was needed to inject reality into these
increasingly unreal discussions about the ostensible military utility of nuclear
weapons.13  He was referring to the ongoing discussions in the early 1980s
regarding how the U.S. could "fight and win a nuclear war" with the Soviets. The
information that Robert McNamara referred to was published in a 1983 article that
he had written in Foreign Affairs:
Having spent seven years as Secretary of Defense dealing with the
problems unleashed by the initial nuclear chain reaction 40 years ago, I
do not believe we can avoid serious and unacceptable risk of nuclear
war until we recognize-and until we base all our military plans,
defense budgets, weapons deployments, and arms negotiations on this
recognition-that nuclear weapons serve no military purpose
whatsoever. 14
McNamara then discussed what he called the "unacceptable risk" of
accidental or inadvertent use of nuclear weapons as a result of misjudgment or
miscalculation in times of crisis. He explained:
Senior Russian military officials have stated that, due to lack of
resources, the Russian nuclear arsenal is increasingly at risk of
accidents, theft, and serious malfunction in its command and control
systems. As for the risk of inadvertent use of the weapons in a crisis,
the Cuban Missile Crisis demonstrated that the United States and the
Soviet Union-and indeed the rest of the world-came within a hair's
breadth of a nuclear disaster in October 1962 as a result of
misinformation and misjudgment. 15
After analyzing the U.S. policy to sustain and modernize the existing nuclear
force, to rely "far into the future" upon the projected deployment of large numbers
of strategic nuclear weapons, and to integrate a national ballistic missile defense
into its offensive weapons system,16 McNamara concluded that
we are at a critical moment in human history with respect to offensive
nuclear forces. There is a strong temptation to continue the strategies of
the past 40 years. Such actions would, in my opinion, be a serious
mistake leading to a high risk to all nations across the globe.1 7
Int'l Relations 361, 361-62 (2002) [hereinafter Hanson].
12. Robert S. McNamara, The Folly of U.S. and NA TO Nuclear Weapons Policies, 51 Int'l Affairs
(Moscow), No. 3, at 104 (June 2005).
13. Id. at 108.
14. Id. at 108.
15. Id. at 109.
16. Id. at 114-16.
17. Id. at 118. See also Robert S. McNamara, Apocalypse Soon, FOREIGN POL'Y, May/June 2005,
VOL. 37:3
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III. HUMAN SECURITY
A new understanding of the concept of security is emerging in the twenty-first
century. The need for a redefinition of the traditional concept of security was
eloquently addressed in 2003 by the Commission on Human Security., The
Commission, co-chaired by Sadako Ogata, former U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees, and Amartya Sen, Nobel laureate in economics, was launched at the
2000 Millennium Summit convened by then U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan
and was established at the initiative of the government of Japan.
Contrasted with the traditional focus on state security, the new concept of
security is aimed at ensuring protection of the people. As the Commission stated,
the security debate has changed dramatically since the inception of state
security advocated in the 17th century. According to that traditional
idea, the state would monopolize the rights and means to protect its
citizens. But in the 21st century, both the challenges to security and its
protectors have become more complex. The state remains the
fundamental purveyor. Yet it often fails to fulfill its security
obligations-and at times has even become a source of threat to its own
people. That is why attention must now shift from the security of the
state to the security of the people-to human security. 19
Thus, according to the Commission, the international community "urgently needs a
new paradigm of security. 2 °
Irene Khan, Secretary General of Amnesty International, provides the
following grim account as an appropriate context to help us understand why human
security needs to supplement the narrow traditional concept of state security. She
led an Amnesty delegation to Burundi in September 2002, days after the Burundi
army had massacred more than 170 civilians in a remote village, and went to the
local hospital to meet the only four survivors. The next day she met the President
of Burundi and asked him what action he would take to protect civilians in the
internal conflict then raging in his country. He replied: "Madam, you do not
understand-we are fighting a war to protect our national security.' 21
18. Commission on Human Security, Human Security Now (2003) [hereinafter Human Security
Now].
19. Id. at 2. In addition to the authorities on human security cited here, see also John F. Jones,
Human Security and Social Development, 33 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 92 (2004); Ved P. Nanda,
Preemptive and Preventive Use of Force, Collective Security, and Human Security, 2004 Sutton
Colloquium: Foreword, 33 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 7 (2004); Priyankar Upadhyaya, Human
Security, Humanitarian Intervention and Third World Concerns, 33 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 71
(2004).
20. Human Security Now, supra note 18, at 2.
21. Irene Khan, A Human Rights Agenda for Global Security, in HUMAN SECURITY FOR ALL: A
TRIBUTE TO SERGIO VIEIRA DE MELLO 17 (Kevin M. Cahill ed., 2004). In its 2001 report, the
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty expressed its views on the need to
think beyond the traditional narrow concept of security:
The traditional, narrow perception of security leaves out the most elementary and
legitimate concerns of ordinary people regarding security in their daily lives. It
also diverts enormous amounts of national wealth and human resources into
2009
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The Human Security Commission's focus is on the empowerment of people,
which can help prepare them against severe present and future threats, both natural
and societal. In a nutshell it affirms that the traditional view of state security has
expanded in the Twenty-first Century to include human security, as well.
2
The focus on human security is to ensure that adequate attention is given to
addressing the real sources of insecurity from which so many people all over the
world suffer. Nuclear weapons constitute a major source of the people's
insecurity. And weapons of mass destruction-nuclear, chemical, and
biological-are obviously among the main threats to state security. In 2004, the
Secretary General's High-level Panel, which was established to examine new
global security threats, enumerated six clusters as threats to international security,
23
which include weapons of mass destruction.
The Union of Concerned Scientists has stated that "[n]uclear weapons remain
the gravest and most immediate threat to human civilization. 24  In June 2007,
speaking at the Council on Foreign Relations, former Senator and co-chairman of
the Nuclear Threat Initiative Sam Nunn listed the greatest threats we currently face
from nuclear weapons: "[C]atastrophic terrorism, a rise in the number of nuclear
armaments and armed forces, while countries fail to protect their citizens from
chronic insecurities of hunger, disease, inadequate shelter, crime, unemployment,
social conflict and environmental hazard. When rape is used as an instrument of
war and ethnic cleansing, when thousands are killed by floods resulting from a
ravaged countryside and when citizens are killed by their own security forces,
then it is just insufficient to think of security in terms of national territorial
security alone. The concept of human security can and does embrace such
diverse circumstances.
INT'L COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 15
(2001) available at http://www.idrc.ca/openebooks/960-7/#page-I 5.
22. Among various definitions of human security, Kofi Annan's encompasses "human rights,
good governance, access to education and health care, and [to ensure] that each individual has
opportunities and choices to fulfill his or her potential." Press Release, Secretary General Kofi Annan,
Secretary-General Salutes International Workshop on Human Security in Mongolia, SG/SM/7382 (May
8-10, 2000) available at www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2000/20000508.sgsm7382.doc. The
Commission on Human Security defines the concept in the following words:
To protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms
and human fulfillment. Human security means protecting fundamental freedoms
.... It means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread)
threats and situations. It means using processes that build on people's strengths
and aspirations. It means creating political, social, environmental, economic,
military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of
survival, livelihood and dignity.
Human Security Now, supra note 18, at 4. The emerging common theme is that it enhances human
rights and facilitates human development.
23. Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure
World: Our Shared Responsibility, 23, U.N. Doc. A/59/565/2004 (2004) available at
http://www.un.org/secureworld/. The other five clusters listed in the report are: economic and social
threats, interstate conflict, internal conflict, terrorism, and transnational organized crime.
24. Union of Concerned Scientists, Nuclear Weapons & Global Security: Nuclear Weapons
Overview, http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear-weapons-and-global-security/nuclear-weapons/technical_
issues/nuclear-weapons-overview.html (last visited May 30, 2009) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons &
Global Security].
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weapons states, increasing danger of mistaken, accidental or unauthorized nuclear
launch .... ,,25 He referred to the January 2007 Wall Street Journal op-ed piece he
had published along with two former Secretaries of State, Henry Kissinger and
George Schultz, and former U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry, in which
they had called upon the United States to provide leadership to prevent nuclear
weapons' "proliferation into potentially dangerous hands, and ultimately ending
them as a threat to the world.,
26
Making the point that terrorist groups are "conceptually outside the bounds of
a deterrent strategy," Senator Nunn and his colleagues stated that the United States
will find itself in a nuclear era "more precarious, psychologically disorienting, and
economically even more costly than was Cold War deterrence. 27  They also
endorsed "setting the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons and working
energetically on the actions required to achieve that goal. 28
At the height of the Cold War, President John F. Kennedy had stated in his
1961 address to the United Nations General Assembly: "Every man, woman, and
child lives under a nuclear sword of Damocles, hanging by the slenderest of
threads, capable of being cut at any moment by accident or by miscalculation or by
madness. The weapons of war must be abolished before they abolish us."
29
IV. THE WORLD COMMUNITY'S EFFORTS TO ELIMINATE NUCLEAR WEAPONS
The catastrophic effects of Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings lead to only
one rational solution to nuclear weapons---eliminate them. The move to abolish
them began with the very first resolution adopted by the United Nations General
Assembly in London in January 1946, entitled "Establishment of a Commission to
Deal with the Problems Raised by the Discovery of Atomic Energy. 3°  The
Resolution, which was adopted unanimously, charged the Commission, inter alia,
to make specific proposals "for the elimination from national armaments of atomic
weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction. 3 1 This
goal has been reaffirmed by the General Assembly in hundreds of subsequent
resolutions.
In the latest iteration of its reaffirmation of the goal, the 63rd Session of the
General Assembly on December 2, 2008, adopted a Resolution entitled "Nuclear
Disarmament,, 32 which recognizes in its operative paragraph 1 that "the time is
25. Sam Nunn, The Mountaintop: A World Free of Nuclear Weapons, Council on Foreign
Relations, 2-3 (June 14, 2007) http://www.nti.org/c-press/speech-samnunncfr07.pdf.
26. Id. at 3.
27. Id. On the risk of nuclear terrorism, see Sue Wareham, It's Time to Abolish Nuclear Weapons,
59 AUST. J. INT'L AFFAIRS 439, 442 (2005).
28. See Nuclear Weapons & Global Security, supra note 24.
29. President John F. Kennedy, Address in New York City before the General Assembly of the
United Nations, 1 Pub. Papers 618, 620 (September 25, 1961), available at http://www.jfklibrary.org/
Historical+Resources/Archives/Reference+Desk/Speeches/JFK/03POF3UnitedNatins9251961 .htm
30. G.A. Res. 1(1), U.N. Doc. A/RES/I(I) (Jan. 24, 1946) available at http://www.un.org/Docs/
joumal/asp/ws.asp?m=A/RES/l(1).
31. Id. 5(c).
32. G.A. Res. 63/46, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/46 (Dec. 2, 2008).
2009
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now opportune for all the nuclear-weapon States to take effective disarmament
measures to achieve the total elimination of these weapons at the earliest possible
time." Among other recommendations for member states, the resolution urges the
nuclear-weapon states "to stop immediately the qualitative improvement,
development, production and stockpiling of nuclear warheads and their delivery
systems, 33 and, as an interim measure, "to de-alert and deactivate immediately
their nuclear weapons." 34 It calls upon the nuclear-weapon states "to agree on an
internationally and legally binding instrument on a joint undertaking not to be the
first to use nuclear weapons," and for all states to give "security assurances of non-
use and non-threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon
States. 3 5 It also calls upon the Conference on Disarmament to establish "an ad-
hoc committee on nuclear disarmament early in 2009 and to commence
negotiations on a phased program of nuclear disarmament leading to the total
elimination of nuclear weapons with a specific framework of time" 36 and for
negotiations on a verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for
nuclear weapons.
37
In the preamble to another Resolution passed on the same day, the General
Assembly reaffirmed "the commitment of the international community to the goal
of the total elimination of nuclear weapons and the creation of a nuclear-weapon-
free world," while convinced that
the continuing existence of nuclear weapons poses a threat to all
humanity and that their use would have catastrophic consequences for
all life on Earth, and recognizing that the only defence against a nuclear
catastrophe is the total elimination of nuclear weapons and the certainty
that they will never be produced again."
The latter Resolution was a follow-up to the 1996 Advisory Opinion of the
International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons.39 In the final operative paragraph of its Opinion the Court unanimously
stated: "There exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion
negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and
effective international control. 4 °
Several aspects of this paragraph are noteworthy. First, it is an elaboration of
certainly one of the most important articles in any arms control measure, article VI
33. Id. 5.
34. Id. 6.
35. Id. 8.
36. Id. 20.
37. Id. 14.
38. G.A. Res. 63/49, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/49 (Dec. 2, 2008).
39. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226 (July 8) [hereinafter ICJ
Advisory Opinion]. See generally NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE WORLD COURT, supra note 7; JOHN
BURROUGHS, THE LEGALITY OF THREAT OR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: A GUIDE TO THE HISTORIC
OPINION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (1997); THE CASE AGAINST THE BOMB (Roger S.
Clark & Madeleine Sann eds., 1996); INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS (Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Philippe Sands eds., 1999).
40. ICJ Advisory Opinion, supra note 39, para. 2F.
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of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), under which the commitment by non-
nuclear weapon states not to possess nuclear weapons is reciprocated by the
commitment of five nuclear-weapon states "to pursue negotiations in good faith on
effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date
and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament
under strict and effective international control. 41  Second, it calls for nuclear
disarmament "in all its aspects," thus differing from article VI of the NPT as it sets
forth an obligation not only to "pursue negotiations in good faith" but in addition
an obligation to bring the specified negotiations to a conclusion. Third, the
nuclear-weapon states' obligation to pursue negotiations for nuclear disarmament
requires international control of the disarmament process. Finally, this obligation
stands alone, unlike the requirement under article VI of the NPT that these states
also pursue negotiations "on a treaty on general and complete disarmament." Thus
it affirms that the obligation to eliminate nuclear weapons is unconditional, not
requiring concurrent progress on conventional disarmament.
Among many other resolutions it has adopted on the issue of nuclear
weapons, the General Assembly reiterated its request to the Conference on
Disarmament to commence negotiations on an international convention prohibiting
42the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
At the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the NPT parties, states
parties decided to strengthen the review process for the Treaty and also decided on
principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.43 The
ICJ's 1996 Advisory Opinion had an influential impact on states parties as they
attended the 2000 Review Conference. The participants did not agree "to
commence multilateral negotiations leading to the conclusion of a nuclear weapons
convention prohibiting the development, testing, production, stockpiling, transfer,
use and threat of use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination under
strict and effective international control," as recommended by Malaysia and Costa
Rica in the working paper they introduced at the Review Conference. 44 However,
they did agree on 13 specific practical steps for progressive and systematic efforts
to implement article VI of NPT, that is, to reach the objective of nuclear
disarmament leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons.45 These include
the urgency of signatures and ratifications, to achieve the early entry into force of
41. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, art. VI, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729
U.N.T.S. 161.
42. G.A. Res. 63/75, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/75 (Dec. 2, 2008).
43. Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, April
17-May 12, 1995, 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, U.N. Doc. NPT/Conf.1995/32 (Part I) & Corr. 2, annex..
44. Working paper submitted by Costa Rica & Malaysia, Follow-Up to the International Court of
Justice Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, submitted to the
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, U.N. Doc.
NPT/CONF.2000/MC.I/SB.I/WP.4 (May 8, 2000).
45. Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 2000
Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, April 24-
May 19, 2000, U.N. Doc. NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II), part I, para. 15.
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the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), negotiations to conclude a
treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, and the
necessity of negotiations on nuclear disarmament.46  The states parties also
reaffirmed that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only sure guarantee
against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.47 However, it is disappointing
to note that no progress has been made toward the implementation of these agreed-
upon specific steps. And the 2005 Review Conference was a huge disappointment
as states parties failed to reach agreement on any substantive issues;48 it produced
no new recommendation for reducing the threat of nuclear proliferation. The then
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan declared that the Conference had "missed a
vital opportunity to strengthen our collective security against the many nuclear
threats to which all states and all peoples are vulnerable. 49
It is also noteworthy that in 1978 at the First Special Session of the General
Assembly devoted to disarmament, all member states affirmed by consensus the
goal of nuclear disarmament, accorded it their highest priority, and decided on
specific concrete steps to achieve that objective. 50 Twenty-two years later, the
United Nations again called for elimination of nuclear weapons in its 2000
Millennium Declaration.51
Following the 1978 Special Session on Disarmament, the UN established the
Conference on Disarmament in 1979, which succeeded the Geneva-based
Committee on Disarmament.52  In his message to the Conference on
Disarmament's plenary meeting in January 2009, UN Director General Sergei
46. The other steps include a moratorium on nuclear test explosions; the principle of irreversibility
to apply to nuclear disarmament; nuclear-weapon-states' commitment to the total elimination of their
nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament; the early entry into force and full implementation of
START II and the conclusion of START III, while preserving and strengthening the ABM treaty;
specific enumerated steps by nuclear weapon states leading to nuclear disarmament; arrangements to
place excess fissile materials under the control of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA);
reaffirmation of the goal of general and complete disarmament; regular reports, within the framework of
the NPT strengthened review process; and the further development of the required verification
capabilities so as to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements to achieve a
nuclear-weapon-free world. Id.
47. Id. Vol. 1, para. 2. For the final document of the 2000 Review Conference, see Vols. I-III of
U.N. Doe. NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I-IV).
48. See Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
Draft final document of the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, May 2-27, 2005, U.N. Doe. NPT/CONF.2005/DC/I (2005).
49. Press Release, Secretary-General, As Review Conference for Non-proliferation Treaty Closes
Without Agreement Secretary-General Says Vital Opportunity Missed to Strengthen Security, U.N.
Doe. SG/SM/9895 (May 27, 2005) available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/sgsm9895.
doc.htm.
50. General Assembly, Special Sessions devoted to Disarmament, May 1978, (SSOD-I); see also
Conference on Disarmament, India: Working Paper on Nuclear Disarmament, U.N. Doc. CD/1816
(Feb. 20, 2007) [hereinafter India's Working Paper on Nuclear Disarmament].
51. G.A. Res. 55/2, U.N. Doe. A/RES/55/2 (Sept. 8, 2000).
52. The United Nations Office at Geneva, http://www.unog.ch (follow "Disarmament" tab then
follow "Conference on Disarmament" hyperlink).
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Ordzhonikidze referred to the "five point proposal to revitalize the international
disarmament agenda" he had issued in October 2008. 53 In his words,
[i]ncluded in this proposal were several specific contributions that could
be made by the Conference on Disarmament with respect to nuclear
disarmament and fissile materials. Indeed, this Conference and its
predecessors have an impressive record of achievement, including the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Bacteriological and Toxin
Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. These instruments
demonstrate the potential of the Conference.
54
In addition to the efforts at the U.N. toward nuclear disarmament, those
advocating the elimination of nuclear weapons include non-nuclear-weapon states
and non-state actors-scientists, security experts, politicians, decision-makers, and
civilian activists. To illustrate, the final document of the 2006 Conference of
Heads of State or Government of Non-aligned Countries called upon the
Conference on Disarmament to establish as the highest priority and as soon as
possible an ad-hoc committee on nuclear disarmament and to begin negotiations on
a phased program for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specific
time framework.5 5
Reports on nuclear disarmament by non-nuclear states include those by the
Canadian House of Commons in 1998, Canada and the Nuclear Challenge,56 the
Japanese government-sponsored Tokyo Forum for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and
Disarmament in 1999,57 and the 1996 report of the Canberra Commission on the
Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, established by the Australian government and
submitted to the Conference on Disarmament in 1997.58 In July 2008, the Prime
Ministers of Australia and Japan established the International Commission on
Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, co-chaired by the former Foreign
Minister of Australia, Gareth Evans, and former Japanese Foreign Minister, Yoriko
Kawaguchi. 59 The Commission will publish a major report by January 2010, in
time for the 2010 NPT Review Conference. 60 Another similar initiative is by the
53. Secretary-General, Message to the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva (January 20, 2009)
www.unog.ch (follow "Disarmament" tab, then follow "Conference on Disarmament" hyperlink, then
follow Statements at Plenary Meetings 2009 hyperlink).
54. Id.
55. U.N. Doc. A/61/472-S/2006/780, Annex 1.
56. Canada and the Nuclear Challenge: Reducing the Political Value of Nuclear Weapons for the
Twenty First Century, available at www.ccnr.org/scfait-recs.html.
57. The Report of the Tokyo Forum for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, Part Three:
Stopping and Reversing Nuclear Proliferation, available at www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/
forum/tokyo9907/report-3 .html.
58. Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Report of the Canberra
Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, available at http://www.dfat.gov.au/cc/index.html
59. International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, About the
Commission, available at www.icnnd.org/index.html.
60. International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, Joint Statement by
Gareth Evans and Yoriko Kawaguchi, New York, Sept. 25, 2008, available at
http://www.icnnd.org/news/releases/080925_js evans-kawaguchi.html.
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New Agenda Coalition, composed of a geographically dispersed group of middle-
power countries-Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, and
Sweden.6'
Numerous elected officials and civil society groups have been actively
involved in nuclear disarmament issues. The former include the Parliamentarians
62for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, Mayors for Peace, an
international organization which is waging a campaign to ban nuclear weapons by
2020,63 and the Middle Powers Initiative,64 which works primarily with middle-
power governments on nuclear disarmament issues.
Among influential reports by civil society groups are a 1997 report issued by
the Henry L. Stimson Center's 1997 Project on Eliminating Weapons of Mass
Destruction, entitled An American Legacy, Building a Nuclear- Weapon-Free
World,65 and a 1997 report released by the National Academy of Sciences, entitled
The Future of Nuclear Weapons Policy.66 A 2007 policy analysis brief was issued
by the Stanley Foundation under the title Overcoming Nuclear Dangers.
67
Among several NGOs which are actively engaged in working on nuclear
policy issues are Soka Gakkai International (SGI)68 and the Nuclear Age Peace
Foundation. 69  The president of Soka Gakkai International, Daisaku Ikeda, has
called "for the creation of a U.N. Decade of Action by the World's People for
Nuclear Abolition and for the early convening of a World Summit for Nuclear
Abolition. 70  He considers such steps as both reflecting and supporting an
emerging international consensus for disarmament. In his words, "[c]rying out in
opposition to war and nuclear weapons is neither emotionalism nor self-pity. It is
the highest expression of human reason based on an unflinching perception of the
dignity of life. 71
SGI's anti-nuclear activities include petition drives for abolition of nuclear
weapons and public education, including organizing exhibitions, conferences, and
72publications. In 1997, SGI members collected over 13 million signatures as part
61. See New Agenda Coalition General Debate Statement to the 2008 First Committee, available
at http://www.mfat.govt.nz/downloads/disarmament/2008-nac-general-statement.pdf.
62. See Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, http://www.gsinstitute.
org/pnnd/about.html.
63. See Mayors for Peace, http://www.2020visioncampaign.org/pages/106/Aboutus/.
64. See Middle Powers Initiative, http://www.middlepowers.org/about.html.
65. The Harry L. Stimson Center, Report No. 22 (March 1997) available at
http://www.stimson.org/wmd/pdf/legacy.pdf.
66. COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND ARMS CONTROL, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF
SCIENCES (National Academy Press 1997) available at www.nap.edu/readingroom/books/fun.
67. DAVID CORTRIGHT, OVERCOMING NUCLEAR DANGERS (Stanley Foundation, 2007).
68. See SGI Homepage, http://sgi.org/.
69. Nuclear Age Peace Found. Homepage, http://wagingpeace.org./.
70. Daisaku Ikeda, Emerging from the Nuclear Shadow, NUCLEAR AGE PEACE FOUNDATION,
Sept. 14, 2006, at para. 15, available at http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/2006/09/14ikeda_
emerging.htm.
71. Id. atpara. 18.
72. See SGI's Antinuclear Activities, SGI, http://www.sgiquarterly.org/assets/images/Jly2007/
activities.pdf.
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of the Abolition 2000 petition drive, which were presented the next year to both
then Secretary-General Kofi Annan and the chairperson of the Preparatory
Committee of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The
Nuclear Age Peace Foundation is primarily committed to working for a world free
of nuclear weapons.
A notable arms expert seeking abolition of nuclear weapons, Ambassador
Max M. Kampelman, spoke to the Conference on the Implications of the
Reykjavik Summit on its 20th Anniversary in October 2006. In his address
Kampelman emphatically declared: "There is today no alternative if we wish to
secure the safety of our nation and of our families other than the elimination of all
nuclear weapons globally along with all other weapons of mass destruction,
including biological and chemical weapons." 73 He concluded the address with the
following exhortation:
It is essential that we lead the world into developing a decisive
move from the "is"-a world with a risk of increasing catastrophe-and
work toward achieving peace and stability, the 'ought.' It was President
John Kennedy who said, '... . the world was not meant to be a prison in
which man awaits his execution .... The weapons of war must be
abolished before they abolish us.' It was President Ronald Reagan who
called for the abolition of 'all nuclear weapons,' which he considered to
be 'totally irrational, totally inhumane, good for nothing but killing,...
destructive of life on earth and civilization.'
The world of science knows this. It is time for the political world
to learn it. It is time for us to act.74
V. NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES' RELIANCE UPON NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR
SECURITY
To reiterate, none of the nuclear-weapon states is willing to relinquish its
nuclear weapons; instead, all nuclear-weapon states rely upon nuclear weapons for
security. How President Obama's administration will shift its policy on this issue
should be known in the near future. However, the prior policy embodied in the
United States' 2002 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)75 demonstrates clearly that
nuclear weapons have been central in U.S. strategic planning. The U.S. is prepared
to target non-nuclear weapon states and Iran, Iraq, Syria, North Korea, and Libya
are specifically mentioned. It has even indicated the possibility of developing new
nuclear weapons.
In its working paper submitted to the Preparatory Committee for the 2010
Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
73. Max Kampelman, Zero Nuclear Weapons: It is Time for Us to Act, VITAL SPEECHES OF THE
DAY, April 2007, at 148, available at www.vsotd.com.
74. Id. at 151.
75. The Bush administration's NPR was issued in January 2002 and partially leaked to the press in
March 2002. Union of Concerned Scientists, Global Security: Nuclear Posture Review,
www.ucsusa.org/global-security/nuclear-weapons/nuclear-posture-review.html.
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Weapons,76 the United States pointed to a number of complexities as the NPT
parties discuss disarmament issues. It encouraged the parties "to debate how to
create an international environment in which it would become possible to achieve"
the goal of nuclear disarmament.77 It noted that "reducing international tension
and strengthening trust between States would be" a prerequisite to realizing the
78goal. It further stated that "until achievement of the changes in the regional and
global security environment called for in the NPT's preamble, the United States
nuclear deterrent will continue to make an important contribution to nuclear non-
proliferation., 79 Finally, it outlined a list of the conditions that would be necessary
to "achieve, and, significantly, to maintain over time, the goal of a world free of
nuclear weapons[.],,
80
China stated its position in the working paper it submitted to the Preparatory
Committee:
Nuclear disarmament should be a just and reasonable process of gradual
reduction towards a downward balance. States possessing the largest
nuclear arsenals bear special responsibility for nuclear disarmament and
should take the lead in drastically reducing their nuclear arsenals in a
verifiable, irreversible and legally binding way, so as to create
conditions for the realization of the final nuclear disarmament in a
comprehensive and thorough manner. 81
In order "to promote nuclear disarmament, reduce the danger of nuclear war
and diminish the role of nuclear weapons in national security policy," China
recommends the following measures:
(a) Abandoning the policies of nuclear deterrence based on the first use
of nuclear weapons and lowering the threshold for using nuclear
weapons;
(b) Honouring their commitment not to target their nuclear weapons
against any countries, nor to list any countries as targets of nuclear
strikes;
(c) Undertaking not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time or
under any circumstances; to refrain unconditionally from using or
threatening to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States
or nuclear-weapon-free zones; and to conclude relevant international
legal instruments thereupon;
(d) Supporting efforts of relevant countries and regions to establish
76. United States of America Working Paper, Achieving and Sustaining Nuclear Weapons
Elimination, Mar. 17, 2007, U.N. Doc. NPT/CONF.2010/PC.1/WP.21 (May 3, 2007).
77. Id. 4.
78. Id 6.
79. Id. 7.
80. Id. 14.
81. China Working Paper, Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Nuclear Disarmament and Reduction of the
Danger of Nuclear War, 7, U.N. NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.46 (May 7, 2007).
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nuclear-weapon-free zones and other weapons-of-mass-destruction-free
zones in accordance with regional conditions on a basis of voluntary
consultation and agreement;
(e) Not developing easy-to-use low-yield nuclear weapons;
(f) Withdrawing and repatriating all nuclear weapons deployed outside
their own territories;
(g) Abandoning "nuclear umbrella" and "nuclear sharing" policies and
practices;
(h) Taking all necessary steps to avoid accidental or unauthorized
launches of nuclear weapons.
82
In its working paper submitted to the Preparatory Committee, the United
Kingdom noted its absolute commitment "to the principles and practice of
multilateral nuclear disarmament." 83 As to its nuclear deterrent, it stated:
At the end of last year we published a White Paper explaining the
decision of the United Kingdom Government to maintain a nuclear
deterrent. In March, the United Kingdom Parliament voted to support
this decision. The United Kingdom has decided to begin the concept
and design work required to make possible a replacement for our
current submarine fleet; and it decided to participate in a programme to
extend the life of the Trident D5 missile system."
84
Russia is equally committed to nuclear weapons' playing an important role in
its military planning, as expressed in its 2000 study, The Concept of National
Security of the Russian Federation.8 5 China continues to modernize its nuclear
weapons capability, while Britain and France have given no indication that they
might agree to the abolition of nuclear weapons.
India, a non-signatory to NPT and now a nuclear-weapon state, has in its
February 2007 working paper submitted to the Conference on Disarmament, urged
"the international community to intensify dialogue so as to build a consensus that
strengthens the ability of the international community to initiate concrete steps
towards achieving the goal of nuclear disarmament., 86 It suggested specific steps,
including reduction of the salience of nuclear weapons in the security doctrines;
measures by nuclear weapon states to reduce nuclear danger, including de-alerting
of nuclear weapons; a global agreement on "no-first-use" of nuclear weapons;
82. Id. 12.
83. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Working Paper, Preparatory
Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons, Working Paper on Disarmament Submitted by The United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland, 11 , U.N. NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.59 (May 9, 2007).
84. Id. 3.
85. See, e.g., Daniel Sumner, Russian Perceptions of Nuclear Weapons, 44 DISARMAMENT DIPL.
16, 16-21 (2000) available at http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd44/index.htm.
86. India Working Paper, Disarmament Commission, Recommendations for Achieving the
Objective of Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 17, U.N.
A/CN. 10/2007/WG.IWP. 1 (April 9, 2007).
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negotiation of a universal, binding agreement on non-use of nuclear weapons
against non-nuclear weapon states; negotiation of a convention on the complete
prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; and "[n]egotiation of a
nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling
and use of nuclear weapons and on their destruction, leading to the global,
nondiscriminatory and verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified
time frame. 87
As already mentioned, there is no practical utility of nuclear weapons as tools
of war, although many states still consider them to be a necessary deterrent against
nuclear attack by others. But such reliance on deterrence entails serious risks and
dangers; there is no consensus that the deterrent qualities of nuclear weapons kept
the peace during the Cold War; and miscalculations or misperceptions can
certainly lead to deadly nuclear exchanges. 88 Non-nuclear-weapon states consider
it hypocrisy and a double standard on the part of nuclear-weapon states insofar as
they have not shown any inclination to implement in good faith the obligation they
undertook under article VI of the NPT. 89
Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohamed El
Baradei, has aptly stated: "The very existence of nuclear weapons gives rise to the
pursuit of them. They are seen as a source of global influence, and are valued for
their perceived deterrent effect. And as long as some countries possess them (or
are protected by them in alliance) and others do not, this asymmetry breeds chronic
global insecurity." 90 Non-nuclear-weapon states equate the existing situation to
"nuclear apartheid." Hence, several of them would like to join the nuclear club,
with the result that non-proliferation as a goal remains illusory so long as nuclear-
weapon states are unwilling to commit themselves to the goal of nuclear
disarmament.
VI. THE UNFINISHED AGENDA
What, then, is the answer? Undoubtedly the only answer lies in nuclear-
weapon states' setting a firm timeframe for the elimination of nuclear weapons and
agreeing on specific, concrete steps toward that goal, and to implement them. The
Indian workpaper on Nuclear Disarmament outlining such steps provides a good
model for consideration. 91 In their working paper presented to the Preparatory
Committee, the members of the Group of Non-Aligned States Parties to the NPT
stated:
The Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Treaty reiterates its call
for a full implementation of the unequivocal undertaking given by the
nuclear-weapon States at the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to
87. Id.
88. See, e.g., Hanson, supra note 11, at 371-72.
89. See, e.g., Hugh Gusterson, A Double Standard on Nuclear Weapons?, Audit of the
Conventional Wisdom (MIT Center for International Studies), April 2006, available at http://web.
mit.edu/CIS/pdf/gustersonaudit.pdf.
90. Mohamed ElBaradei, Towards a Safer World, ECONOMIST, October 18, 2003, at 51.
91. Working Paper Submitted by India, supra note 86.
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the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to accomplish
the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear
disarmament. That undertaking should be demonstrated without delay
through an accelerated process of negotiations and through the full
implementation of the 13 practical steps to advance systematically and
progressively towards a nuclear-weapon-free world as agreed to at the
2000 Review Conference.
92
The Group further stated that it
remains deeply concerned by the lack of progress towards achieving the
total elimination of nuclear weapons despite some reports of bilateral
and unilateral reductions. The Group is also concerned by the existence
and continued deployment of tens of thousands of such weapons, whose
exact number remains unconfirmed, owing to the lack of transparency
in various nuclear weapons programmes. While noting the signing of
the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian
Federation on Strategic Offensive Reduction on 24 May 2002, the
Group stresses that reductions in deployments and in operational status
cannot take the place of irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of,
nuclear weapons. The non-entry into force of START II is a setback to
the 13 practical steps in the field of nuclear disarmament adopted at the
2000 Review Conference. In that regard, the Group calls for the
application of the principles of irreversibility and increased
transparency by the nuclear-weapon States regarding nuclear
disarmament and nuclear and other related arms control and reduction
measures.
93
The Group also called for the establishment of a subsidiary body on nuclear
disarmament to focus on the issue of fulfillment of the nuclear-weapon States'
obligations under article VI of NPT, to pursue in good faith negotiations leading to
nuclear disarmament.
94
A Nuclear Weapons Convention is needed to supplement the NPT, which, as
the 2005 Review Conference evidences, has fallen short of achieving its objective
of nuclear disarmament, as nuclear-weapon states seem to be unwilling to fulfill
their commitment under article VI of the NPT. As far back as in April 1997, the
Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy, the U.S. branch of the International
Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms, prepared a draft Model Nuclear
Weapons Convention. 95  The Model Convention proposed an international
structure for inspection and control paralleling that in the Chemical Weapons
92. Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Working Paper Presented by the Members of the Group of Non-
Aligned States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 3, U.N.
NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.8 (April 27, 2007).
93. Id. 6.
94. Id. 10.
95. See IALANA, Securing our Survival: The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Conventions § 2.
(1997), available at http://icanw.org/securing-our-survival.
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Convention. In November 1997, Costa Rica presented the Draft Model Nuclear
Weapons Convention at the United Nations General Assembly. 96
In April 2007, Costa Rica submitted to the 2007 Preparatory Committee for
the 2010 NPT Review Conference an updated Model Nuclear Weapons
Convention.97  Subsequently, on December 17, 2007, Costa Rica and Malaysia
wrote to the UN Secretary-General requesting him to circulate the Model
Convention as a UN document of the 62nd Session of the General Assembly,
which he did. 98
The Model Convention prohibits the development, testing, production,
stockpiling, transfer, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons and mandates their
elimination.99 States parties to this Model Convention are obligated to destroy all
their nuclear arsenals according to a series of phases. The Model Convention also
prohibits the production of weapons usable fissile material and requires delivery
vehicles to be destroyed or converted to make sure that they are non-nuclear
capable. 100 States parties to the Model Convention would be required to declare all
nuclear weapons, all nuclear material, all nuclear facilities, all nuclear weapons
delivery vehicles they possess or control, and the locations of these vehicles.'01
The Model Convention provides for a series of five phases for the elimination
of nuclear weapons. These begin with taking nuclear weapons off alert, removing
nuclear weapons from deployment, removing all nuclear warheads from their
delivery vehicles, disabling the nuclear warheads, removing and disfiguring the
"pits" and placing the fissile material under international control. The United
States and Russia would be required to make the deepest cuts in their nuclear
arsenals, limiting their stockpiles to 1,000 warheads each.,
0 2
The Model Convention has extensive provisions regarding verification, which
include reports and declarations from states, routine and challenge inspections, on-
site sensors, satellite photography, and radionuclide sampling and other remote
sensors. It also includes information sharing with other organizations and citizen
reporting. The Model Convention provides protection to those reporting suspected
violations, which includes the right of asylum. It also establishes an International
96. Draft Nuclear Weapons Convention Circulated by Costa Rica, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/52/7
(November 17, 1997).
97. Costa Rica Working Paper, Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the
Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Model Nuclear Weapons
Convention, U.N. Doc. NPT/CONF.2010/PC.I/WP.17 (May 1, 2007).
98. Permanent Representatives of Costa Rica and Malaysia, Letter dated December 17, 2007, to
the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/62/650 (January 18, 2008) [hereinafter Costa Rica and Malaysia's
Letter to the Secretary-General].
99. Model Nuclear Weapons Convention -- Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Testing, Production, Stockpiling, Transfer, Use and Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons and on their
Elimination (updated from the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention circulated in November 1997 as
U.N. Doc. A/C.1/52/7), April 2007, attachment to Costa Rica and Malaysia's Letter to the Secretary-
General, U.N. Doc. A/62/650, Annex (hereinafter Model Convention).
100. Model Convention, supra note 99, at 8.
101. Id. at 25-27.
102. Id. at 28-31.
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Monitoring System to gather information, and such information is to be available
through a registry. Information related to commercial secrets or national security
is to be kept confidential. 0 3 National implementation measures to fulfill states'
obligations under the Model Convention include the prosecution of persons
committing crimes and protection for those reporting violations.'
0 4
The Model Convention provides for the establishment of an Agency for its
implementation. 0 5 Such Agency is to be responsible for ensuring compliance,
verification and decision making, and it is to comprise a Conference of States
Parties, an Executive Council, and a Technical Secretariat. The necessary powers
and functions and privileges and immunities, and provides for an international
monitoring system are also enumerated.
The production of any fissionable or fusionable material which can be used
directly to make a nuclear weapon is prohibited under the Model Convention. This
includes highly enriched uranium and plutonium other than that in spent fuel. For
nuclear energy purposes, low enriched uranium would be permitted. 10 6 The Model
Convention includes detailed provisions for consultation, cooperation, and fact-
finding to clarify and resolve issues of interpretation regarding compliance and
other matters. 107 States parties by mutual consent may refer a legal dispute to the
International Court of Justice. The Agency is also authorized to recommend to the
U.N. General Assembly that the Assembly request an advisory opinion from the
ICJ on a legal dispute. Eventually, under the Model Convention, there are
provisions for sanctions or recourse to the U.N. General Assembly and Security
Council for action.
As to financing, nuclear-weapon states are to meet the costs of destruction of
their nuclear arsenals. They are also to meet the costs of verification of nuclear
facilities under their authority. However, a voluntary international fund is to be
established to assist states that may have financial difficulties in meeting their
obligations. 1
08
The Model Convention provides for an optional protocol concerning energy
assistance. It does not prohibit the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, but
the optional protocol would establish a program of energy assistance for states
parties that choose not to develop nuclear energy or to phase out existing nuclear
energy programs. 10 9 It also provides for an optional protocol concerning the
compulsory settlement of disputes." 10
As a promising development, several nuclear-weapon-free zones have been
established under international agreements. As the U.N. General Assembly noted
103. Id. at 32-35.
104. Id. at 36-37.
105. Id. at 40-51.
106. Id. at 9.
107. Id. at 60-66.
108. Id. at 67.
109. Id. at 72.
110. Id.
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in a resolution it adopted in a December 2008 resolution, "the Antarctic Treaty and
the treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok, Pelindaba, and Semipalatinsk, as
well as Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status, are gradually freeing the entire
southern hemisphere and adjacent areas covered by those treaties from nuclear
weapons."111
VII. CONCLUSION
During the 1990s significant progress was made in arms control under the
leadership of the United States and Russia. Several important initiatives have been
undertaken and several important treaties have been negotiated with the objective
of building confidence and reducing nuclear armaments. The Conference on
Disarmament and the International Atomic Energy Agency has played a vital role
in accomplishing these objectives.
These initiatives and treaties notwithstanding, the menace of nuclear weapons
continues to threaten national and global security. The only meaningful response
will be a nuclear weapons convention, and the General Assembly has called once
again upon "all States immediately to fulfill [their obligation under NPT article VI]
by commencing multilateral negotiations leading to an early conclusion of a
nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, testing,
deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing
for their elimination.'
' 12
The 2007 Model Nuclear Weapons Convention proposed by Costa Rica and
Malaysia for the 2010 NPT Review Conference is an appropriate starting point.
The United States and Russia, as the major nuclear powers, must take the lead to
make nuclear weapons history.
111. Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, G.A, Res. 63/49, preambular , U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/49 (Dec. 2,
2008).
112. Id. 2.
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VICTIMS' PARTICIPATION RIGHTS WITHIN THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: A CRITICAL OVERVIEW
MIRIAM COHEN*
I. INTRODUCTION
The formation of the International Criminal Court marked an important
change in international criminal justice. The Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court (hereinafter "Rome Statute")' not only established the
International Criminal Court (hereinafter the "ICC" or the "Court") as a permanent
institution with jurisdiction "over persons for the most serious crimes of
international concern,"2 but also brought about changes to the international
criminal scene,3 namely a completely new system for victims' participation in
criminal proceedings 4 during the trial phase as well as the pre-trial phase.5 One of
the Court's main function is the establishment of the truth and in this sense
participation of victims may contribute to the accomplishment of this goal.6
The recognition of victims' participatory rights in criminal proceedings is a
novelty in international criminal law.7 Victims' right to participate in the
*LLB (Universit6 de Montr6al); LL.M. (Cantab). The research of the Court's jurisprudence is up-
to-date until September 2008. This article builds upon a research project pursued at the University of
Cambridge in 2007. I want to thank Dr. Roger O'Keefe and Jane Bestor for reading an earlier version
of this article and providing insightful comments. All errors of fact and interpretation are my own.
1. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90,
37 I.L.M. 1002 (entered into force July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
2. Id. art. 1.
3. In comparison to the ad hoc international criminal tribunals preceding the International
Criminal Court [hereinafter ICC or the Court] the differences are numerous. This study will focus on
the provisions relating to participatory rights.
4. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 68. See also Carsten Stahn et al., Participation of Victims
in Pre-Trial Proceedings of the ICC, 4 J. INT'L CRIM, JUST. 219 (2006) [hereinafter Stahn et al.;
Gerard J. Mekjian & Mathew C. Varughese, Hearing the Victim's Voice: Analysis of Victims" Advocate
Participation in the Trial Proceeding of the International Criminal Court, 17 PACE INT'L L. R. 1 (2005)
[hereinafter Mekjian & Varughese]; Timothy Kuhner, The Status of Victims in the Enforcement of
International Criminal Law, 6 OR. REV, INT'L L. 95 (2004). See generally Gilbert Bitti & Hakan
Friman, Participation of Victims in the Proceedings, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:
ELEMENTS OF CRIMES AND RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 456 (Roy S. Lee ed., 2001).
5. In this study, the author will not differentiate between the trial and the pre-trial phase
pertaining to victims' participation in proceedings, but rather study the subject in a general approach.
6. David Donat-Cattin, Article 68 Protection of Victims and Witness and their Participation in
the Proceedings, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:
OBSERVERS' NOTES ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 1275, 1300 (Otto Triffterer ed., 2d ed. 2008).
7. WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 328 (3d
ed. 2007) [hereinafter SCHABAS]. See also Emily Haslam, Victim Participation at the International
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
proceedings is one of the main innovative features of the Court, granting victims
further rights than testifying as witnesses.8  Before the ICC, other international
criminal tribunals did not provide victims with significant rights of participation
and were mainly concerned with bringing criminals to justice.9 In this sense, this
participatory scheme is a distinguishing feature between the ICC and other ad hoc
international criminal tribunals, such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (hereinafter "ICTY") and the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda (hereinafter "ICTR") which bear no provisions on victims'
participation in proceedings.' 0  As far as national criminal law systems are
concerned, victims may have participatory rights to a certain degree depending on
the jurisdiction in question.ll
The adoption of provisions recognizing participatory rights has caused much
dissension amongst jurists. The arguments in favor and against victims'
participation in proceedings are numerous. 12 Many argue that the recognition of
participatory rights represents a great victory in international criminal justice. 13
Others fear that victim participation in proceedings may conflict with the accused's
right to a fair trial 14 and "affect the expeditiousness of proceedings." 
15
Criminal Court: A Triumph of Hope Over Experience?, in THE PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT: LEGAL POLICY AND ISSUES 315 (Dominic McGoldrick et al. eds., 2004) [hereinafter Haslam].
See also Antonio Cassese, The Statute of the International Criminal Court: Some Preliminary
Reflections, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 144, 167 (1999).
8. See Haslam, supra note 7, at 315. See also Silvia A. Fernindez de Gurmendi, Elaboration of
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ELEMENTS OF
CRIMES AND RULES OF PROCEDURE 235, 255 (Roy S. Lee ed., 2001).
9. Mekjian & Varughese, supra note 4, at 15 (suggesting that in the ICTR victims were granted
some minimal participatory rights which consisted of the prosecutor asking the victims as well as
witnesses whether some individuals should be investigated for further crimes against humanity).
10. See generally Michael Bachrach, The Protection of Rights and Victims under International
Criminal Law, 34 INT'L LAW. 7 (2000) (providing a more detailed study on victims' rights under
international criminal law) [hereinafter Bachrach]. See also David Donat-Cattin, The Role of Victims in
ICC Proceedings, in COLLECTION OF ESSAYS ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT 251, 268 (Flavia Lattanzi & William A. Schabas eds., 1999).
11. See Stahn et al., supra note 4, at 220 (discussing the fact that victims' participation rights
differ depending on national law system. The authors contend that the participatory scheme within the
ICC is aligned with some civil law systems that allow in general for victims' active participation in
criminal proceedings). This article does not analyze victims' participatory rights in national systems.
See generally MARION ELEONORA INGEBORG BRIENEN & ERNESTINE HENRIETTE HOEGEN, VICTIMS OF
CRIME IN 22 EUROPEAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS (2000) (discussing participatory rights in
domestic European systems).
12. This article will examine some of these arguments.
13. See Kristen Boon, Rape and Forced Pregnancy Under the ICC Statute: Human Dignity,
Autonomy, and Consent, 32 COLUM. HUMAN RTS L. R. 625, 643 (2001). See also Claude Jorda &
Jr6me de Hemptinne, The Status and Role of the Victim, in 2 THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 1387, 1388 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2002)
[hereinafter Jorda & de Hemptinne].
14. See Mugambi Jouet, Reconciling the Conflicting Rights of Victims and Defendants at the
International Criminal Court, 26 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REv. 249, 278 (2007).
15. See Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06 OA8, Decision of the Appeals
Chamber on the Joint Application of Victims a/0001/06 to a/0003/06 and a/0105/06 concerning the
"Directions and Decision of the Appeals Chamber" of 2 February 2007, 12 (June 13, 2007)
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It has been asserted that "punishing the criminals is not enough" as there will
be no justice without ensuring justice for victims. 16 Moreover, it has been argued
that allowing victims to participate in proceedings may preclude them from "taking
justice in their own hands" and stop the cycle of violence. 17 Taking part in
proceedings only as witnesses before the ICC does not address victims' concerns;
as witnesses they are an object in the criminal process. 18 Victims have witnessed
the crimes but also live with the consequences of those crimes; therefore their
position and rights as victims go beyond that of a witness.
The adoption of provisions that allow victims to participate in proceedings
regarding hideous crimes can also represent an achievement in bringing criminals
to justice. Victims can provide the Court with knowledge that only those who
experienced these crimes can give and "their attendance in person at the trial may
help in establishing the truth." 19 As Claude Jorda and J6r6me de Hemptinne have
observed, the ICC "appears to mark a new step forward .... victims are accorded
the double status denied to them by the provisions setting up the ad hoc
Tribunals., 20 Their participation will ensure that their concerns are taken into
account when passing a final judgement on criminals. Nevertheless, victims'
participation rights are provided for throughout the proceedings and not only
during the trial stage.21 After all, crimes were committed not just against the
international community but also against people, namely the victims.
As the right to take part in proceedings has been recognized in the Rome
Statute, it remains for the different Chambers of the Court to interpret the scope of
participatory rights. The jurisprudence concerning the scope and interpretation of
participatory rights are currently under development. In order to provide for
effective participation, the Rome Statute and the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence 22 combined establish victims' participation rights. These provisions,
although providing for the same objective of giving victims a voice in proceedings,
differ in application. On the one hand, articles 15(3) and 19 of the Rome Statute2 3
for example recognize very specific rights of participation that apply only in the
context prescribed in the text of these provisions. On the other hand, victims are
granted a very broad right of participation because article 68(3) recognizes
[hereinafter The Appeals Chamber Decision on the Joint Applications of Victims].
16. Fiona McKay, The Victims Rights Working Group, The Conference for the Establishment of
an International Criminal Court, Speech on Behalf of the Victims Rights Working Group (June 16,
1998) available at
http://www.vrwg.org/Publications/01/1 998%2ORome%20Statement%2016%2OJuneI .pdf
17. Sam Garkawe, Victims and the International Criminal Court: Three Major Issues, 3 INT'L
CRIM. L. R. 345, 349-50 (2003).
18. See SCHABAS, supra note 7, at 328. In the ICTY and ICTR the roles of victims were merely
to provide testimonies as witnesses to the parties. Jorda & de Hemptinne, supra note 13, at 1391.
19. Jorda & de Hemptinne, supra note 13, at 1388.
20. Id.
21. Stahn et al., supra note 4, at 237.
22. U.N. Preparatory Comm'n for the Int'l Criminal Court [PCNICC], Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add. 1 (Nov. 2, 2000) [hereinafter RPE ICC].
23. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 15, paras. 3, 19.
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participatory rights in the "proceedings," making it possible for victims to
participate in different phases of the proceedings. 24
The extent to which victims can take part in proceedings, as well as the
conditions of participation regarding this general right of participation affirmed in
article 68(3) will have an impact in the exercise of other specific participatory
rights in the proceedings. Accordingly, what is the difference between a situation
and a case and what is the status of victims relating to each? 25 Is the investigation
phase included in the term "proceedings" of article 68(3)? Finally, what are the
criteria for eligibility as victims and more specifically what is the conception of
"personal interests", which determines the status of victim to a situation or a case.
These questions will be addressed in this article that analyses the compatibility of
participatory rights with the rights of the accused.
Victims' participation may not amount to a second prosecutor2 6 since it would
be against the rights of the accused and contrary to a fair trial (which are in turn
conditions to participation pursuant to article 68(3)).27 The Rome Statute grants
diverse participatory rights but is not clear as to how these rights may be applied in
practice and how conflicting interests might be reconciled. Much is left for
judicial interpretation and clarification. The jurisprudence of the Court in this
regard is still being developed thus it is not yet entirely clear what role victims
might play in the different stages of criminal proceedings and how far their rights
can go.28 From the few decisions of the different Chambers of the Court, it can be
argued that a common interpretation of participatory rights is being sought.
29
The goal of this paper is to give a critical overview of the participatory
scheme devised within the ICC. It analyzes the scope of victims' participation at
different stages in the proceedings and the interpretation of participatory rights
thus far. It also focuses on examining some specific provisions and the application
of article 68(3) at different stages of the proceedings. Although article 68(3) is
contained in Part 6 of the Rome Statute concerning "the trial", as this paper will
24. Id. art. 68, para. 3.
25. See, e.g., Stahn et al., supra note 4, at 221-23 (concerning the difference between victims of a
situation and victims of a case).
26. See The Appeals Chamber Decision on the Joint Applications of Victims, supra note 15, 28.
See also id. f 19 (Pikis, J., concurring) (stating that the "e]quality of arms is another element of a fair
trial, which in the context of the Statute, putting the burden of proof on the Prosecutor, means that the
defendant cannot be required to confront more than one accuser. Holding the scales even between the
parties with the burden of proof cast upon the Prosecutor rules out a second accuser.") [hereinafter
Separate Opinion of Judge Pikis].
27. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 68, para. 3.
28. See Jorda & de Hemptinne, supra note 13, at 1388-89. See also Julian Fernandez, Variation
sur la victime et la justice p~nale internationale, REVUE DE CIVILISATION CONTEMPORAINE DE
L'UNIVERSITt DE BRETAGNE OCCIDENTALE 1, 9 (2006) (Fr.) (stating that "Le r6gime de ]a CPI d6pend
encore de sa digestion future par les d6cisions de la Cour ") available at www.univ-
brest. fr/amnis/documents/Femandez2006.pdf.
29. See, e.g., Situation in Uganda, Prosecution's Application for Leave to Appeal the Decision on
Victims' Applications for Participation a/0010/06, a/0064/06 to a/0070/06, a/0081/06 to a/0104/06 and
a/01 11/06 to a/0127/06, ICC-02/04-103 (Aug. 20, 2007) [hereinafter Prosecution's Application for
Leave to Appeal the Single Judge Decision].
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examine, it has been used in relation to participation at other stages of the
proceedings. This paper will also analyze whether equilibrium can be reached in
practice between opposing interests of the Prosecution, the accused, and victims.
The analysis in this paper of the different participatory provisions follows the
structure of the Rome Statute. It will first focus on certain provisions concerning
specific participatory rights -- that allow participation only within the scope of the
specific provision and the application of the criteria in article 68(3) to these
provisions. Then, it will examine the conditions for the exercise of the broad right
of participation pursuant to article 68(3) of the Rome Statute. Finally, the paper
will conclude by contending that a balance between contrasting interests can be
reached in practice.
II. THE ROAD TO THE ADOPTION OF PARTICIPATORY RIGHTS: AN OVERVIEW OF
THE ROLE OF VICTIMS IN THE AD HOC INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS
This section will focus briefly on victims' rights within the framework of ad
hoc international criminal tribunals in order to illustrate the position of victims in
international criminal proceedings prior to the ICC. This section does not intend to
give a thorough analysis of the practice and jurisprudence of these tribunals. The
aim of this section is to point out the gap that existed prior to the establishment of
the ICC in matters relating to participatory rights in order to set the context to
examine the groundbreaking system of victims' participation created in the ICC.
Although victims are an inevitable part of an armed conflict, their rights have
not been recognized in a satisfactory way in criminal proceedings prior to the
establishment of the ICC. Neither in the World War II trials nor in the ad hoc
tribunals which followed, were victims allowed to participate. 30 The Nuremberg
and Tokyo trials represented a step forward in international criminal justice by
creating a new era for the recognition of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
genocide regarding individuals' accountability for their actions in the international
arena.31  This beginning of the fight against impunity was crucial for the
development of international criminal law as it is today. Just like any new system,
however, it needed improvements. One of the changes that needed to be made was
in relation to the rights of victims.
After the Second World War tribunals, other conflicts started that generated
new international criminal tribunals. This was the case for the ICTR and the
ICTY. In spite of the great achievements of the ICTY and ICTR in bringing war
criminals to justice and promoting peace in their respective regions, they failed to
address victims' concerns.32 As stated above,33 the ICTY Statute did not include
30. See generally Mekjian & Varughese, supra note 4, at 7-15.
3 1. Id. See generally Luc Walleyn, Victimes et tkmoins de crimes internationaux: du droit 6 une
protection au droit d la parole, 84 Revue internationale de la Croix-Rouge 51 (2002). In this article,
the author analyzes, inter alia, the rights granted to victims prior to the ICC in international
humanitarian law.
32. See generally Jorda and de Hemptinne, supra note 13. In relation to the ICTY, see generally
Marie-Bnfdicte Dembour and Emily Haslam, Victim-witnesses at War Crimes Trials: Silencing
Hearings? 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 151 (2004). For a study of victims' rights before the United Nations ad
hoc criminal tribunals, see Haslam, supra note 7, at 317-19.
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provisions that recognized participatory rights.34  The ICTR Statute also did not
provide for such rights, but, according to Gerard Mekjian and Mathew Varughese,
the ICTR did establish some minor participatory rights in very specific
circumstances.35 In these tribunals, generally the role that victims play is solely
that of a witness. This position is consistent with the view that criminal
proceedings are between the Prosecution and the defence. One possible reason for
the absence of participatory rights is that, contrary to the ICC, the ad hoc tribunals
were created by the adoption of Security Council resolutions. Only fifteen
member States of the United Nations are members of the Security Council (of
which, only five are permanent members).36 Therefore, the creation of these
tribunals and the adoption of their regulating statutes did not amount to a
representative system where all member states could negotiate the provisions, as
was the case for the ICC. This may be one of the underlying reasons that victims'
participatory rights were not a concern in the creation of these tribunals and the
adoption of their statutes.37
Acting as a witness can be one of the roles of victims, but not its main
attribution. Before serving as witnesses of crimes, they suffered the atrocities that
took place during conflicts and have to live with the consequences of crimes. As
Elizabeth Guigou has affirmed
Victims are not simply witnesses whose participation in proceedings
should be limited to gathering the information which they are able to
provide. They have a separate role to play, and this must be recognised
by the International Criminal Court, as is expressly provided for,
moreover, by the Rome Statute.
38
Even before the establishment of the ICTY there was pressure from the
international community for the creation of a permanent international criminal
institution with jurisdiction to judge international crimes such as war crimes,
genocide, and crimes against humanity.39 Negotiations amongst States were taking
33. Supra note 3.
34. See S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993). This is the Security Council
resolution that established the ICTY.
35. See Mekjian & Varughese, supra note 4, at 11-15.
36. The U.N. Security Council is composed of five permanent members: China, France, Russian
Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States and ten non-permanent members (with year of
term's end): Austria (2010), Japan (2010), Uganda (2010), Burkina Faso (2009), Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya (2009), Viet Nam (2009), Costa Rica (2009), Mexico (2010), Croatia (2009), Turkey
(2010). The General Assembly elected Austria, Japan, Mexico, Turkey, and Uganda to serve as non-
permanent members of the Security Council for two-year terms starting on January 1, 2009. The newly
elected countries will replace Belgium, Indonesia, Italy, Panama, and South Africa. Current
membership information available at http://www.un.org/sc/members.asp (last visited Feb. 7, 2009).
37. Other reasons have been suggested for explaining the lack of provisions concerning victims'
rights. See Jorda and de Hemptinne, supra note 13, at 1391.
38. tlisabeth Guigou, Address of the Ministry of Justice at the International Colloquium on
"L'Acc~s des victims a la Cour Pdnale Internationale", (Apr. 27, 1999), cited in Jorda & de
Hemptinne, supra note 13, at 1397.
39. See generally WILLIAM SCHABAS, THE UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNALS: THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, RWANDA, AND SIERRA LEONE (2006).
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place and soon after the establishment of the ICTY, the International Law
Commission (hereinafter "ILC") concluded a draft of the ICC Statute.4 °
The establishment of the ICC changed the situation of victims and their role
in international criminal proceedings in various ways. To sum up, it completely
modified the position of victims from witnesses of crimes to that of being the
subject of rights by granting them specific participatory rights at many stages of
the proceedings and a broad right of participation pursuant to article 68(3). In spite
of other important rights for victims, this paper will only focus on the participatory
rights scheme.
III. SPECIFIC PARTICIPATORY RIGHTS IN PROCEEDINGS WITHIN THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT FRAMEWORK
Before analyzing the provisions that grant victims participatory rights, it is
important to address the question of whether the recognition of victims' rights in
the Rome Statute is a good initiative in international criminal law. The recognition
of a role for victims in proceedings is an achievement that was, amongst other
factors, highly influenced by the "advocacy of non-governmental organisations, 'Al
which helped ensure that the Rome Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence
contained strong provisions on victims' rights.42 The question that remains is how
these rights will be interpreted and applied in practice. In other words, how the
rights of victims will affect the rights of the accused and the duties of the
Prosecution, trial management and to what extent victims can take part in
proceedings. In light of these considerations, this paper will analyze the main
provisions that deal with participatory rights.43
As stated above,"4 victims are granted, throughout the Rome Statute and the
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, various opportunities to participate in the ICC
proceedings. The Rome Statute recognizes on many occasions different
participatory rights of victims. 46 It is imperative to analyze them, discuss their
differences, and determine in which cases they are applicable in order to
understand the ICC victims' participatory scheme. Moreover, it is important to
note, from the beginning of this study, that these rights differ greatly from each
40. Report of the International Law Commission on its forty-sixth session, May 2-July 22, 1994,
G.A. Res. 10, 42-91, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/49/10 (1994).
41. Haslam, supra note 7, at 321.
42. Id. See also, Amnesty Int'l, The International Criminal Court: Ensuring an effective role for
victims, Al Index: IOR 40/10/1999, July 1, 1999, available at
http://asiapacific.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGIOR400101999?open&of=ENG-385. See also, Jorda
& de Hemptinne, supra note 13, at 1400. See also, Amnesty Int'l, The International Criminal Court:
Making the Right Choices Part If, Al Index: IOR 40/011/1997, July 1, 1997, available at
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/IOR40/0 11/1997.
43. This paper will focus on selected provisions contained within the Rome Statute only.
44. Stahn et a]., supra note 4, at 224-37.
45. See generally Bachrach, supra note 10.
46. In this article, the author will focus on participation rights and will not analyze other rights
granted to victims within the ICC framework. For a complete study of victims' rights in the ICC
Statute, see Sam Garkawe, The Victim-Related Provisions of the Statute of the International Criminal
Court: A Victimological Analysis 8 Int'l R. of Victimology 269 (2001).
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other,47 mainly in two ways: the stages at which victims can participate and who
can actually participate at each stage.48 In this section, this paper will examine
some participatory rights acknowledged throughout the Rome Statute that provide
for participation at different stages of the proceedings, 49 which the writer refers to
as "specific participatory rights" because their application is limited to situations
envisaged within the framework of the articles. This section will first examine
article 15(3) of the Rome Statute in the context of the decision of the Prosecution
to pursue an investigation. Second, this section will focus on article 19 of the
Rome Statute. Finally, this section will analyze articles 53 and 61 of the Rome
Statute as well as participation pursuant to articles 56 and 57 of the Rome Statute.
A. Participation Under Part 2 of the Rome Statute
The second Part of the Rome Statute concerns jurisdiction, admissibility and
applicable law. It contains important provisions on victims' participation rights in
the pre-trial phase of proceedings. In this context, this section will focus on article
15(3) and article 19 of Part 2 specifically.
1. Decision to Initiate Investigations (Article 15)
Article 15 deals with an important part of prosecutorial proceedings, the
decision to initiate investigations. It concerns the power attributed to the
Prosecutor to initiate investigations proprio motu on the basis of information
received. 0 In many cases the information that leads the Prosecutor to start an
investigation proprio motu is provided by victims.51 It may be argued that victims'
participation at this stage of proceedings is important in gathering all the relevant
information and understanding what in fact occurred during armed conflicts in
order to successfully start and pursue the investigation. For this reason, the Rome
Statute allows victims "to make representations" once the Prosecutor decides that
there are sufficient grounds to proceed with the investigation.52 The scope of their
participation is limited to "making representations to the Pre-Trial Chamber" and
is concerned only with the request to the Pre-Trial Chamber to start an
investigation. However restricted this right may be it is a very important one, since
it allows victims to participate at a very early stage of the proceedings, even before
the beginning of an investigation, the starting point of criminal proceedings. In
this sense, it is not premature at this early stage of proceedings to grant victims
rights to participate since the information provided may assist the Pre-Trial
Chamber in its decision on whether an investigation should start.
47. The author has divided participatory rights in two groups, specific rights and broad
participatory rights. In this section, the focus will be on some provisions that establish specific rights
of participation.
48. See Stahn et al., supra note 4, at 224-37.
49. This analysis of provisions concerning participatory rights is not exhaustive.
50. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 15, para. 1.
51. Morten Bergsmo & Jelena Pejic, Article 15, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS' NOTES ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 581, 590 (Otto Triffterer
ed., 2d ed. 2008).
52. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 15, para. 3.
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According to the text of article 15 of the Rome Statute, participation is only
permitted on the condition that its exercise is "in accordance with the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence" 3 Nevertheless, it is not clear from the text of article
15(3) whether their participation is also submitted to the conditions included in the
general participation scheme of article 68(3). This provision states that victims can
participate only "where their interests are affected" and the application of article
68(3) relates to "stages of the proceedings determined to be appropriate by the
Court., 54 If one considers the request for authorization of an investigation to be a
stage of the proceedings as pursuant to article 68(3), then whether personal
interests are affected becomes a condition to the exercise of victims' participatory
rights under article 15(3).
The Decision on victims' applications for participation in the Uganda
Situation (hereinafter "the Single Judge Decision") is a landmark decision of the
ICC concerning victims' participatory rights. 55 It provided a thorough study of
previous decisions of the Court and analyzed various applications for participation
pursuant to article 68(3). This decision concerned the application of victims to
participate in the pre-trial phase of proceedings in the Uganda situation.
In this decision, the Single Judge has adopted a view that victims' "personal
interests" have an impact on the application of participatory rights pursuant to
article 15(3). In other words, the Single Judge Decision applied the principle
enacted in article 68(3) as a further condition to article 15(3). In fact, the Single
Judge Decision concluded that
Article 15, paragraph 3, provides that "victims" may make
representations to the Pre-Trial Chamber when the Prosecutor concludes
that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation and,
accordingly, submits to the Pre-Trial Chamber a request for
authorisation of such an investigation in the absence of referral by a
State or the Security Council. In this scenario, the "personal interests"
of the alleged victim (or victims) may be affected since victims'
representations to the Pre-Trial Chamber can provide factual and legal
elements for the decision to authorise the investigation into the situation
within which the same victims claim to have suffered harm as a result of
the commission of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.
56
A final remark is crucial. Article 15(3) requires the making of representations
to be in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. It is Rule 5017 that
53. Article 15(3) provides that "If the Prosecutor concludes that there is a reasonable basis to
proceed with an investigation, he or she shall submit to the Pre-Trial Chamber a request for
authorization of an investigation, together with any supporting material collected. Victims may make
representations to the Pre-Trial Chamber, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence". Id.
54. Id. art. 68, para. 3. This provision will be studied in detail in Part IV of this paper.
55. Situation in Uganda, Decision on victims' applications for participation a/0010/06, a/0064/06
to a/0070/06 , a/0081/06 to a/0104/06 and a/0111/06 to a/0127/06, ICC-02/04-101 (Aug. 20, 2007)
[hereinafter the Single Judge Decision].
56. Id. 90.
57. On a more practical basis, Rule 50(3) and Rule 50(4) concern the manner in which the
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applies to article 15(3). Rule 50(1) states that whenever the Prosecutor decides to
start an investigation, he or she must inform victims of this decision or inform the
Victims and Witness Unit.58 It is important to stress the rather obvious fact that the
Prosecutor must inform only the victims of whom he is aware. The notification of
victims is an important step since it enables them to make representations as to
whether an investigation should take place and provide indications, which might
help the conduct of the investigation before it begins. 59 As it has been stated,6 ° the
Prosecution's obligation to inform victims of the intention to start investigations is
quite innovative in comparison with the duty of notification in national systems,
61
where the Prosecutor does not always have such an obligation at early stages of the
proceedings.62
2. Challenges to the Jurisdiction of the Court or Admissibility of a Case
(Article 19)
Article 19(3) in Part 2 of the Rome Statute concerns a crucial issue in ICC
proceedings, namely "challenges to the jurisdiction of the Court or the
admissibility of a case." Article 19(3) reads as follows:
The Prosecutor may seek a ruling from the Court regarding a question
of jurisdiction or admissibility. In proceedings with respect to
jurisdiction or admissibility, those who have referred the situation under
article 13, as well as victims, may also submit observations to the
Court.
63
participation occurs. As stated in article 15(3), victims may only participate by "making
representations," which is explained in rule 50(3) that these must be "in writing'" to the Pre-Trial
Chamber. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 15, para. 3. RPE ICC , supra note 22, Rule 50, 3-4.
However, in the event that the Pre-Trial Chamber decides that it is appropriate it may "hold a hearing"
to gather further information or to ask further questions.
58. RPE ICC, supra note 22, Rule 50, 1.
59. As noted by Stahn et al., supra note 4, at 226 n. 32, the notification of victims at such an early
stage was a recommendation of the Eur. Comm. of Ministers, Recommendation No. R (85)11 on the
Position of the Victim in the Framework of Criminal Law and Procedure, 387th Mtg. of the Ministers'
Deputies, Doc. No. 2269 (1985).
60. See Stahn et al., supra note 4, at 227-28.
61. For an overview of the duty of notification in national systems, see id., at 227-28, where the
author states that: "France, Greece, Italy, Scotland, Turkey, Italy and Malta, do not formally obligate
the police or other criminal justice authorities to notify victims at this early stage. In Austria, Iceland
and Portugal, a partial statutory obligation for informing victims has been created, meaning that only
certain victims are notified, or only certain information is provided. In Germany and Sweden,
legislation recognizes that the victim should be notified at this stage, but does not place an obligation on
any party to carry out the task of notification. And while England, Wales, Ireland and the Netherlands
impose a duty on police to notify victims at the stage of the initiation of investigations, the duty in each
case is a general, non-statutory duty."
62. See THE REDRESS TRUST, ENSURING THE EFFECTIVE PARTICIPATION OF VICTIMS BEFORE THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING LEGAL
REPRESENTATION FOR VICTIMS 4 (2005), available at http://www.vrwg.org/Publications/02/
REDRESS%20-%2OLegal%20Representation%20for/o20Victims%2023%20May%/o202005.pdf
(concerning the interest of victims to participate at early stages of the proceedings).
63. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 19, para. 3.
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This provision enacts a right of participation parallel to the duty of the
Prosecution with regard to the question of admissibility and jurisdiction. Since
victims have an interest that crimes of which they suffered the consequences are
admissible under the jurisdiction of the Court, it is fair that they may "submit
observations." Here, the scope of the participation is different from that
recognized in article 15(3), as the right to make observations pursuant to article 19
is not only recognized for victims but also for those who have referred the situation
under article 13. Rule 59 applies to the proceedings pursuant to article 19.
Rule 59 provides for a very specific application of the right as it only allows
"the victims who have already communicated with the Court in relation to the case,
or their legal representatives" to submit observations.64 There are two important
points in this Rule. First, it concerns a limited category of victims - those who have
previously communicated with the Court - which means that there is an additional
practical condition for participation. The sense of "having communicated with the
Court" has been explained as "victims that, whilst not having (as yet) been allowed
to participate in proceedings, have nevertheless been in contact with the Court. 6 5
As concluded in the Single Judge Decision, "having communicated with the
Court" applies to victims who have presented the relevant form and duly registered
it with the Registry.66 Second, and more importantly, Rule 59 refers to "a case" as
opposed to "a situation. 67  In general terms, participation in a case is more
restricted than participation in a situation.68
This differentiation between "a situation" and "a case" becomes particularly
interesting if analyzed in the context of Rule 93, which concerns the power of the
Pre-Trial Chamber to seek the views of "victims of a situation., 69 Using a broad
interpretation and applying Rule 93 to the context described in article 19, the Pre-
Trial Chamber might allow victims to submit their observations in relation to a
situation as well as a case. Be that as it may, this article submits that participation
should be limited to victims of a case because the participatory right provided for
in article 19 concerns very specific circumstances. Moreover, Rule 59 makes it
clear that participation is in relation to a case.
B. Participation Pursuant to Part 5 of the Rome Statute: Investigation and
Prosecution
A different regime from that established in Part 2 of the Rome Statute is
recognized for proceedings in Part 5, which concerns the "Investigation and
Prosecution., 70 These proceedings are also governed by the Rules of Procedure
64. RPE ICC, supra note 22, Rule 59, 1.
65. Single Judge Decision, supra note 55, 93.
66. Id.
67. For a difference between participation in a situation as opposed to a case, see Single Judge
Decision, supra note 55, 11-21, 96-111.
68. See Christopher K. Hall, Article 19, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS' NOTES ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 637, 640 (Otto Triffierer
ed., 2d ed. 2008).
69. Id.
70. Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts, 53-61.
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and Evidence,7' which set the path for participation referring to the "initiation of
investigation" or the decision not to prosecute72 and in relation to the confirmation
of charges, pursuant to article 6171 of the Rome Statute. Although the text of
article 53 does not specifically concern victims' right of participation,74 it is Rule
92(2) that makes the connection providing that the Court has a duty to notify to
victims of the Prosecutor's decision not to initiate investigations or not to
prosecute pursuant to article 53.75 Rule 92(2) limits the category of victims to
those who have already participated and "those who have communicated with the
Court in respect of the situation or case in question."
76
The same category of victims is granted a right to participate in the
proceedings relating to the Court's decision to hold a hearing to confirm the
charges, pursuant to article 61 of the Rome Statute.77 It is Rule 92(3) that
establishes the duty of the Court to notify victims "who have communicated with
the Court in respect of the case in question" of its decision to hold a hearing to
confirm the charges.78
Another instance where victims' participatory rights become important is
where evidence is concerned.79 More specifically, article 56 of the Rome Statute
concerns a "unique investigative opportunity" which may be initiated by a request
of the Prosecutor or by the Pre-Trial Chamber itself.80 Article 57 concerns inter
alia the preservation of evidence.81 Victims' participatory rights are important at
this stage because the preservation of evidence is a crucial point in the proceedings
and imperative for the Prosecution in the accomplishment of its duties, therefore
participation might affect the conduct of proceedings and trial-management.
Within these provisions, participatory rights are not specifically provided for in the
text of these articles. 82 Therefore, participatory rights can only be attached to
articles 56 and 57 by the application of article 68(3).
These provisions had an importance especially in regards to the Prosecution's
Application for Leave to Appeal the Decision on Victims' Applications for
Participation (hereinafter "Application for leave to appeal the Single Judge
Decision").83 The Single Judge Decision makes the connection between the
preservation of evidence as provided by articles 56 and 57 and the notion of
"personal interests," pursuant to article 68(3),84 making it clear that victims'
71. See Stahn et al., supra note 4, at 225.
72. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art, 53.
73. Id. art. 61.
74. See generally id. art. 53.
75. RPE ICC, supra note 22, Rule 92, 2.
76. Id.
77. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art, 61.
78. RPE ICC, supra note 22, Rule 92, 3.
79. Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 56-57.
80. Id. art. 56.
81. Id. art. 57.
82. See generally Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 56-57.
83. Prosecution's Application for Leave to Appeal the Single Judge Decision, supra note 29.
84. Single Judge Decision, supra note 55, f 100.
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personal interests must be affected in order for them to be granted participatory
rights in proceedings relating to the preservation of evidence. Furthermore, in
relation to article 57 of the Rome Statute, the Single Judge Decision refers to the
presentation of victims' "views and concerns" as pursuant to article 68(3) of the
Rome Statute.8 5 In its Application for leave to appeal the Single Judge Decision,
the Prosecutor challenges the Single Judge Decision in relation to victims' rights to
participate at the investigation phase of proceedings. 86  In this regard, the
Prosecutor submits
that, on the one hand, the Decision includes extensive participation at
the investigative stage, including in activities undertaken pursuant to
Articles 56 and 57 of the Statute, and further leaves open the possibility
of further (and undefined) participation. 87
The above-mentioned debate clarifies, pursuant to the Single Judge Decision,
that the conditions set out in article 68(3) of the Rome Statute are applicable to
other stages of the proceedings such as the investigation stage pursuant to articles
56 and 57 of the Rome Statute,88 even where the latter provisions do not expressly
establish a right to participate in proceedings. The Prosecution's response to the
Single Judge Decision's interpretation of participatory rights submits that the
participation of victims in the investigative phase of proceedings may compromise
the expeditiousness of the trial.89 Furthermore, the Prosecution submits that "such
activity can impact the Prosecution's investigations, and thus affects fairness in
terms of "respect for the procedural rights of the Prosecutor"."9 In spite of the
Prosecution's arguments for clarification of the scope of victims' participation in
the investigation phase,91 the Single Judge Decision has maintained the position to
allow victims to participate, pursuant to articles 56, 57 and 68(3) of the Rome
Statute.92
85. Id. 101.
86. Prosecution's Application for Leave to Appeal the Single Judge Decision, supra note 29, 7.
87. Id.
88. Donat-Cattin, supra note 6, at 1286-87.
89. In fact the object of the Prosecution's application for Leave to Appeal is to clarify the extent
of victims' rights to participate in the investigative phase pursuant to article 68(3) and in relation to
articles 56 and 57. Prosecution's Application for Leave to Appeal the Single Judge Decision, supra
note 29, 7.
90. Id. 13.
91. The prosecution submits further that in certain areas, such as in Northern Uganda for example,
the participation of victims in the investigation phase could have an impact in the outcome of the
investigation since external actors' pressure can compromise the fairness of the investigation.
Prosecution's Application for Leave to Appeal the Single Judge Decision, supra note 29, 14.
92. Decision on the Prosecution's Application for Leave to Appeal the Decision on Victims'
Applications for Participation a/00 10/06, a/0064/06 to a/0070/06, a/0081/06 to a/0104/06 and a/0 111/06
to a/0127/06, ICC-02/04-112 (Dec. 19, 2007) (hereinafter Decision on Prosecution's Application for
Leave to Appeal]. In this decision, the Single Judge denies the Prosecution's application for leave to
appeal the Single Judge Decision, supra note 26. In fact, the Prosecution's application for leave to
appeal concerned mainly the "issue of to what extent and in what manner victims may participate in an
investigation, under Article 68(3), including in relation to Articles 56 and 57(3)(c), which [he] submits
affects the fair and expeditious conduct of the proceedings." Prosecution's Application for Leave to
Appeal the Single Judge Decision, supra note 29, 7.
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The Single Judge Decision reiterated in December 2007, in the Decision on
the Prosecution's Application for Leave to Appeal the Decision on Victims'
Applications for Participation 93 that victims have a right to participate in the
investigative phase of proceedings, only by presenting their "views and concerns,"
which he classifies as not an "active" intervention.
94
It is not clear from the text of article 68(3) that it is applicable in this context
and articles 56 and 57, which concern the investigation stage, do not expressly
provide for victims' participatory rights. Considering the impact of evidence
management in the investigation stage and in the entirety of proceedings, profound
attention should be given to this phase as it regards victims' participation. In order
to maintain a balance between victim's and accused's rights, in certain stages
participation may not be appropriate.
IV. A GENERAL PARTICIPATORY RIGHT: PARTICIPATION IN THE PROCEEDINGS
PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 68(3) OF THE ROME STATUTE
Article 68(3) concerns the participation of victims in the proceedings without
any attachment to a specific stage of the proceedings. The text of the provision
reads as follows:
Where the personal interests of the victims are affected, the Court shall
permit their views and concerns to be presented and considered at
stages of the proceedings determined to be appropriate by the Court and
in a manner which is not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of
the accused and fair and impartial trial. 95
The Court has not made a general conclusion as to the scope of article 68(3),
limiting itself to the application of this article on a case-by-case basis and to certain
phases of the proceedings. 96 In other words, this provision is contained in Part 6 of
the Rome Statute, which pertains to "the trial", but the text of the provision does
not limit it to the trial phase.97 In fact, this provision states that when victims'
personal interests are affected, "the Court shall permit their views and concerns to
be presented and considered at stages of the proceedings determined to be
appropriate by the Court" (emphasis added).98
On the one hand, the text of article 68(3) does not specify that participation is
only permitted in the trial phase. On the other hand, the structure of the Rome
93. Decision on Prosecution's Application for Leave to Appeal, supra note 92.
94. Id. 31.
95. Rome Statute, supra note I, at art. 68, para. 3.
96. See Stahn et al., supra note 4, at 236 (arguing that there are two different approaches to the
interpretation of this article: "One might argue that the Pre-Trial Chamber is empowered to permit the
views and concerns of victims to be presented and considered at any stage of the proceedings, pursuant
to Article 68(3) . . . Article 68(3) might be viewed as a general mandate clause, which needs to be
implemented through other specific provisions in the Statute and Rules and does therefore not serve as
an independent basis of authority for the Court to allow for broader victims' involvement.").
97. Rome Statute, supra note 1, at part VI.
98. Id. at art. 68, para. 3.
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Statute suggests that the provisions contained in Part 6 refer solely to the trial stage
thus the location of article 68(3) in this Part could indicate that it is limited to the
trial phase. If the first interpretation is adopted, article 68(3) was misplaced and
should not have been included in that part of the Rome Statute, which concerns the
trial stage specifically. Those in favor of this approach99 rely on the fact that the
text of the provision mentions at "stages of the proceedings determined by the
Court" which is not limited only to the trial stage otherwise it would only indicate
"at the trial stage." However, in accordance with article 31(1) of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (hereinafter "VCLT'), 10 which is the
instrument for interpreting treaties such as the Rome Statute, the location of the
provision in Part 6 is an important element for the interpretation, indicating an
element of context. If article 31 (1)of the VCLT 101 is used to interpret article 68(3)
of the Rome Statute, it could be concluded that the latter only concerns the trial
stage.
This paper favors the first interpretation for two reasons. First, albeit the title
of Part 6 concerns the trial phase, the text of the article provides two literal
indications that its application is not limited to the trial phase. The first indication
is the word "stage" in the plural, implying that it refers to various stages. If it
referred solely to the "trial stage" it would have been specified that their views
were to "be presented and considered at the trial stage" (or at least the word
"stage" would be in the singular, referring only to the "trial stage"). Second, the
use of the word "proceedings" is larger than the trial alone and includes not only
the trial phase but also the pre-trial phase.
With this caveat, this paper submits that article 68(3) does not create an
unlimited right of participation at any or all stages of the proceedings. The
conditions stipulated in this provision play a major role in deciding whether
victims should participate in a specific phase but in spite of the broad scope of
article 68(3) there are stages of proceedings when it is inappropriate for victims to
participate, as for example participation pursuant to articles 56 and 57.
Furthermore, the Court's role is crucial in limiting the application of article 68(3)
only to stages of proceedings that are appropriate and not using this provision
indiscriminately to allow victims to take part at every phase of the proceedings. In
light of these considerations, a thorough analysis of the conditions of article 68(3)
is imperative. This will be the object of the next section, which first studies the
conditions that triggers the existence of a participatory right and second the scope
of the participation.
99. See Jrr6me de Hemptinne, The Creation of Investigating Chambers at the International
Criminal Court: An Option Worth Pursuing?, 5 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 408, 412 (2007) (concluding that
article 68(3) of the Rome Statute provides for a participatory right at "'all phases of the proceedings,
from the opening of the investigation until the sentencing.").
100. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, 1, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 311.
101. Id.
2009
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
A. The Conditions for the Exercise of Participatory Rights Contained in Article
68(3)
1. Definition of Victims Within the ICC Framework
The right to participate in proceedings is not automatic. 10 2 The first condition
for participation is very clearly stated in the text of the article: the participant must
qualify as a victim. 10 3 The Rome Statute does not define the term "victim", which
is given in Rule 85 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICC. Therefore,
the first consideration when examining participatory rights is the concept of victim.
According to Rule 85:
For the purposes of the Statute and the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence:
(a) "victims" means natural persons who have suffered harm as a
result of the commission of any crime within the jurisdiction of
the court;
(b) victims may include organizations or institutions that have
sustained direct harm to any of their property .... 104
The term "victims" is quite vague and it includes not only natural persons but
also organizations and institutions (which in practice translate as a greater category
of victims who can take part in the proceedings).105 The scope of the definition of
victims, it has been argued, might interfere with the fairness and expeditiousness of
the trial since "the definition is too broad and vague allowing for too many victims
to participate." 1 6 Thus a precise analysis of victims' applications for participation
is crucial.'
0 7
102. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-925, Decision of the Appeals
Chamber on the Joint Application of Victims a/0001/06 to a/0003/06 and a/0105/06 concerning the
"Directions and Decision of the Appeals Chamber" of 2 February 2007, 12 (June 13, 2007)
(concluding that a right to participate in an appeal is not automatic and a demonstration that the
personal interests are affected is always necessary). See also, Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo,
ICC-01/04-01/06-824, Judgment on the appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo against the decision of
Pre-Trial Chamber I entitled "Dcision sur la demande de mise en libert6 provisoire de Thomas
Lubanga Dyilo", 43 (Feb. 13 2007) [hereinafter Judgment on theA appeal of Lubanga Dyilo ("In the
absence of any express mention of victims within regulations 64 (4) or (5), the Appeals Chamber
therefore does not interpret the reference to a "participant" or to the filing of "[tihe response" within
those provisions to mean that victims have an automatic right to participate in an interlocutory appeal
under article 82 (1) (b) of the Statute").
103. See Single Judge Decision, supra note 55, 9 (implying that the concept of victim should
follow the definition given in Rule 85 RPE ICC).
104. RPE ICC, supra note 22, at Rule 85.
105. Compare RPE ICC, supra note 22, at Rule 85 with Int'l Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 2(a), IT/32/Rev. 37 (Apr. 6, 2006) (providing for a more restricted
definition of victim, "Victim: A person against whom a crime over which the Tribunal has jurisdiction
has allegedly been committed").
106. Requite de la D~fense sollicitant l'autorisation d'interjeter appel de la < Decision on Victims'
Participation >) rendue le 18janvier 2008, ICC-01/04-01/06-1135, 28-32 (Jan. 28, 2008).
107. See e.g. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-1136, Application for Leave
to Appeal Trial Chamber I's 18 January 2008 Decision on Victims' Participation, Introduction (Jan. 28,
2008).
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This issue has been studied in a decision of the Trial Chamber in the case of
The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo. 108 The Trial Chamber in this decision
has taken a very broad approach in granting victim status to persons having
suffered harm, allowing an applicant who "suffered any harm as a result of the
commission of a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court" to participate in
proceedings. 109  This conclusion is controversial and was the object of an
application for leave to appeal by both the Defence and Prosecution, which was
indeed granted.'1 10
The Appeals Chamber rendered a decision on July 11, 2008.111 The Appeals
Chamber reversed the Trial Chamber's decision112 on the extent to which Rule 85
has the effect of restricting participation of victims to crimes contained in the
charges confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber. In fact, for the purposes of
participating in trial proceedings, the Appeals Chamber has made it clear that the
"harm alleged by a victim and the concept of personal interests under article 68 (3)
of the Statute must be linked with the charges confirmed against the accused."
113
In the first decision concerning participatory rights, the Pre-Trial Chamber I
relying on Rule 85, established a few conditions for applicants to be granted the
status of victims in order to participate in proceedings. 14  Namely, victim
applicants have to: i) be natural persons; ii) persons who have suffered harm; iii)
the harm has to have been caused by alleged crimes covered by the ICC's
jurisdiction; and iv) show a causal link between the alleged crimes and the harm.' 15
The definition of victim is the basis of any application for participatory rights
leading one to conclude that it is a general definition and not one that only applies
pursuant to article 68(3) of the Rome Statute.
A comment on the definition of "victims" is worth noting. Judge Pikis in a
Separate Opinion concluded that the reference to the term "victim" in articles
108. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-1119, Decision on victims'
participation, 90-92, (Jan. 18, 2008), [hereinafter Decision on Victims' Participation in the Case of
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo].
109. Id. 90.
110. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-1 191, Decision on the Defence and
Prosecution Requests for Leave to Appeal the Decision on Victims' Participation of 18 January 2008,
29-34 (Feb. 26, 2008).
111. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-1432, Judgment on the appeals of The
Prosecutor and The Defence against Trial Chamber Is Decision on Victims' Participation of 18 January
2008, Judgment (July 11, 2008.) [hereinafter Judgment on the Appeals of The Prosecutor and The
Defence].
112. Decision on Victims' Participation in the Case of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, supra note 108,
97.
113. Judgment on the Appeals of The Prosecutor and The Defence, supra note 111, at Reasons 2.
114. Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, ICC-01/04-101-tEN-Corr, Decision on the
Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5 and
VPRS 6, 79 (Jan. 17, 2006) [hereinafter Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo].
115. Jr6me de Hemptinne and Francesco Rindi, ICC Pre-Trial Chamber Allows Victims to
Participate in the Investigation Phase of Proceedings, 4 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 342, 345 (2006). See also,
Jouet, supra note 14, at 260.
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43(6), 68(1), (2), (4) and (5) "leave[s] the impression that they are not confined to
those immediately affected by pending proceedings."' 16
Furthermore, only individuals can be prosecuted for international crimes
within the jurisdiction of the Court, 1 7 but victims may include those who are not
natural persons, such as organizations or institutions. 18 It is also noteworthy that
the Single Judge in the situation in Darfur has concluded that the definition of
victim cannot include deceased persons within the scope of natural persons. 119
2. The Notion of Personal Interest
Qualifying as a victim is not sufficient to participate in proceedings pursuant
to article 68(3).120 Given that the definition of victim does not seem to cause much
ambiguity, participants to proceedings not only have to be victims within the
above-mentioned definition pursuant to Rule 85, but must also have their "personal
interests affected."' 12' Therefore, the notion of "personal interests" becomes of
crucial relevance because it represents the conditio sine qua non for the application
of this article. Since the article is unclear as to what can affect their personal
interests, it can be argued that the proceedings in which they wish to take part
should affect their "personal interests" and not, in a broad approach, the entire
proceedings. 122 This view is consistent with the Appeals Chamber position that an
application is needed for participation in an appeal and that the Appeals Chamber
"cannot automatically be bound by the previous determination of the Pre-Trial
Chamber that it was appropriate for the victims to participate before the court of
first instance."1
23
The notion of personal interests has great impact in practice since, depending
on the interpretation the Court gives to this concept, the right to participate may be
denied. Furthermore, the right is highly dependent on the proceeding the victim
may wish to participate in, since in certain proceedings, for example concerning
procedural issues, it is difficult to conceive that a victim's personal interests could
be affected. 124 The notion of personal interests has been given some attention in
116. Separate Opinion of Judge Pikis, supra note 26, 13.
117. Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 1.
118. RPE ICC, supra note 22, at Rule 85.
119. Situation in Darfur, ICC-02/05-1 I 1-Corr, Corrigendum to Decision on the Applications for
Participation in the Proceedings of Applicants a/0011/06 to a/0015/06, a/0021/07, a/0023/07 to
a/0033/07 and a/0035/07 to a/0038/07, 36 (Dec. 14, 2007) [hereinafter Darfur Situation Decision].
120. Separate Opinion of Judge Pikis, supra note 26, 13.
121. Id.
122. This approach is consistent with the Appeals Chamber position that an application for
participation should be filed for each stage. See Judgment on the appeal of Lubanga Dyilo, supra note
102, 38-41.
123. Id. 43.
124. E.g., Prosecution's Response to the Joint Application of Victims, supra note 15 ("[O]rdinarily
when the issue to be addressed is a narrow and procedural one, like the one relating to whether an
appeal against a decision on confirmation may be appealed under Article 82 (1) (b), it will be difficult
to sustain a position that the victims' 'personal interests' are affected."). See also Separate Opinion of
Judge Pikis, supra note 26, 1 ( "[P]articipation of victims before the Pre-Trial Chamber does not per
se confer upon them a right to take part in an appeal mounted by a party against a first-instance decision
or any aspect of it.").
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the decisions rendered by the Court.125  Therefore, it is necessary to analyze
whether the notion has been restrictively or broadly interpreted. Since this
criterion is, as stated above, a condition to allow participation, it is important that
the decisions of the Court are consistent in the interpretation of this concept in
order to provide for certainty and clarity for future proceedings. 126
As far as the ICC's jurisprudence is concerned, it is not yet very clear whether
this notion should receive a restrictive or broad interpretation. The first decision
that dealt with article 68(3) and the notion of "personal interests" was a decision
from the Pre-Trial Chamber I in January 2006 regarding the situation in the
Democratic Republic of Congo. 127  In this decision, the notion of "personal
interests" was defined in general terms at the investigation stage. 128
In relation to the same question - how victims' "personal interests" must be
affected the Single Judge Decision concluded that this will be dependent "not
only upon the nature and scope of the proceeding, but also upon the personal
circumstances of the victim in question." 129 The Single Judge Decision studied
thoroughly the issue of victims' participation rights pursuant to article 68(3) and in
particular analyzed the notion of "personal interests." 130 In this regard, the
decision studied previous jurisprudence on victims' participation rights 31 and, as
stated by the Prosecution on its Application for Leave to Appeal the Single Judge
Decision,132 it took a different approach in regards to the notion of "personal
interests" than that of previous decisions. In fact, the Prosecution submitted that
"the Decision involves the issue of the extent to which victims may participate
under Article 68(3); specifically, regarding the scope of victims' participation, the
decision provides for a definition of the personal interests of victims diverting from
the other chambers.,
133
In light of these considerations, it can be argued that the Single Judge
Decision is not unambiguous in relation to the scope of victims' participation. It
concluded that victims should participate in proceedings under articles 56 and 57,
albeit these provisions do not expressly provide for participation. As the
Prosecution has stated, 3 4 article 68(3) should not provide for "autonomous
procedural rights" as it can be argued from the Single Judge Decision.
135
125. See Judgment on the Appeal of Lubanga Dyilo, supra note 102, 43; Single Judge Decision,
supra note 55, at 77 9-10; Separate Opinion of Judge Pikis, supra note 26, 13.
126. Prosecution'sA pplication for Leave to Appeal the Single Judge Decision, supra note 29, at
Introduction.
127. Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, supra note 114, 61.
128. Id. 63.
129. Single Judge Decision, supra note 55, 89.
130. Id. 7 8-10.
131. E.g. Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, supra note 114, 7 (analyzing mainly the
Pre-trial Chamber I decision).
132. Prosecution's Application for Leave to Appeal the Single Judge Decision, supra note 29, 6.
133. Id.
134. Id. f 7.
135. Single Judge Decision, supra note 55, 103.
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A more recent decision has also touched on the issue of "personal interests" at
the investigation stage. Judge Kuenyehia, in the situation in Darfur has noted:
It is the view of the Single Judge that in accordance with article 68(3) of
the Statute and the jurisprudence of the Court, the assessment of the
personal interests of the victims in specific proceedings taking place
during the investigation of a situation and the pre-trial stage of a case is
only to be conducted for the determination of the specific set of
procedural rights attached to the procedural status of victim.1 3
6
By the same token, the Trial Chamber in a January 2008 decision on victims'
participation in the case of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo has concluded that a "general
interest in the outcome of the case or in the issues or evidence the Chamber will be
considering at that stage is likely to be insufficient." 137 In contrast, a previous
decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber I of January 2006, the first decision concerning
participatory rights, stated that "personal interests of victims are affected in general
at the investigation stage, since the participation of victims at this stage can serve
to clarify the facts, to punish the perpetrators of crimes and to request reparations
for the harm suffered."'
3 8
As far as the Appeals Chamber is concerned, it has taken a decision of
principle and has concluded that decisions on whether victims' personal interests
are affected should be made on a case-by-case basis. 139 It has further urged that
extreme caution should be taken in order to avoid confusing victims' personal
interests with the role of the Prosecution.
1 40
In light of the above decisions and taking into account the different
interpretations of judges, it is still too soon to conclude on which test should be
used in the application of article 68(3) of the Rome Statute in relation to the notion
of "personal interests." 141
3. The Appropriateness of Participation
As far as other conditions of article 68(3) are concerned, the appropriateness
of participation is an important factor to consider. Once the Court has decided that
victims' personal interests are affected by the proceedings in which they wish to
participate, their participation is again not automatic. The Court must adjudicate
on whether it is appropriate for them to participate at that particular stage of the
proceedings. 142
136. Darfur Situation Decision, supra note 119, 13.
137. Decision on Victims' Participation in the Case of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, supra note 108,
96.
138. Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, supra note 114, 63.
139. The Appeals Chamber Decision on the Joint Applications of Victims, supra note 15, 28
(concluding that the question should be decided on a case-by-case basis, but noting some "clear
examples" of situations where the personal interests of victims are affected).
140. Id.
141. See Prosecution's Application for Leave to Appeal the Single Judge Decision, supra note 29,
9.
142. The Appeals Chamber Decision on the Joint Applications of Victims, supra note 15, at
Separate Opinion of Judge Song, 21.
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The question of appropriateness of participation, like that of the notion of
personal interests, is to be addressed by the victims in an application seeking leave
to participate. 143 The application should also be decided on a case-by-case basis.
Victims will not be granted an automatic right of participation just because their
personal interests are affected. This is clearly evidenced by Judge Song in his
Separate Opinion in the June 2007 Appeals Chamber Decision on the Joint
Applications of Victims. 144 He concluded that although the personal interests of
victims were affected, an application for leave to appeal a decision pursuant to
article 82(1)(b) of the Rome Statute is not the appropriate stage for victims to
participate in the proceedings. At this stage of the proceedings, the Appeals
Chamber is determining a preliminary issue on whether or not the appeal can be
heard. 14
5
The question of appropriateness of participation is closely related to the rights
of the accused and the right to a fair and expeditious trial. Participatory rights
should not be granted if the consequence is to cause an undue delay in the
proceedings and thus prejudice the rights of the accused. It seems that this is an
important consideration the Court will take into account when judging whether
participation is appropriate at a certain stage of the proceedings. 146 In his Separate
Opinion, Judge Song concluded that
[I]n the circumstances of the present case, it would not be appropriate
for the Victims to participate at this stage and to submit their views and
concerns in relation to the admissibility of the appeal. The proceedings
in this appeal have been delayed for several weeks due to the
withdrawal of counsel for the Appellant shortly after the appeal had
been filed . . . On balance, the participation of the Victims at this stage
of the proceedings therefore would be inappropriate. 1
47
When judging on the appropriateness of participation, the Single Judge
Decision noted that this notion is highly connected to the effect on "personal
interests":
[T]he statute makes it clear that the Court's discretion in determining
the appropriateness of a victim's participation has to be exercised
against the criterion of the existence of an impact on the personal
interests of the applicant. With regard to each of the victims involved,
this determination will then depend not only upon the nature and scope
143. Judgment on the Appeal of Lubanga Dyilo, supra note 102, 38.
144. The Appeals Chamber Decision on the Joint Applications of Victims, supra note 15 at
Separate Opinion of Judge Song, 21. Judge Song concluded that "In light of this decision of the
Appeals Chamber and in the circumstances of the present case, it would not be appropriate for the
Victims to participate at this stage and to submit their views and concerns in relation to the admissibility
of the appeal." Id. 23.
145. Id. at Decision, 26.
146. Id. at Decision, 22.
147. Id. at Separate Opinion of Judge Song, 23.
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of the proceeding, but also upon the personal circumstances of the
victim in question.
48
In light of the above, whenever the rights of the accused, which are defined in
article 67 of the Rome Statute, 149 and the right to a fair and expeditious trial, are in
jeopardy, participation will consequently be inappropriate. As noted by Judge
Pikis in his Separate Opinion,150 the appropriateness of the participation will
depend on the manner in which victims' views and concerns are expressed. To
decide on the appropriate stage of the proceedings it is important to analyze in
what way the participation is to occur. In the words of Judge Pikis, participation at
a stage of the proceedings
[M]ust be at an interval of the proceedings that would be appropriate,
regard being had to the norms of a fair and impartial trial and the rights
of the accused evaluated within the context of the Statute. An opportune
stage at which the views and concerns of participating victims may be
presented is at the outset of the proceedings, alerting the Court and the
parties to the implications of the case on the personal interests of
victims and how best they may be safeguarded.
1 5
'
It goes without saying that the "presentation of views and concerns" should be
in accordance with the rights of the accused, as the text of article 68(3) states.
152
However, in practice how should this participation be exercised? It is a concern to
the accused as well as to the Prosecution that the victims are not given a very broad
right of participation so as to become a second prosecutor. 53 Reconciling the broad
right of participation which article 68(3) creates and the right of the accused to
have only one opponent is a difficult task; therefore, it is crucial to limit the scope
of the participation to strictly the presentation of "views and concerns" of the
victims and to properly define what this mode of participation consists of.
In this sense, the Prosecutor bears some duties in regards to the accused that
the victims do not have. For instance, the Prosecution holds the burden of proof.
54
If participatory rights are unlimited, it may well happen that victims perform duties
that are solely incumbent upon the Prosecution and thus affect the notion of
"equality of arms." 155 For the equilibrium of the process not to be broken, victims
should not concur with the Prosecution in the effort to prove the accused's guilt
and get a conviction. Their role should be to provide the Court, the Prosecution,
148. Single Judge Decision, supra note 55, 7 89.
149. Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 67.
150. Separate Opinion of Judge Pikis, supra note 26, 17.
151. Id. 720.
152. See Stahn et al., supra note 4, at 236.
153. See, e.g., Prosecution's Application for Leave to Appeal the Single Judge Decision, supra note
29, 7 13, (citing Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06-901-Corr-tEN, Corrigendum to the
Response to the Application by Victims a/000 1/06,a/0002/06,a/0003/06 and a/0105/06 for
Authorization to Participate in the Appeal Proceedings Relating to the Decision on the Confirmation of
Charges, 77 25, 29-31 (May 16, 2007)).
154. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 66, para. 2.
155. See, e.g., Separate Opinion of Judge Pikis, supra note 26.
VOL. 37:3
VICTIMS' PARTICIPATION RIGHTS
and the accused with their concerns. In practice, victims should not be allowed to
interfere in any role that by its nature belongs solely to the Prosecution in
accordance with its duties pertaining to evidence and conviction. Judge Pikis in
his Separate Opinion drew a good illustration of how the equilibrium may be
reached in practice. Victims ought not to have the power to make any accusation,
nor to present their views and concerns in relation to the evidence, the conduction
of the case by the Prosecution or the defence put together by the accused.1
56
The purpose of victims' participation is to shed light on the suffering and
harm that occurred during or as a consequence of the crime being considered and
assist in the discovery of the truth. Furthermore, their views and concerns can
bring a voice to the entire community who suffered, if not as direct victims,
certainly as indirect victims of the crimes committed. If this is the manner in
which participation occurs, it does not conflict with the roles of other parties and
may indeed prove beneficial for the conduct of proceedings, since it puts the
crimes in perspective by giving an idea of the reality in times of conflict. In this
sense, victims' participation can be beneficial to the establishment of the truth
since they have "first-hand knowledge of the crimes."'157  Furthermore, their
participation as victims and not merely their testimony as witnesses can assist the
Court with clarification of the facts of the case. As noted by Claude Jorda and
Jr6me de Hemptinne, this role can be a "decisive contribution to the prevention of
future crimes.'
' 58
4. The Rights of the Accused and the Notion of a Fair and Impartial Trial
Further conditions imposed by article 68(3), are that participation be done in
accordance with the rights of the accused and with a fair and impartial trial. This
paper has already discussed these conditions when analyzing the notions of
"personal interest" and the "appropriate stage of the proceedings." It is evident
from these discussions that it is difficult to untangle them from the other conditions
stipulated in article 68(3). Nonetheless, it is still important to give some
supplementary attention to these two conditions (the rights of the accused and the
notion of fair and impartial trial) which are inseparable.
The rights of the accused are expressly defined in article 67 of the Rome
Statute. 159 However, this list is not exhaustive. Other rights can be found
throughout various provisions of the Rome Statute. For instance, article 66 enacts
the principle of presumption of innocence well-recognized in international criminal
law and in many domestic criminal systems.' 60 In practical terms, the inclusion of
156. Id. 15-16 (Judge Pikis draws an analysis of the terms "views and concerns," and in regards to
other versions of the Rome Statute he concludes that "[t]he term 'views' in the context of article 68 (3)
of the Statute signifies 'opinion', in fact an opinion, stance or position on a subject. In the Russian and
Spanish version of article 68 (3) of the Statute the word 'opinion' is used. '[C]oncems' signify matters of
interest to a person; matters that preoccupy him/her. '[P]r~occupations' is precisely the word used in the
French text of the Statute.").
157. Jorda & de Hemptinne, supra note 13, at 1397.
158. Id.
159. Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 67.
160. Id. at art. 66. The author submits that this principle could also be regarded as a component of
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the victims in the proceedings cannot in any way interfere with the defendant's
presumption of innocence as victims' participation give a different color to the
facts which are being presented to the Court. In addition to the rights provided for
in the Rome Statute, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence provide for some basic
guarantees to the accused. 161 Further to the presumption of innocence, there are
other guarantees to ensure that the accused receive a just and impartial
judgment. 162
The condition of a fair and impartial trial is a right of the defendant. This
notion is particularly linked with an expeditious trial, on which victims'
participation can cause a great impact. Participatory rights can be a real threat to
the expeditiousness of the trial since in certain cases the number of victims can be
very high and thus cause undue delays to the proceedings. 63 It is thus crucial to
define who is eligible to participate and when it is appropriate to participate. It is
always important to keep in mind that the positions of victims and that of the
accused can be opposed throughout the proceedings. 164 Therefore the views and
concerns of victims cannot affect the rights of the accused or the right to a fair and
impartial trial.
The right to a "fair and impartial trial," as stated in the Single Judge Decision,
includes the notion that the fairness of the proceedings "should be preserved to the
benefit of all participants in the proceedings," and that would include victims and
Prosecution, as well as the accused who is the core beneficiary of this right.165 It
goes without saying that the participation at a certain stage may jeopardize the
rights of the accused whereas in other stages it might not.
However broad the participatory rights granted in article 68(3) may be,1 66 the
accused is also granted many rights and guarantees. The aim is then to balance
those rights. From the decisions of the ICC interpreting participatory rights in light
of the rights of the accused, this balance is being sought.
The Court should not be carried away with the undeniable need for
participatory rights and all arguments in favor of broad participation, if that is to
the detriment of the rights of the accused. To reach the "balance of conflicting
interests", victim's rights should be limited at certain stages of the proceedings
where their participation could put at risk the accused's rights. These stages where
participation may infringe the accused's rights are, for example, stages where the
the right to a fair and impartial trial.
161. See, e.g., RPE ICC, supra note 22, at rule 141(2) (allowing the accused to have the last word
at the end of the trial). This right is particularly important since victims can have the right to express
the effect of the evidence on their personal interests at the end of the trial, as noted by Judge Pikis,
Separate Opinion of Judge Pikis, supra note 26, 21.
162. E.g. Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 63 (stating that trial should be in the presence of the
accused).
163. See Jorda & de Hemptinne, supra note 13, at 1408.
164. Jouet, supra note 14, at 250.
165. Decision on Prosecution's Application for Leave to Appeal, supra note 92, T 27.
166. Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 68, para. 3. Other more specific rights are granted to
victims in article 15(3), 19 and others. However, article 68(3) enacts a very broad right of participation
in the sense that it refers to participation in proceedings, which has a very broad definition.
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question is purely procedural1 67 or stages where their participation might interfere
with the duties that belong solely to the Prosecution with regard to the case, e.g. in
instances of evidence management. 1
68
B. The Scope of Participatory Rights Pursuant to Section 68(3) of the Rome
Statute
This section will briefly analyze the scope of participation in the proceedings.
First, it will examine participation in a case as opposed to a situation. Second, it
will analyze the mode of participation, such as the presentation of "views and
concerns" pursuant to article 68(3) of the Rome Statue and other types of
participation. The analysis in this part of the essay will be fairly short as the
question of the scope of participation has been touched upon to a certain extent
previously in this paper.
On a preliminary note, in terms of the manner in which participation may
occur, it is important to first examine the general form of participation established
in article 68(3) which applies to participation pursuant to other articles of the
Rome Statute, such as articles 56 and 57 of the Rome Statute, as has been
discussed. 169  The manner in which participation may occur has an impact in
practice depending on whether this participation occurs by presenting their views
and concerns 170 or whether it is by "submit[ting] observations to the Court, 171 or
even by "mak[ing] representations to the Pre-Trial Chamber."'1 72
The text of article 68(3) does not specifically provide an explanation of
whether it refers to victims of a situation or victims of a case. 173  Since this
provision concerns participation at stages of the "proceedings," it serves as a
general provision for participation at different phases, as stated above. This was
the interpretation adopted by the Pre-Trial Chamber I in the ICC's first decision
concerning victims' participation.1 74 This decision makes it clear that the wording
167. Prosecution's Response to the Joint Application of Victims, supra note 15, 3.
168. Prosecution's Application for Leave to Appeal the Single Judge Decision, supra note 29, 12.
169. See discusion supra Part III.
170. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 68, para. 3.
171. See id. at art. 19, para. 3.
172. See id. at art. 15, para. 3.
173. See Stahn et al., supra note 4, at 221-22. The author affirms that "the Statute and Rules fail to
specify clearly if and where participatory rights are linked to 'victims of a situation' (e.g. all natural
persons, organizations and institutions that have suffered harm as a result of the commission of crimes
within the jurisdiction of the Court in a specific territory) or confined to 'victims of a case' (e.g. natural
persons, organizations and institutions that have suffered harm as a result of the conduct of one or
several identified accused or suspects)." Furthermore, he suggests two possible interpretations for the
notion of victims: "broad approach ... in relation to the territorial and temporal scope of the 'situation'.
This position receives some support from the broad definition of victims under Rule 85 and the fact that
the protection of the interests of victims is a principle which applies, in general, at all stages of the
proceedings .... Moreover, the concept of 'victims of the situation' is expressly embedded in specific
provisions of the ICC system."
174. See Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, supra note 114, at 72-75 (recognizing
victims' participatory rights at the investigation stage, in the context of a situation, and concluding that
participation pursuant to article 68(3) could entitle victims with a right to take part in proceedings
relating to articles 56 and 57 of the Rome Statute).
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of article 68(3) of the Rome Statute was interpreted broadly enough to allow for (i)
participation in the investigation stage of proceedings 175 and (ii) allow for
participation in the investigation of a situation.176  This position has been
questioned by the Prosecution; 177 however the Pre-Trial Chamber I denied the
Prosecution's application for leave to appeal this decision. 78  Moreover, this
interpretation was reaffirmed by the Single Judge Decision. 179 A decision in the
situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo has confirmed that participation in
the investigation stage is permitted pursuant to article 68(3) and that it is possible
to be granted the status of victim to participate in proceedings before the Pre-Trial
Chambers. 1
80
As far as the mode of participation is concerned, Judge Pikis in his Separate
Opinion presents an interesting approach.181 He proceeds to an interpretation of
the terms "views and concerns." He concludes that this mode of participation is a
very strict one and does not provide victims with a right to become a party to the
proceedings. 182  Furthermore, he pursues an analysis on the significance of the
term "views" and concludes that victims' views are their opinions, their position in
relation to a subject and their "concerns" means their preoccupations, something
that bothers them.1
83
Finally, it is worth noting that once all the conditions of article 68(3) are met,
the Court has to permit victims' views and concerns to be presented, since the text
of the article uses the word "shall" and not "may" as it was a matter of discussion
and negotiation.1
84
175. Id. 72. For an analysis of participation at the investigation stage, see David Lounici &
Damien Scalia, Premidre D~cision de la Cour P~nale Internationale Relative aux Victimes: Etat des
Lieux et Interrogations, 76 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PtNALE 375 (2005).
176. See Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, supra note 114, at 65-66.
177. Situation in Uganda, ICC-02/04-85, Prosecution's Reply under Rule 89(1) to the Applications
for Participation of Applicants a/0010/06, a10064/06 to a/0070/06, a/0081/06 to a/0104/06 and
a/01 11/06 to a/0127/06 in the Uganda Situation, 20-21 (Feb. 28, 2007). The Prosecution is of the
view that the text of article 68(3) is not broad enough to include participation in the investigation of a
situation.
178. Situation in the Democratic Republic of The Congo, ICC-01/04-135, Decision on the
Prosecution's Application for Leave to Appeal the Chamber's Decision of 17 January 2006 on the
Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of VPRS 1, VPRS 2, VPRS 3, VPRS 4, VPRS 5 and
VPRS 6 (March 31, 2006).
179. Single Judge Decision, supra note 55, at 88-90.
180. Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ICC-01/04-423, Corrigendum to the
Decision on the Applications for Participation Filed in Connection with the Investigation in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo by a/0004/06 to a/0009/06, a/00 16/06 to a/0063/06, a/0071/06 to
a/0080/06 and a/0105/06 to a/0110/06, a/0188/06, a/0128/06 to a/0162/06, a/0199/06, a/0203/06,
a/0209/06, a/0214/06, a/0220/06 to a/0222/06, a/0224/06, a/0227/06 to a/0230/06, a/0234/06 to
a/0236/06, a/0240/06, a/0225/06, a/0226/06, a/0231/06 to a/0233/06, a/0237/06 to a/0239/06 and
a/0241/06 to a/0250/06, Introduction (Jan. 31, 2008).
181. Separate Opinion of Judge Pikis, supra note 26, 14-17.
182. Id. 15.
183. Id.
184. See United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, Committee of the Whole, Working Group on Procedural Matters, Rome,
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V. CONCLUSION
Hideous crimes are a major concern for the entire international community.
The need to prevent these crimes from happening as well as to punish the criminals
is the endeavor of international criminal justice. However, a justice system cannot
be complete without taking into account the existence of victims of crimes and
what they have to say about the violence they have experienced during conflict
situations.
Hearing the victims' voice' 85 is the beginning of a process of reconstructing
societies destroyed by international crimes and providing for their reintegration.
With the establishment of the ICC as a permanent court to try the gravest crimes,
victims' rights are now rooted in its legal documents. This represents a historic
event. This paper has addressed whether participatory rights pits victims' against
the accused by compromising the latter's rights. This paper has argued that
victims' participatory rights do not necessarily have to conflict with the rights of
the accused and a fair and expeditious trial.
The ICC system can become a system of justice186 that moves away from
times when suffering was regarded as a tool for punishing criminals to a system
where pain brings the right to participation and restoration. The threat of turning
victims into a second prosecutor against the accused does not have to become real.
This article has argued that the equilibrium can be reached in practice if victims are
not granted participation rights at stages when their participation is not appropriate
(e.g. at the investigation phase) and are granted limited rights at early stages of the
proceedings (thus avoiding undue delays in the proceedings).
Much depends on the current development of the jurisprudence of the ICC in
the interpretation and application of these provisions. The manner in which judges
of the Court will interpret and apply these provisions is under current development.
Competing rights need not necessarily be opposed and it is for the Court to provide
for harmony amongst opposing interests. It remains to be seen whether the
provisions concerning participatory rights will amount to a "charter of victims'
rights", that also takes into consideration opposing rights and interests.
Italy, June 15-July 17, 1998, Proposal Submitted by Canada, 3, A/CONF.183/C.I/WGPM!L.58 (July
6, 1998) (showing that both terms were suggested for article 68(3) of the Rome Statute).
185. As suggested by the authors Mekjian & Varughese in the title of their article, "Hearing the
Victim's Voice: Analysis of Victims' Advocate Participation in the Trial Proceeding of the International
Criminal Court", supra note 4.
186. But see Donat-Cattin, supra note 10 (stating that the right to participate in proceedings is a
true "justice for victims"). The author disagrees with the idea of "justice for victims," since justice is a
notion that can only be achieved by the considerations of all parties involved, the community as a
whole.
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HAWALA, MONEY LAUNDERING, AND TERRORISM FINANCE:
MICRO-LENDING AS AN END TO ILLICIT REMITTANCE
CHARLES B. BOWERS*
I. INTRODUCTION
"Hawala", in Arabic, means "to transfer;"' it is also known as "Hundi,"
meaning "to collect" - from Sanskrit root.2 Though the term might be a new
addition to the western lexicon, it is used quite readily the world-over in some
form. A traveler's check, for example, is known as "hawala safir" from parts of
Africa to Asia and throughout the Middle East.3 This paper, as interlocutor, seeks
to introduce (to re-introduce to some) not only the term hawala, but the unique
security challenges this concept - that of an informal, and less than transparent,
value transfer system - presents. Beyond examining the role of hawala in money
laundering and terrorism finance, the objective of this work is to weigh the
effectiveness of current efforts in addressing these issues, both at the street-level
and in the legislative realm, post September 11, 2001 (9/11). Lastly, the author
offers recommendations based on US, UAE, Turkey, and Netherlands-based
research coupled with numerous interviews with various subject-matter experts
ranging from international bankers to legislators to diplomats to federal agents.
II. THE HAWALA TRANSACTION
Hawala, in its most basic delineation, is "money transfer without money
movement," 4 without movement in formal financial institutions that is. Upon
customer request, a US-based hawaladar - a hawala operator will call, fax, or
email their hawaladar associate in Pakistan, for example, with the specifics of the
transaction (i.e. amount and password only - no names are used). This Pakistan-
based hawaladar will then pay the requested amount out of his/her own funds, and
in local currency, upon receiving the agreed upon password from the recipient.
The only paper trail might be a notation, often encoded or in a little-known dialect
. An attorney living in Washington, D.C. Special thanks to FinCEN, the Grameen Foundation,
professor Marilyn Cane, and Mr. John Cassara.
1. Samuel Munzele Maimbo, The Money Exchange Dealers of Kabul: A Study of the Hawala
Systems in Afghanistan v n. 1 (World Bank Publication, Working Paper No. 13, 2003).
2. Saeed Al-Hamiz, Hawala: U.A.E. Perspective, in REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS FOR HAWALA
AND OTHER REMITTANCE SYSTEMS 30, 31 (Int'l Monetary Fund, 2005).
3. Id.
4. JOHN A. CASSARA, HIDE & SEEK: INTELLIGENCE, LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND THE STALLED
WAR ON TERRORIST FINANCE 145 (Potomac Books 2006).
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(e.g. Gujarati5 or Memoni6), of the debt obligation in internal books. The funds are
distributed, often delivered right to the door of the intended recipient, all within a
course of minutes,7 without receipts or paperwork, and all outside of formal
financial institutions.
Theoretically, payments between hawaladars operate both ways. In our
example the Pakistani hawaladar could just as easily request that his US colleague
pay out X to a US recipient. As is typically the case, however, flows tend to be
asymmetrical (i.e., money leaves more developed nations bound for least
developed nations in the form of remittances). It is clear, however, that this trade
is not simply bilateral. Our US and Pakistani hawaladars would be dealing
concurrently with operators in Dhaka, Muscat, Istanbul, London, etc.
Hundreds or thousands of these transactions are bundled together over the
course of weeks or months with consolidation taking place at various levels. Mid-
level hawaladars act as clearing houses for small scale operators, larger hawaladars
act as clearing houses for those in the middle, and so on. In Dubai, at the mega-
level, tranches of value worth £100,000 are the minimum units of trade in each
hawala swap. 8 Despite this layering, eventually balance sheet positions, even at
the lowest levels, have to be settled.
Some settlement occurs within traditional banking channels, but much of this
balancing of the accounts takes place through alternative channels like cash
couriers. 9 Despite Reports of International Transactions of Currency or Monetary
Instruments (CMIR) reporting requirements,'l money is effectively smuggled
across our borders in this fashion every day. In fact, in the US State Department's
1998 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, bulk cash smuggling was
deemed one of the most utilized money laundering techniques in the United States
and around the world. In the same report, a decade later, the same holds true: "The
smuggling of bulk currency out of the United States is the largest and most
significant ... money laundering threat facing law enforcement. Deterring direct
access to US financial institutions by criminals does not prevent money laundering
if illicit proceeds can still reach US accounts through indirect means."'1
The principal drawback of using couriers is one of logistics. One million
dollars in "street cash" (i.e. bills in $5, $10, and $20 denominations) weighs
5. Patrick M. Jost & Harjit Singh Sandhu, The Hawala Alternative Remittance System and its
Role in Money Laundering 20 n. 13 (A FinCEN/Interpol Paper, 2000).
6. Memoni, often classified as a dialect of Sindhi, is spoken by roughly 500,000 people - most of
whom live in Karachi. NationMaster Encyclopedia, Languages of Pakistan,
http://www.nationmaster.com/encyclopedia/Languages-of-Pakistan (last visited Feb. 16, 2009).
7. Some hawaladars guarantee receipt of payment within 10 minutes. Interview with hawaladars,
in Sharjah, Dubai, & Abu Dhabi (June 22-30, 2008).
8. Roger Ballard, Hawala: Criminal Haven or Vital Financial Network? Newsletter of the Int'l
Inst. of Asian Studies (Int'l Inst. of Asian Studies, Univ. of Leiden), Oct. 2005, at 5.
9. CASSARA, supra note 4, at 146.
10. 31 U.S.C. § 5316 (2007); 31 C.F.R. § 103.23 (2009); 31 C.F.R. § 103.27 (2009).
11. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU FOR INT'L NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS,
INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT: VOLUME II MONEY LAUNDERING AND
FINANCIAL CRIMES 5 (2008) [hereinafter DEP'T OF STATE].
VOL. 37:3
HAWALA, MONEY LAUNDERING, AND TERRORISM FINANCE
approximately 256 pounds. 12 Therefore, in larger transactions, some hawaladars
(or their associates) utilize import/export businesses. Through these companies,
"countervaluation" the settling of accounts through trade rather than transfer
occurs. 3 Countervaluation is done either by the underinvoicing or overinvoicing
of product flows between these import/export businesses.14 For example, if a
hawaladar owed $25,000 to a colleague in Bishkek, he might overinvoice a
shipment of carpets. The carpets, having a true value of $25,000 would be
invoiced at $50,000; $25,000 would cover the legitimate cost of goods and the
remaining $25,000 would settle his/her debt. As John Cassara, former CIA officer
and US Customs agent, notes, "The cover of the business transaction and the
documentation involved wash the money clean .... [A] customs inspector is hard-
pressed to spot moderate discrepancies in invoice pricing and product
description."'' 5 Whether carpets or gold, it's simply unrealistic to expect customs
agents to wade through mountains of pile verifying knots per square inch or the
purported purity of gold; is it solid gold or simply gold-plated; is it 18-carat or 22-
carat?
The products involved in countervaluation present tracking challenges in and
of themselves. Though the principle focus of this paper is on the hawala
transaction, the use of goods in the countervaluation process makes the mention of
trade-based money laundering a necessity. And, gold, in particular, presents one of
the most challenging set of security concerns. In fact, some, like Mr. Cassara,
argue that for the role gold plays in ethnic-based alternative remittance systems, it
should be classified as an alternative remittance system itself (more on this later).' 6
III. VALUABLE REMITTANCE TOOL OR NATIONAL SECURITY THREAT?
Remittances - the money that migrant workers send back to their countries of
origin 17 - play a large and ever growing role in the global economy. As far back as
the 1990's, "[D]eposits from emigrants ... represented almost 20 percent of total
deposits in the Portuguese banking system."' 8 Skip ahead a few years, and in 2002
remittances from the US to Latin America averaged $200-300 per month per
person while monthly sums to Pakistan and India were nearly three times that
amount per person.' 9 As a result, by 2003, developing countries were receiving
$96 billion in remittance inflows. 20 This sum accounted for more than 5 percent of
12. CASSARA, supra note 4, at 131.
13. Id. at 146.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 150.
17. Manuel Orozco, Worker Remittances in an International Scope 1 (Multilateral Inv. Fund of
the Inter-Am. Dev. Bank, Working Paper, 2003), available at http://www.microlinks.org/ev-en.php?
ID=7777_201 &ID2=DOTOPIC.
18. Id. at 8.
19. Id. at 9.
20. Jose de Luna Martinez, Workers' Remittances to Developing Countries: A Survey with Central
Banks on Selected Public Policy Issues 4 (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 3638,
2005), available at http://go.worldbank.org/F43572F 110.
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the 2003 GDPs for 25 developing countries, 21 and nearly 7.5 percent of the GDP
and 160 percent of the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) of Vietnam. By 2005,
global remittances passing through formal channels exceeded a staggering $233
billion.23
I pause to stress two points here, the first being that the above-mentioned
figures are indeed estimates. There are many reasons, but two in particular, that
suggest why these numbers should be viewed with a modicum of skepticism.
Firstly, there is a lack of uniformity in remittance classification. In many
countries, companies which would otherwise be classified as money transmitters
are considered commercial entities rather than financial institutions, and are,
therefore, exempt from many of the regulatory, oversight, and reporting
requirements. 24 In addition, remittances which are paid through post offices are
seldom reported to financial authorities (as is the case in the US). 25 As such, those
transactions also escape inclusion in remittance data. Secondly, the levels of
reporting, and thus the adequacy of the data collected, vary from country to
country. For example, even where money transfer companies are required to
register as financial institutions, they often fail to report both the number and value
of remittance transactions.26
Another point that needs to be emphasized is that these figures represent only
those flows passing through formal channels. While "most countries do not
measure remittances that occur through informal channels,",27 international bodies
do, and their figures are in the tens of billions of dollars. 28 Some commentators,
like professor Roger Ballard, place international levels higher still: "[u]nrecorded
flows moving through informal channels . . . are conservatively estimated to
amount to at least 50 percent of recorded flows. ' 29 If that statement is accurate,
informal flows would amount to roughly $115 billion annually. In Pakistan alone,
"[o]fficials .. .estimate that more than $7 billion flow into the nation through
hawala channels each year. 30  To put these numbers into perspective, the sum of
formal and informal remittance flows is somewhere around $350 billion per year,3'
while 2007 CIA Factbook figures list China's budget revenues at just $450
billion.32
21. Id.
22. Raul Hernandez-Coss, The Canada-Vietnam Remittance Corridor: Lessons on Shifting from
Informal to Formal Transfer Systems 4 (World Bank, Working Paper No. 48, 2005), available at
http://go.worldbank.org/TUUN6HHHE0.
23. Ballard, supra note 8, at 3.
24. Martinez, supra note 20, at 8.
25. Id. at 9.
26. Id. at 8-9.
27. Id. at 12.
28. U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, CONTRIBUTIONS BY THE DEP'T OF THE TREASURY TO THE FINANCIAL
WAR ON TERRORISM, Fact Sheet 15 (2002).
29. Ballard, supra note 8, at 3.
30. U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, supra note 28, at 15.
31. Ballard, supra note 8, at 3.
32. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY [CIA], THE WORLD FACTBOOK (2007), available at
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/.
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Cautionary notes aside, no matter how broad the discrepancies between the
actual figures and the estimates above, and between reporting methodologies and
the actual data, two things are clear. First, give or take hundreds of thousands of
dollars, or tens of billions of dollars for that matter, and the numbers involved are
still enormous. Second, there is a clear bifurcation of preference among remitters.
Some choose to utilize the formal sector while others, often at risk of criminal
prosecution, opt for the informal.
Why is that the case? Why would one prefer to send money through a
hawaladar? There are four basic incentives that seem to fuel this choice: (1) the
absence of formal sector alternatives, (2) cultural familiarity, (3) affordability, and
(4) anonymity.
"[H]awala continues to be the best option for most immigrants and the only
one for those coming from regions devastated by civil conflict and disasters., 33 In
Afghanistan, in the absence of traditional financial institutions, hawaladars
provided the only viable commercial banking services while the Taliban held
power.34 Even after the ousting of the Taliban, what banks there were, "were
plagued by significant weaknesses, among them, weak corporate governance ....
unskilled human resources, outdated technolog[y] . . . , and grave problems of
liquidity and solvency,, 35 not to mention corruption and outright theft.
Traditional banks and wire services were, and still are, simply reluctant to risk
the capital and personnel required to set up shop in regions like Afghanistan and
the tribal areas of Pakistan. Yes, traditional financial institutions do exist in the
urban centers, but keep in mind that hawala is attractive not only to the un-
serviced, but to the under-serviced as well. Just because bank X might have a
branch in Karachi, does not mean that it is either expedient or safe to travel for
hours through rough neighborhoods, cash in hand, to do business. Hawaladars, as
a "safe" alternative, offer to deliver payments to the doors of recipients, even to
those in rural areas - areas that are disproportionately victimized by the violence of
radicals, tribal chieftans, and warlords.
Our second incentive, that of cultural familiarity, or what professor Nikos
Passas, of Northeastern University, terms "cultural inertia," also plays a significant
role.36  Saeed al-Hamiz, Executive Director of the Banking Supervision and
Examination Department of the Central Bank of the UAE, tries to explain the
cultural/historical significance of hawala as follows:
33. Nikos Passas, Formalizing the Informal: Problems in the National and International
Regulation of Hawala, in REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS FOR HAWALA AND OTHER REMITTANCE
SYSTEMS 7, 9 (International Monetary Fund, 2005).
34. Maimbo, supra note 1, at 1.
35. Samuel Maimbo, Challenges of Regulating and Supervising the Hawaladars of Kabul, in
REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS FOR HAWALA AND OTHER REMITTANCE SYSTEMS 47, 51 (IMF, 2005).
36. Passas, supra note 33, at 10.
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Hawala . . predates bank transfers by hundreds of years. During the
twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the development of trade between
regions called for the establishment of reliable and trustworthy
instruments to finance those transactions Hawala . operated
within tight-knit extended families that were based in two or more
major trading centers.37
At the operator level, not much has changed since the twelfth century. For
example, within many hawala networks, and other informal remittance systems,
the core of trust among operators still consists of familial ties. Further, they
continue to be ethnically exclusive in the services they provide (e.g. you must be
Vietnamese to access the Vietnamese system).38 This exclusion by force of habit
and community tradition acts as a formidable obstacle to commercial competition
from the outside. In that sense our second incentive simply reinforces incentive
one. And, again, this is particularly true in rural areas where rarer dialects, lesser
known traditions, and a general distrust of outsiders act as further barriers to entry.
Despite this fairly high level of service, hawaladars manage to keep their
costs, and thus their prices (i.e. a fee in the form of a percentage of the amount
remitted, often only 1-2 percent), 39 low - our third incentive. Remittance fees (e.g.
8.3-13 percent from NY to Bangladesh, Pakistan, or Sri Lanka) can be extremely
expensive, comparatively, when utilizing formal sector avenues. Unlike stand-
alone banks and wire services that have to pass their high overhead costs on to
their customers, hawaladars, which are often integrated with other businesses,
share the costs of infrastructure. 40  Further, these businesses provide cover for
illicit money transmitters whom subsequently save additional monies by avoiding
registration and reporting requirements. In addition, many of these entities are
family owned and operated.41 As such, insurance, retirement plans, and minimum
wage are often ignored. As an added bonus, as these businesses (e.g. ethnic
grocers, foreign exchange houses, rug dealers, travel agencies, etc.) tend to cater to
ethnic populations, they provide hawaladars with steady streams of potential
clientele.
Lastly, the real savings that is passed on to customers is created via currency
speculation. "Hawala-type transactions . . . provide special advantages in
situations where the remitting country has a convertible currency and no capital
controls,42 and the receiving country has inconvertible currency and/or a black
37. AI-Hamiz, supra note 2, at 30-31.
38. Hernandez-Coss, supra note 22, at 29.
39. Jost, supra 5, at 6.
40. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY & U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 2002 NATIONAL MONEY
LAUNDERING STRATEGY 22 (2002), available at http://www.treasury.gov/offices/enforcement/
publications/ml2002.pdf.
41. Al-Hamiz, supra note 2, at 31.
42. Capital Controls are government mandated conversion of foreign currency into local currency,
often at unfavorable rates -- think Cuba or the former Soviet Union. CTR. FOR POPULAR ECONOMICS,
CONTROLLING CAPITAL 2 (2006).
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market exchange rate. 4 3 Given the low overhead costs of hawala operations, as
discussed above, hawaldars can profit from the slimmest of margins alone. A US
hawaladar was quoted as saying that his business could still make money on just a
2 percent exchange rate margin.44
Ultimately, further "discounts" may be passed on to unwitting remitters by
hawaladars that are willing to circulate counterfeit notes. Given that hawaladars
live and die on the basis of trust, this is, admittedly, a rare thing. But, it does
happen. In 2003, for example, "substantial volumes of freshly printed, shrink-
wrapped Afghani notes," of Russian origin and of questionable authenticity, were
discovered in Afghanistan and were only made "available to dealers selling
dollars. ' 45
Anonymity, our fourth and last incentive, should come as no surprise given
that hawala is illegal in many countries,4 6 and given that hawala owes much of its
affordability to illegal currency speculation and other questionable business
practices. This point is best illustrated by the fact that even in the United Arab
Emirates (the "UAE"), where hawala is legal to the extreme, hawaladars refused to
come forward in order to attend the Abu Dhabi "International Conference on
Hawala. 4 7 As a further, and more comical, illustration, in 2002, US Treasury
Secretary Paul O'Neil's advance security team visited a Dubai hawala in
preparation for his visit the following day.48 When Secretary O'Neil arrived for
his meeting he found that not only were the hawaladars missing, but that the entire
storefront had been removed the night before.49
Again, with all that we know about hawala these accounts might not be
surprising. What might be surprising, however, is that this desire for secrecy
extends to the remitters themselves, and not just to the obvious, viz money
launderers, tax evaders, and terrorist organizations. Throughout their working
lives, migrant workers the world-over tend to fluctuate in their legal status. Some
may enter one country illegally and then subsequently "earn" the right to stay,
while others might initially enter through legal channels but overstay their visas.
While this legal fragility might do little to temper the flow of immigrants, or the
flow of money home for that matter, what it does is create a fear of all government
and quasi-government institutions post offices, banks, etc. As a result, and
coupled with the incentives above, what emerges is a natural inclination to opt for
the informal versions of necessary services. In the context of money transmitters,
this would be hawaladars.
43. John F. Wilson, Hawala and Other Informal Payment Systems: An Economic Perspective 4
(IMF Working Paper, 2002).
44. Jost, supra note 5, at 7.
45. Maimbo, supra note 35, at 17.
46. Passas, supra note 33, at 13.
47. Id.
48. JOHN B. TAYLOR, GLOBAL FINANCIAL WARRIORS: THE UNTOLD STORY OF INTERNATIONAL
FINANCE IN THE POST-9/11 WORLD 24 (2007).
49. Id.
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Lastly, as an addendum to our fourth incentive, I include something that I call
"anonymity by default." In Pakistan and Yemen illiteracy stands at 50 percent,
while in Somalia and Afghanistan the figures are 60 percent and 70 percent
respectively. 50 Given both the high emigration totals for countries with lower
levels of education and the high rates of immigration for countries employing
manual laborers, one can deduce that many remittance senders are, at best, poorly
educated. Many can neither read nor write their own names, much less fill out
and/or decipher account statements, deposit slips, and transfer orders.
Consequently, for this segment of the population, the need for identification means
little more than an invitation for ridicule. As such, the ease by which one can send
money through a hawaladar by simply verbalizing a password is attractive in that it
masks a lack of education; anonymity is simply an added bonus.
Despite how attractive these incentives are, and ironically due to how
attractive these incentives are, hawala does have a darker potentiality. Though
popular media has only recently discovered hawala and its dark side, the potential
for abuse has appeared on the radars of both the law enforcement and intelligence
communities for years before September the 1 Ith, 2001. Though before 9/11, as
Senior Economist of the International Monetary Fund's Middle Eastern
Department John Wilson states, "This [analysis] was generally in the context of
money laundering and underground banking activities. For instance, hawala has
been commonly mentioned in the periodic typologies of money laundering systems
prepared by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), by FATF-affiliates such as
the Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering.'
Only after the attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon did knee-jerk
speculation by various federal agencies bring the presumed relationship between
hawala and terrorism finance to the forefront.52 This, despite the fact that
hawaladars played only a minor role in the 9/11 attacks; 53 "most of the identified
funding was transferred via cash, wire-transfers, and travelers' checks, 54 - the bulk
of funds passing through SunTrust Bank accounts in Venice, Florida.55 Further,
neither method nor amount triggered Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) Suspicious Activity
Reports (SARs), Currency Transaction Reports (CTRs), or Reports of International
Transactions of Currency or Monetary Instruments (CMIRs).56
All that said, hawala has, on multiple occasions, been used to finance terrorist
activities. A senior Indian law enforcement official even went so far as to say that
all terrorist attacks in India are financed through hawala.57 While certainly an
overstatement, Interpol has reported verifiable accounts of terrorist funds passing
50. See CIA, supra note 32.
51. Wilson, supra note 44, at 1.
52. Mark Butler & Rachelle Boyle, Alternative Remittance Regulation Implementation Package 5
(Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering Paper, 2003).
53. Passas, supra note 33, at 14.
54. CASSARA, supra note 4, at 176.
55. Ballard, supra note 8, at 2.
56. See CASSARA, supra note 4, at 190.
57. Id. at 178.
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through hawaladars in India and elsewhere. The military hardware used to
assassinate an important Indian politician was purchased with hawala funding.58
The requisite explosives used in the bombing of a major Indian city in 1993 were
purchased with funds flowing through hawala operators in the U.K., Dubai, and
India.59  And, al-Qaeda operatives, via the Saudi-based charity al-Haramain 60
(more on this later), responsible for the attacks on the US embassies in Nairobi and
Dar es Salaam were funded, in part, through local hawaladars, 61 just to name a few.
While of course it is true that most of the estimated $115 billion in informal
remittances is spent in harmless ways, this should bring little comfort given that
terrorist operations cost so little in relative terms. The 9/11 attacks, for example,
are estimated to have cost $300,000$500,000.62 This is quite a small sum when
one considers the more than $1,000,000,000 in damage caused.63  That fact is
particularly troubling when one recognizes that the 9/11 attacks were an anomaly
in terms of operational costs, most terrorist events cost far less than $100,000.64
[A]ccording to the UN it is believed that the 1998 simultaneous truck
bombings of US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania cost less than
$50,000; the October 2000 attack on the USS Cole in Aden is estimated
to have cost less than $10,000; the Bali bombings in October 2002 cost
less than $50,000; the 2003 bombing of the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta
cost about $30,000; the attacks in Istanbul in November 2003 cost less
than $40,000; the March 2004 Madrid train attacks cost about
$10,000;65
[and the London bombings in July 2005 cost 8,000 British pounds].66
In sum, though the concept of hawala is fairly straightforward, what should
have been made clear by this discussion is that the role that it plays on the
international stage is anything but straightforward. Is it a valuable remittance tool
or is it a national security threat? The answer, as frustrating as it may be, is that it
is both. And, it is precisely this duality - simultaneously an affordable remittance
option to the unbanked and nefarious funding vehicle to terrorists and money
launderers - that makes regulation both so tricky and so unattractive to politicians.
There is, understandably, a reluctance in poorer countries to close the tap through
which vital monies flow. But, there is an equally compelling, or perhaps more
compelling, security interest in favor of regulating these informal channels (we
58. Jost, supra note 5, at 14.
59. Id.
60. Taylor, supra note 49, at 22.
61. Ballard, supra note 8, at 2.
62. CASSARA, supra note 4, at 176.
63. The Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, How much did the September 11 terrorist
attack cost America? http://www.iags.org/costof911 .html (last visited Feb. 10, 2009).
64. CASSARA, supra note 4, at 190.
65. Id.
66. United Kingdom Home Office 2006 Press Release 7 (FATF/GAFI Working Paper on Terrorist
Financing, 2008).
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examine some of these regulatory efforts in the following sections). This is
especially true when (1) there is a proven track record of abuse, and (2) there may
be viable alternatives to hawala in the formal sector that we have yet to utilize.
IV. THE EFFICACY OF REGULATION EFFORTS
A. International Regulation
Prior to the September the 11 th attacks the international community was well
aware of the potential abuse of alternative remittance avenues in the context of
money laundering. This is hardly a surprise given the sheer scale of laundered
funds globally; according to International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates,
laundered funds account for as much as 5 percent of the global GDP, or $3.6
trillion a year.67 In fact, "every FATF typologies report since 1996 has noted the
use of alternative remittance systems by criminal groups to launder money. 6 8
Note: despite the ambiguity in this FATF reference to the laundering of funds by
"criminal groups," the bulk of these laundered funds, and consequently the bulk of
attention paid by the international community, was/is attributed to the illicit sale of
narcotics.69
Terrorism finance on the other hand, when juxtaposed with this mountain of
narco-money, seems rather inconsequential. The UN dollar estimates for terrorist
events, cited above, represent the direct operational costs of the attacks themselves.
But, even when one also includes recruiting costs, sustenance costs, training costs,
propaganda costs, etc., as one must to reach a more accurate number, the figures
still pale in comparison. This statement of course assumes that within this vast
pool of black money one can readily distinguish terrorist funds from those of the
cartels, illegal arms brokers, car thieves, etc. This author doesn't think it is that
easy given that obfuscation is built into the system at every level.
In fact, to illustrate just how tough this categorization actually is, I again cite
to the US Department of State's International Narcotics Control Strategy Report.
In the March 2008 edition, the report lists over fifty countries and territories that
have been given the "Major money laundering countries" designation.70 Major
money laundering countries are defined in section 481(e)(7) of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 as one "whose financial institutions engage in currency
transactions involving significant amounts of proceeds from international narcotics
trafficking. 7 1
Without more, the insufficiency of this definition, akin to the very first
international conventions on money laundering which made drug trafficking acts
the only predicate offenses - the underlying crimes that produce the proceeds
which, when laundered, lead to the offense of money laundering 72  is obvious.
67. U.S. DEP'T. OF STATE, supra note 11.
68. Butler & Justice, supra note 53, at 7.
69. See Matthew S. Morgan, Money Laundering: The American Law and Its Global Significance,
3-SUM NAFTA: L. & Bus. REV. AM. 24,24-25 (1997).
70. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 11, at 12.
71. Id. at 11.
72. PAUL ALLAN SCHOTT, REFERENCE GUIDE TO ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND COMBATING
VOL. 37:3
HAWALA, MONEY LAUNDERING, AND TERRORISM FINANCE
Thankfully, however, the 2008 report continues with the following inclusive notes:
[T]he complex nature of money laundering transactions today makes it
difficult in many cases to distinguish the proceeds of narcotics
trafficking from the proceeds of other serious crime ... [Therefore
t]his year's list of major money laundering countries recognizes this
relationship by including all countries and other jurisdictions whose
financial institutions engage in transactions involving significant
73amounts of proceeds from all serious crime.
Just as the US was compelled to expand its definition of "major money
laundering countries" so too was the international community forced to adopt
additional predicate offenses in recognition of this difficulty in divining the source
and end-use of these funds.74 After all, the same dollar, or peso, or lira that can
buy cocaine today can buy a rocket-propelled grenade launcher tomorrow. In fact,
the term 'narcoterrorism,' as best illustrated by groups like the Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) aptly describes this cross-miscegenation.
Whether the proceeds from coca or the opium poppy, a portion of these monies are
recycled back into the security/terrorist apparatus necessary to cultivate, protect,
move, and push their product. Bottom-line: to chip away at money laundering is to
indirectly combat terrorism finance and vice versa.
B. Terrorism Finance Treaties & the 1267 Committee
In 1999, the UN adopted the International Convention for the Suppression of
the Financing of Terrorism, "[n]oting that the number and seriousness of acts of
international terrorism depend on the financing that terrorists may obtain.9
75
Article 2(1) of the convention states the following:
Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention
if that person by any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and
wilfully, provides or collects funds with the intention that they should
be used or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in part, in
order to carry out:
(a) An act which constitutes an offence within the scope of and as
defined in one of the treaties listed in the annex.76
Given the lack of agreement in the international legal community regarding
the definition of 'terrorism,' the highlighted verbiage in Article 2(l)(a) is
important. As such, I here provide the list of annexed conventions in its entirety.
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (1970); 7 7
THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM III-1 (2d ed. 2006).
73. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 11, at 11-12.
74. SCHOTT, supra note 73, at 111-1.
75. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, G.A. Res. 109, at
3, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doe. A/54/49 (Vol. I) (1999) (emphasis added)
[hereinafter Terrorism Financing Convention].
76. Id. art. 2(1)(a) (emphasis added).
77. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T.
1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105.
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Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil
Aviation (1971 );78 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes
Against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents (1973);79
International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages (1979);80 Convention on
the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (1980);81 Protocol for the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation
(1988);82 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Maritime Navigation (1988);83 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf (1988);84
and the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings
(1997).85
As biting as Article 2 may first appear there are several problems with this
convention, the first being the form of the instrument itself. As a convention,
further action (e.g. ratification) is required by member States before
recommendations take legal effect at the domestic level. Even then (even if signed
and ratified) there are several escape clauses within the convention that hinder full
implementation. Article 2(2)(b) of the International Convention for the
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, for instance, allows for the selective
adoption of the treaties annexed to this convention the very same treaties that
define the crime to which this convention speaks.86 By allowing limited adherence
to these treaties one may effectively manage (i.e. limit) the scope of the crime as
applied to his/her country.
Yet another escape clause emerges in the form of Article 8 which states that
"Each State Party shall take appropriate measures . . . for the identification,
detection and freezing or seizure of any funds used or allocated for the purpose of
committing the offences set forth in Article 2 as well as the proceeds derived from
such offences, for purposes of possible forfeiture. '' 7 Again, this language sounds
78. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept.
23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, 974 U.N.T.S. 177.
79. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected
Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167.
80. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 11,081,
1316 U.N.T.S. 205.
81. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Oct. 26, 1979, T.I.A.S. No.
11,080, 1456 U.N.T.S. 124.
82. Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International
Civil Aviation, Feb. 24, 1988, 1589 U.N.T.S. 474.
83. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation,
Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 201.
84. Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located
on the Continental Shelf, Mar. 10, 1988, 1678 U.N.T.S. 304.
85. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, Dec. 15, 1997, 2149
U.N.T.S. 256.
86. Terrorism Financing Convention, supra note 76, art. 2(2)(b).
87. Id. art. 8(1).
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as tough as did Article 2, initially. But, Article 8 implementation is prefaced by
the phrase "in accordance with [Member States'] domestic legal principles. 88
The Francois, duc de la Rochefoucauld maxim "Truth does not do as much
good in the world as the semblance of truth does evil" 89 is certainly applicable here
where international mandates are qualified by "domestic legal principles."
90
Countries are thus allowed to choose how enforcement will occur at home, if at all,
all the while receiving kudos for having signed an international treaty against
terrorism. In reality, problem states freeze suspect assets, thereby facially
complying with the law, but then refuse to prosecute based on domestic legal
principles that are often antiquated, apathetic, religiously-biased, and/or altogether
lacking. This inaction allows respective statutes of limitations to run, thus baring
prosecution and resulting in the eventual release of the previously frozen funds.
This is exactly what hampered both the investigation and prosecution of the
Saudi charity al-Haramain Islamic Foundation (AHF). According to the US
Treasury's Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, the US branch of AHF,
headquartered in Oregon, was involved in tax evasion and money laundering in an
attempt to disguise funds bound for Chechen fighters. 91 In addition, it was
discovered that the Somali and Bosnian branch offices had a long running
association with both al-Itihaad al-Islamiya (AIAI) and al-Qaeda.92
Despite a US terrorism designation on September 9th, 2004 and a UN
designation under UNSCR 1267 (see below) on September 28th, the Saudi
government consistently refused, and still refuses, to prosecute its nationals, citing
an insufficiency of evidence.93  As the most blatant instance of this
noncooperation, Suliman al-Buthe, AHF USA's former attorney and senior
executive, despite having been specially designated as a global terrorist by
INTERPOL,94 was given a position in the Saudi Health Ministry for his troubles.95
In fact, al-Buthe felt so comfortable that he gave an interview to the BBC, from his
apartment in Riyad, in which he laughed off his special designation status.
96
88. Id.
89. FRANCOIS DE LA ROCHEFOUCAULD, MAXIMS 64 (Leonard Tancock trans., Penguin Classics
1988) (1665).
90. Terrorism Financing Convention, supra note 76, art. 8(1).
91. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, U.S.-Based Branch of Al Haramain Foundation
Linked to Terror Treasury Designates U.S. Branch, Director (Sept. 9, 2004), available at
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/j s1895.htm.
92. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Fact Sheet: Contributions by the Dep't of the
Treasury to the Fin. War on Terrorism (Sept. 2002), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases
/reports/2002910184556291211 .pdf.
93. Jihad and the Petrodollar: Programme Two (BBC News Internet podcast Nov. 2007),
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/documentaryarchive/7108987.stm.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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In 1999, as a compliment to the International Convention for the Suppression
of the Financing of Terrorism, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1267.97
Resolution 1267 "require[s] member States to freeze the assets of the Taliban,
Osama Bin Laden and al-Qaeda and entities owned or controlled by them, as
designated by the 'Sanctions Committee' (now called the 1267 Committee)." 98
While an improvement in terms of the power of the instrument - 1267 is a Chapter
VII (i.e., legally binding) Resolution which requires no further action on behalf of
member States to take legal effect - the same issues of subjective application and
prosecution remain. While Resolution 1267 requires the freezing of suspect assets,
it does not speak to the ultimate disposition of those funds after the initial freezing.
Are they to be returned to those whom have been wrongly accused of having links
to the Taliban, Osama Bin Laden, and al-Qaeda? Are they to be returned upon a
failure to prosecute (for any reason)? Are portions to be returned if the suspect
agrees to "gift" the remainder to the government or to a religious charity?
C. Financial Action Task Force (FA TF) Recommendations
In an attempt to address some of the questions above, and to provide badly
needed uniformity, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) - originally created in
1989 by the G-7 to combat money laundering99 expanded its mission to include
combating the financing of terrorism (CFT). In October of 2001, just a month after
the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the FATF issued 8 Special Recommendations on
Terrorist Financing, adopting a 9th in 2004.00 When combined with its 40
Recommendations on Money Laundering, originally released in 1990,101 the
recommendations serve as a body of international mandates with regards to
AML/CFT programming.
Special Recommendation 1: Ratification and implementation of UN
instruments. The FATF calls for the adoption of the above-mentioned
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and
UNSCR 1373.102 In addition, countries are urged to implement all "resolutions
relating to the prevention and suppression of the financing of terrorist acts.,
10 3
Special Recommendation 2: Criminalizing the financing of terrorism and
associated money laundering. While the title is self-explanatory, the meat of this
recommendation comes in the call to expand predicate offenses. This is significant
because the concepts of terrorism finance and money laundering are new editions
to many legal systems in the Middle East and in South Asia. In fact, "in the early
97. G.A. Res. 1267, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999).
98. SCHOTT, supra note 73, at 111-5.
99. Id. at 111-7 to 111-8.
100. Fin. Action Task Force [FATF], 9 Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing (Oct. 24,
2004), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/document/9/0,3343,en_32250379_32236920_34032073 1 1 1
1,00.html.
101. FATF, The 40 Recommendations (June 2003), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/document/28/0,3343,
en_32250379_32236930_33658140 1 1 1,00.html.
102. SCHOTT, supra note 73, at Annex V-1.
103. Id.
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1990s fewer than two dozen nations had criminalized money laundering."' 0 4
Today that number has increased nearly eight fold. 0 5 By the end of 2007,
reflecting a comparable upward trend, the number of jurisdictions that had
criminalized terrorist financing reached 137.106
Special Recommendation 3: Freezing and confiscating terrorist assets.
Recommendation 3 calls not only for the freezing and confiscation of terrorist
assets, it targets the proceeds and assets purchased with the proceeds of such
activities as well, no matter how removed. If applied in broad strokes, the
incentive for legitimate companies (e.g. ethnic grocers) to allow illicit remittance
operations to piggyback on their infrastructure, for example, is substantively
decreased. Grocers who might receive a few hundred dollars in 'hush-money'
each month now have to contemplate losing their entire business, their home, their
cars, their accounts, anything that that money was either spent on or comingled
with.
Special Recommendation 4: Reporting suspicious transactions related to
terrorism. Recommendation 4 calls for "financial institutions, or other businesses
or entities subject to anti-money laundering obligations" to report suspect
transactions.10 7 Suspicion alone is apparently the standard of proof which sets into
motion this reporting requirement.
Special Recommendation 5: International cooperation. Countries shall ensure
territorial integrity with regard to terrorists, terrorist organizations, and terrorist
financiers. That is to say, countries shall not provide, nor acquiesce in being used
as, a terrorist safe haven.
Special Recommendation 6: Alternative remittance. All countries should
require either the licensing or registration of all formal and informal money/value
transfer services. In addition, both formal and informal money/value transfer
services should be subject to the FATF 40 Recommendations. Lastly, failure to
comply should result in appropriate sanction.
Special Recommendation 7: Wire transfers. Financial institutions of all
stripes are required to supply "meaningful originator information (name, address,
and account number)". Further, they are either to refuse or to scrutinize transfers
that contain incomplete originator information.
Special Recommendation 8: Non-profit organizations. In recognition of the
particular ease by which criminal elements can masquerade as non-profits,
countries are called on to strengthen applicable transparency laws (e.g. auditing
requirements, governance, etc.). In addition, countries are called on to prevent the
exploitation of legitimate entities by nefarious organizations.
Special Recommendation 9: Cash couriers. "Countries should have measures
in place to detect the physical cross-border transportation of currency and bearer
104. CASSARA, supra note 4, at 139.
105. Id.
106. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 11, at 4.
107. SCHOT, supra note 73, at Annex V-2.
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negotiable instruments . . . ." Further, in the case of detection, authorities should
be granted the power to confiscate suspect currency or monetary instruments.
The initial international cohesion that FATF Special Recommendations
provided, post 9/11, was certainly needed. However, as now applied, these
recommendations are of limited value. This is principally because the FATF is
merely an intergovernmental policy group. As such, it has no enforcement
capability whatsoever, which, despite global notoriety, is exactly why FATF
intellectual products are termed "recommendations." Without an enforcement
mandate, countries are free to trim, or altogether ignore, policy implementation.
At the individual level, Special Recommendation 1 does nothing more than
incorporate UN instruments that, as discussed above, can be gamed to the point of
being rendered ineffectual. And, while in theory, Special Recommendation 2 is a
welcomed broadening of predicate offenses, in practice, it was difficult to get
counties excited about enforcement when there were only a handful of applicable
offenses. Now, complements of Recommendation 2, policing agencies abroad face
expanding responsibilities without commensurate increases in enforcement
budgets. A wider net alone does not guarantee a larger catch if one lacks either the
will or the strength to hoist the net back into the boat.
Special Recommendations 3 and 4 both suffer from qualitative enforcement
issues. As to Recommendation 3, the freezing and seizure of assets means very
little if an eventual prosecution does not follow. Funds are all too often allowed to
thaw and assets are all too often returned. As to Recommendation 4, the reporting
of suspicious transactions applies only to financial institutions and to those entities
that are subject to anti-money laundering obligations. As discussed in the
Valuable Remittance Tool or National Security Threat section, 1°8 in many
countries, businesses that would otherwise be classified as financial institutions are
considered mere commercial entities. As such, they often escape both the
definitional stigma of 'financial institution' and the subjection to anti-money
laundering obligations. Further, even when financial institutions and money
transfer services are subject to such obligations they are incentivized by the
absence of enforcement to underreport both the value and numeracy of legitimate
transfers, let alone suspicious transactions - which would bring unwanted
regulatory attention.
Special Recommendation 5 calls for the denial of safe havens to terrorists,
terrorist organizations, and terrorist financiers. Below is just a sampling of the
many instances where reality veers from legislative idealism. I again cite to the Al
Haramain case above, and to the following: ETA continues to operate in the
Basque areas of Spain and in southern France, 109 Jemaah Islamiyah and Abu
Sayyaf Group fighters continue to shelter in both the Philippines and Indonesia,l°
108. See supra pp. 10-11.
109. OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY
REPORTS ON TERRORISM ch. 8 (2006), available at http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2005/65275.htm.
110. Id.
VOL. 37:3
2009 HAWALA, MONEY LAUNDERING, AND TERRORISM FINANCE 395
the PKK is alive and well in northern Iraq,"' Hezbollah thrives in Lebanon,
112
Ittihad al Islami hides in Somalia, 113 Hamas owns the Palestinian Territories, 1 4 the
Sadrists train in Iraq,115 the IMU and Hizb ut-Tahrir continue to operate in the
Tajik, Uzbek, and Kyrgyz part of the Ferghana Valley, 116 and a significant amount
of al-Qaeda senior leadership now lives in the tribal areas of Pakistan and
Afghanistan.1 17 I digress.
Special Recommendation 6 calls for the licensing or registration of all formal
and informal money/value transfer services. According to the Interpretive Note to
Special Recommendation 6, 'licensing' means "a requirement to obtain permission
from a designated competent authority in order to operate . ,I18 'Registration',
on the other hand, simply means "a requirement to . . . declare to a designated
competent authority the existence of" a money/value transfer business.1 19 Between
the two approaches, registration, for obvious reasons, is far less intrusive.
It should be of little surprise then that the UAE opts for registration alone. In
2003, the Central Bank of the UAE issued "Regulation Concerning Hawaladars
(Hawala Brokers) for Registration and Reporting." 120 Through various
announcements in local newspapers, hawaladars were "invit[ed] . . . to register
with the Central Bank and obtain a free-of-charge certificate." 12 1 By the end of
this registration drive only 184 hawaladars applied for certification. 122 Perspective:
there are 600 plus Starbucks locations in Florida alone,' 23 and yet in the hawala
capital of the world only 184 hawaladars registered. Certainly there are more, and
yet Special Recommendation 6 calls for the licensing or registration of all formal
and informal money/value transfer services (more on UAE noncompliance later).
As with the Special Recommendations collectively, Special Recommendation
6 and 7 suffer from a simple lack of follow-through. If wire transfers are not
scrutinized or altogether refused for containing insufficient originator information,
what exactly is the penalty? All too often, the answer is nothing. In fact, even
here at home, it's readily admitted that "most money service businesses do not
comply with ... requirements and there is little enforcement of the regulations."'
124
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. CIA, supra note 32.
116. OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, supra note 110.
117. Id.
118. SCHOTT, supra note 73, at Annex VI-] 5.
119. Id. at Annex VI-16.
120. CENTRAL BANK OF THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES, LAWS REGULATIONS AND PROCEDURES
IMPLEMENTED IN THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES FOR ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING AND COMBATING
TERRORISM 9 (2005), available at http://centralbank.ae/pdf/AMLSU/RegulationSummary-2005.pdf.
121. Id. at 9-10 (emphasis added) (reference ANNEX for original U.A.E. registration documents).
122. Id. at 10.
123. Starbucks, http://www.starbucks.com/retail/locator/ViewAll.aspx?a- 1&CountrylD=244
&StatelD =5&FC=RETAIL&City (last visited Feb. 6, 2009).
124. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 11, at 13.
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For a variety of reasons (discussed in detail in the Disincentivized
Cooperation section), enforcement efforts behind Recommendation 8 are not, and I
believe never will be, complied with in the Middle East and in parts of Asia. The
Pakistan-based al-Rashid Trust - a group which provided funding for both the
Taliban and al-Qaeda via the Global Jihad Fund, supported the Jaish Mohammed
terrorist group, and was directly linked to the kidnapping and subsequent murder
of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl 125  for example, was designated as a
terrorist facilitator/financier by the UN in October of 2001.126 Initially, and in
facial compliance with UNSCR 1267, the Pakistani Interior Ministry banned al-
Rashid and ordered the freezing of its assets. 127 Two points: (1) the ban did not
take effect until well after the designation, 128 thus allowing the terrorists precious
time in which to drain their accounts; and (2) the Sindh High Court (SHT) has
since ordered the government to lift the ban on the charity. 129 Lastly, in an article
by Naveed Siddiqui of Pakistan's Daily Times, Rashid Trust organizers - free from
arrest or prosecution stated that they would continue their work by simply
renaming their charity the Al Amin Welfare Trust. 3 0
Little that has been done with respect to Recommendation 9 has been
effective in stopping money laundering, generally, and terrorism finance, in
particular. Volume II of the 2008 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report
states that bulk cash (and I would add gold) smuggling continues to be one the
most utilized money laundering techniques in the world. 13' This is due, in part, to
the high levels of currency required to trigger the international equivalents of
Reports of International Transactions of Currency or Monetary Instruments
(CMIRs). In the US, one has to declare cash only when in excess of $10,000, in
South Africa 175,000 rand (approximately $24,600),132 and in Moldova 10,000
euros (approximately $14,160).' Given that terrorists regularly utilize cash
couriers to transit funds, and given that attacks cost so little in relative terms, I
would argue that these figures are too high.
In addition, I would suggest that bulk cash smuggling provisions are
circumvented by smuggling more compact, and less overt, forms of value (e.g.,
jewelry). However, even in countries where one must declare the value of
precious stones and metals being carried, the trigger value amounts are still much
too large. In Saudi Arabia, for example, one must only report the carrying of gold
125. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Treasury Office of Terrorism and Fin. Intelligence, Al Rashid
Trust (Sept. 23, 2001), available at http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/keyissues/protecting/
charities execorder_13224-a.shtml.
126. Id.
127. Naveed Siddiqui, Al-Rashid Trust Plans to Work Under New Name, DAILY TIMES (Pak.), Apr.
29, 2007, available at http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page= 2 007\04\29\story-29-4-
2007_pg7_3.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 11, at 5.
132. Id. at 419.
133. Id. at 334.
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and jewels if the value amount exceeds 60,000 Saudi riyals ($16,000 approx.). 134
As such, a large family could simply walk across the border with nearly $100,000
in unreported, untraceable value.
In his book Hide & Seek, John Cassara provides a brief illustration of the
tracing complications that gold presents in what is known as 'The Gold Cycle." 
35
Switzerland, for its infamous secrecy in banking and the glut of cash accumulated
thereby, has emerged as one of the top manufacturers of gold bars.' 36  From
Switzerland, the gold is shipped to Italy. The gold is then transformed, for resale,
into what amounts to hundreds of tons of gold rope and chain each year, thus
making Italy "the largest exporter of worked gold in the world."' 137 From Italy,
with the gold now in a form that is more readily transported without question, it is
taken by couriers - under falsified shippers export documents - or by smugglers
(posing as casual tourists) into other countries.
The amount gained by avoiding taxation on export/import is the laundered
value. Any gold that is not resold can be melted back into ingot form and used as
currency that escapes account freezes and Bank Secrecy Act (more on this later)
detection. The proceeds from sale, however, can be divvied up into multiple
currencies and sent either to offshore bank accounts or back to Switzerland to
purchase more gold to start the cycle again.
D. The Egmont Group of FIUs
In 1995, at the Egmont-Arenberg Palace in Brussels, various Financial
Intelligence Units (FIUs) met to discuss the strengthening of national AML/CFT
programs. 138  Thereafter, the group became known as the Egmont Group of
FIUs. 139 The group's official definition of an FIU serves both as an explanatory
and as a barrier to entry; in order to become a member, a country must first be able
to satisfy the definition below.
[A] central, national agency responsible for receiving (and, as
permitted, requesting), analyzing and disseminating to the competent
authorities, disclosures of financial information:
(i) concerning suspected proceeds of crime and potential financing
of terrorism, or
(ii) required by national regulation, in order to counter money
laundering and terrorist financing.14
0
134. Id. at 6.
135. CASSARA, supra note 4, at 73-74.
136. Id. at 74.
137. Id.
138. Press Release, Egmont Group, Major Meeting of FIU's in Korea Progresses the Fight Against
Money Laundering and Terrorist Fin. (May 29, 2008), available at http://www.egmontgroup.org/
PRESSRELEASEversion 27_MAY_2008_G.pdf.
139. The Egmont Group, Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs), http://www.egmontgroup.org/
aboutegmont.pdf (last visited Feb.5, 2009).
140. The Egmont Group, Interpretive Note Concerning the Egmont Definition of a Financial
Intelligence Unit, http://www.egmontgroup.org/files/library-egmont-docs/egmont-final_
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FIUs serve as repositories of suspect financial information. 141  This
information is analyzed and shared through a secured web server - the Egmont
Secure Web (ESW) -and through multiple working group meetings held
throughout the year. 142 FIUs pride themselves in this ability to rapidly disseminate
financial intelligence both to their peers and to nonmember states. I, however,
question the wisdom of information sharing with countries that appear to be more a
part of the problem than the solution. The US State Department admits that "far
too many countries that boast solid AML/CFT standards and infrastructures are
still simply not enforcing their laws.', 143 The statement continues, "In some cases
the lack of enforcement is due to a lack of capacity, but in far too many others it is
due to a lack of political will.'
144
My concern is twofold. First, I worry that problem states can hide beneath a
patina of legitimacy while doing nothing substantive in the line of enforcement.
By having AML/CFT legislation on the books, regimes can claim that they are in
full compliance with international standards (e.g. the Egmont criteria), regardless
of follow-through. The Nigerians, for example, were placed on the FATF's list of
'45non-cooperative countries and territories (NCCT) in 2001. However, within one
year the FATF claimed that "Nigeria enacted two pieces of legislation to remedy
the deficiencies.' 46 How can the passage of legislation without any enforcement
intent remedy deficiencies? As a result, and without any genuine effort, Nigeria,
an Egmont member despite ranking 147 out of 180 - 180 being the worst - on
Transparency International's 2007 Corruption Perceptions Index,' 47 now has
leverage to fend off its critics that push for verifiable reform.
This leverage also enables individuals to broadcast questionable assurances to
the financial community-at-large. In a 2008 article in the Khaleej Times,
Abdulrahim Mohamed al-Awadi Assistant Executive Director and Head of the
Anti-Money Laundering and Suspicious Cases Unit (AMLSCU) at the Central
Bank of the UAE - stated that "[t]he U.A.E. has a very robust AML/CFT
regime," 148 therefore, banks should not hesitate in allowing money exchanges to
open "Nostro Accounts.' 149 I am not saying that Mr. al-Awadi is a liar, nor am I
interpretive.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2009).
141. See INT'L MONETARY FUND, FIN. INTELLIGENCE UNITS: AN OVERVIEW 2 (2004), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fiu/fiu.pdf.
142. The Egmont Group, Information Paper on Financial Intelligence Units and the Egmont Group
6, http://www.egmontgroup.org/info-paper final-oct_2004.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2009).
143. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 11, at 9.
144. Id. at 10.
145. FATF, Review to Identify, Non-Cooperative Country Territories: Increasing the Worldwide
Effectiveness of Anti-Money Laundering Measures (June 22, 2001), available at http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/dataoecd/56/41/33922055.pdf.
146. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 11, at 351.
147. Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2007, http://transparency.org/
policy research/surveys-indices/cpi/2007 (last visited Feb. 5, 2009).
148. Issac John, Remove Curds on Nostro Accounts, Central Bank Tells Overseas Banks, KHALEEJ
TIMES Apr. 29, 2008, available at http://www.khaleejtimes.com/DisplayArticIeNew.aspsection
=business&xfile=data/business/2008/april/business-apri875.xml.
149. Nostro accounts enable foreign entities to hold, abroad, large amounts of a particular country's
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suggesting that the UAE lacks AML/CFT standards (of some sort). What I am
saying, however, is that the existence of an AML/CFT regime, that may or may not
ever be enforced, should not be the sole basis by which banks decide to do
business.
By touting compliance at some level, countries also argue that they are
entitled to training and information sharing. This brings me to my second concern.
By training some of the most corrupt governments on the planet, are we not simply
making them more sophisticated transgressors? Moldova, for example, recently
received advanced financial investigative techniques training by the IRS's
Criminal Investigation Division.15° This, despite a move towards establishing an
Offshore Financial Center (OFC) in the face of US opposition; 151 despite the fact
that out of 165,199 suspicious activity reports only 4 criminal cases bearing money
laundering charges were initiated (up from 0 in 2006),152 and despite 0 arrests
and/or prosecutions involving terrorist financing. 1
53
Access to resources and sensitive information continues to be granted to the
Romanian FIU - Oficiul Nacional de Prevenire si Combatere a Spalarii Banilor
(ONPCSB) 54 - despite the fact that "investigations have resulted in only a handful
of successful prosecutions to date."'155 Training was extended to Azerbaijan and
Congo, who rank 150 and 168 out of 180, respectively, on Transparency
International's Corruption Perceptions Index. 156  And, Pakistan continues to
receive support despite a 2007 Asia/Pacific Group threat to suspend membership
for noncompliance, 157 and despite the fact that the current president, Mr. Asif Ali
Zardari (a.k.a. "Mr. 10%"), has himself served an 11 year jail term on corruption
charges.
158
Lastly, the South African Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC), 159 an Egmont
member amazingly enough, continues to have access to the secure server. I say
"amazingly enough" because despite a high density of Nigerian, Pakistani, and
Indian drug traffickers, and Russian, Israeli, Lebanese, Chinese, and Taiwanese
organized crime syndicates, "the number of money laundering and terrorist finance
investigations, prosecutions, and convictions is . . . very low.' 160  Further still,
currency. See id.
150. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, INT'L NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT (2006), available at
http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2006/vo12/html/62136.htm.
151. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 11, at 7.
152. Id. at 332.
153. Id. at 333.
154. The Egmont Group, Financial Intelligence Units of the World (May 2008),
http://www.egmontgroup.org/fdes/ibrary-egmont-docs/list-current-egmont-members.pdf [hereinafter
Egmont].
155. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 11, at 398.
156. Transparency, supra note 148.
157. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 11, at 356.
158. Jane Perlez, From Prison to Zenith of Politics in Pakistan, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2008,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/1 1/world/asia/i lpstan.html?pagewanted=print.
159. Egmont, supra note 155.
160. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 11, at 417-18.
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despite country-specific FATF recommendations made in 2003, to this day South
Africa has all but ignored implementation - including the requirement to report its
significant volume of internal hawala-type transactions.
161
E. United States Regulation." Formal Sector
Less than one month after the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United
States, the domestic machinery of the intelligence, law enforcement, and financial
communities began scrambling a counterattack. Then-Treasury Secretary Paul
O'Neill, on September the 24, 2001 voiced this aggressive urgency as follows:
If you have any involvement in the financing of the al Qaida
organization, you have two choices: cooperate in this fight, or we will
freeze your US assets; we will punish you for providing the resources
that make these evil acts possible. We will succeed in starving the
terrorists of funding and shutting down the institutions that support or
facilitate terrorism.1
62
On the same day, President Bush announced Executive Order 13224 which
authorizes both the freezing of assets within the US and the denial of access to US
financial markets. 163 When coupled with UNSCRs 1267, 1373, and 1390, the
order, in theory, imposes AML/CFT and cooperative duties on our "partners"
abroad. 164
On October of the same year, the Uniting and Strengthening America by
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA
PATRIOT) Act was signed into law.' 65  "The Patriot Act" calls for harsher
penalties, an expansion of investigative and designation powers, and an
enhancement of information sharing among law enforcement communities,
between law enforcement and private financial institutions, and within the
financial sector itself.'66 In addition, the Patriot Act calls for a retooling of Bank
Secrecy Act (BSA) provisions.167
The BSA (31 USC §§ 5311-5330) was originally established in 1970 to fight
tax evasion and organized crime.' 68 Though there was a revamp in 1992 which
expanded BSA application to financial institutions other than banks, 16 9 real
ballooning of the regulatory regime did not occur until after 9/11. Section 358 of
the Patriot Act expanded "the scope of BSA to include intelligence and
counterintelligence to protect against international terrorism.'
' 70
161. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 11, at 419.
162. TREASURY DEP'T, supra note 28, at 2.
163. Id. at 5.
164. Id. at 17.
165. Id. at 10.
166. Id.
167. THE SEC'Y. OF THE TREASURY, THE BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., THE
SEC. AND EXCH. COMM'N, A REPORT TO CONGRESS IN ACCORDANCE WITH 356(c) OF THE USA
PATRIOT ACT 2 n.2 (2002), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press/releases/reports/356report.pdf.
168. Id. at2.
169. Id.
170. THE SEC'Y OF THE TREASURY, supra note 168.
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This expanded mission is carried out by Treasury's Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network (FinCEN), the US FIU. FinCEN is tasked with three
principal service missions: (1) to analyze financial intelligence, (2) to control BSA
implementation, and (3) to oversee international financial intelligence collection.17"'
That said, the core of FinCEN's contribution stems from the collection, sorting,
and analysis of BSA reports.
"BSA requires many financial institutions to create 'paper trails' by keeping
records and filing reports on certain transactions."' 72 These paper linkages allow
law enforcement to trace illicit funds back to their source. Currency Transaction
Reports (CTRs), for example, must be filed for any exchange with the same
customer in the same day which exceeds $10,000.173 And, Currency and Monetary
Instrument Reports (CMIRs) must be filed for cross-border movement of cash and
bearer negotiable instruments of $10,000 or more. 174
Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) are to be filed if the transaction involves
$2,000 (in individual or aggregate form) and appears to be "suspicious" in
nature. 175 Suspicious activities include an attempt to structure (a.k.a. "smurf')
transactions to avoid CTR reporting requirements.176 Smurfing is accomplished by
breaking a large transaction into multiple, smaller transactions which would fall
below the $10,000 CTR threshold. Another red flag might be a transaction(s) that
appears to lack any business purpose: higher than normal levels of account
activity, for example the cycling of funds between various accounts, and same-day
deposits and withdrawals without any reasonable explanation might suggest illicit
activity. Lastly, and obviously, any proceeds that are blatantly of criminal
generation must be reported.
177
With nearly 50 data fields, SARs are really the key to combating terrorism
finance in the formal financial sector. 178 In fact, a former director of FinCEN is
quoted as saying "With SARs, it is now like having a haystack full of needles."' 179
The informational value that SARs forms provide stems not only from the breadth
of detail solicited, but also from the breadth of institutions that are required to file.
171. CASSARA, supra note 4, at 132.
172. FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, BANK SECRECY ACT
REQUIREMENTS, A QUICK REFERENCE GUIDE FOR MONEY SERVICES BUSINESSES 1, available at
http://www.msb.gov/materials/enIbank-reference.pdf [hereinafter BANK].
173. Id.
174. BANK, supra note 173.
175. FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, REPORTING
SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY, A QUICK REFERENCE GUIDE FOR MONEY SERVICE BUSINESSES,
available at http://www.msb.gov/materials/en/report-reference.pdf [hereinafter REPORTING].
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. See ANNEX, pp. 82-84.
179. CASSARA, supra note 4, at136.
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'Financial institutions' (a term which US Treasury uses to include banks,
savings and loans, credit unions, and other depository institutions) 180 are, of course,
under BSA purview, but so too are nontraditional financial institutions (e.g.
casinos and brokers and dealers in securities). Money Service Businesses (MSBs)
are also grouped under this latter category. Money Service Businesses are defined
as:
Any person doing business, whether or not on a regular basis or as an
organized business concern, providing one or more of the following
services:
money orders, traveler's checks, check cashing, currency dealing
or exchange, stored value, AND
Conducts more than $1,000 in money service business activity:
with one person, in one or more transactions (in one type of
activity), on any one day, OR
Provides money transfers [a Money Transmitter] in any amount.
18
'
Money Transmitters are defined as:
A person that engages as a business in the transfer of funds through a
financial institution is a money transmitter and an MSB, regardless of
the amount of transfer activity. Generally, the acceptance and
transmission of funds as an integral part of a transaction other than the
funds transmission itself (for example, in connection with the sale of
securities or other property), will not cause a person to be a money
transmitter. 182
Generally, MSBs, in accordance with 31 CFR Part 103.41, must register with
FinCEN within 180 days of establishment. 183  This brings us to what I call
'Loophole 1'. What would stop an individual from closing shop on day 179 and
then reopening the following week? This is not simply your author playing devil's
advocate. Our record for securing guilty verdicts when it comes to prosecution on
terrorism finance charges is very poor. 184 Therefore, identifying and eliminating
loopholes which allow these characters to flirt with criminality while technically
following the letter of the law is quite important.
180. FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, MONEY LAUNDERING
PREVENTION: A MONEY SERVICE BUSINESS GUIDE 4, available at http://www.fincen.gov/
statutesregs/guidance/pdf/msbpreventionguide.pdf [hereinafter MONEY].
181. Id. at45.
182. Id. at 45.
183. Id. at 6.
184. IBRAHIM WARDE, THE PRICE OF FEAR: THE TRUTH BEHIND THE FINANCIAL WAR ON TERROR
95-97 (University of California Press 2007); U.S. v. Benevolence Int'l. Found. No. 02 CR 414, 2002
WL 31050156 (N.D.I11. Sept. 13, 2002).
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Further, the weakness of this provision comes in the form of accountability, or
rather the lack thereof. If confronted, what prevents a savvy, unregistered MSB
that has been operating for years from claiming that they just opened for business
last month? Are we really to believe that our monitoring efforts are so substantial
today that we know, and more importantly can prove in a court of law, when
exactly this 180 day period began? We simply cannot count on MSBs to report (or
to report accurately) to FinCEN. We must police them better.
And, while I understand that the FBI may have the monopoly on terrorism
finance investigations within the United States, the Bureau simply lacks the
resources to tackle an issue of this magnitude alone. Our local law enforcement
officials must be trained to spot suspect businesses. Whether this occurs within a
specially designated branch or as part of a larger Counter-terrorism (CT)
contingent under city or county jurisdiction, it must occur. At a minimum,
numerical superiority puts officers/detectives in a unique position to provide
quantitative tactical intelligence through contact. If at a later stage the FBI takes
over the case, great, but the Bureau will never make that case without the
assistance of these feeder-cells. There are some that would suggest that security
would be compromised by an expansion of those 'in the circle'. This is simply not
the case. There would be no 'circle' to speak of; information would flow in a
unidirectional, linear fashion (i.e. towards the Bureau and FinCEN as end-users).
Loophole 2: While BSA requires MSBs to establish written Anti-Money
Laundering (AML) procedures, such programs need not be reviewed by outside
consultants. "Such review may be conducted by an officer or employee of the
money service business .... ,,185 This is quite troubling to say the least when the
objective of the review is to "determine whether the business is operating in
compliance with the requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act .. ,, 6 Why is a
compliance determination, one with potential national security ramifications, not
considered a nondelagable duty? Borrowing from Professors Prosser and Keeton,
a nondelegable duty is defined as one in which "the responsibility is so important
to the community that the employer [the US government] should not be permitted
to transfer it to another."
'1 87
Perhaps this shocking approach stems from the 2004 Second International
Conference on Hawala. The 'Conference Statement' from that session states the
desire to "avoid over-regulation that might drive [Informal Funds Transfer
systems] operations underground."' 188 Two comments: (1) the criminal elements
185. 31 C.F.R. § 103.125(d)(4) (2002).
186. FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FIN-2006-G012,
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS: CONDUCTING INDEPENDENT REVIEWS OF MONEY SERVICE BUSINESS
ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING PROGRAMS 1 (2006), available at http://www.msb.gov/pdf/Guidance-
MSBIndependentAudits9-21 .pdf.
187. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 512 (West Publ'g
Co. 1984) (1941).
188. Int'l Monetary Fund, Second Int'l. Conference on Hawala, Abu Dhabi (Apr. 5, 2004), in
REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS FOR HAWALA AND OTHER REMITTANCE SYSTEMS at 97 (International
Monetary Fund 2005).
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that both own and use these MSBs/IFTs/IVTs already operate underground, and
(2) when has it ever been the policy of law enforcement officials to allow criminal
activity to continue in fear that a crackdown might force criminals to work harder
at their craft? If anything, we need to ramp up enforcement efforts, thus exacting
additional risks/costs on these services. Once those risks/costs eat into profit
margins, those using these informal transmission services for mere economical
reasons will go elsewhere when such costs are inevitably passed on the customer.
The only clients remaining will be the malefactors that are willing to pay higher
rates for the continued promise of secrecy. As such, analytical teams could then
narrow their focus to these specific individuals. There is a very large caveat here:
before such a crackdown there must be a place, a well regulated culturally sensitive
place, for the affected to go.
189
Bottom-line: agnostic to source (of such bad policy), if such delegation is
truly the prevailing mentality of government today then why stop there? Why not
disband the IRS and simply have taxpayers audit and then fine themselves? Why
not get rid of all corporate and securities statutes and have companies like Enron
and Lehman decide what's best to report? The answer to all the above is, of
course, because: (1) people (both natural and juridical) are rational actors that will
take advantage of any given system if allowed to do so, and (2) the core function
of government is to govern.
I am not calling for larger government or for more legislation, I am simply
calling for enforcement of the laws and policies that we already have. For
example, in a commissioned study done in the mid-1990's MSBs in the US were
estimated to number nearly 200,000, and yet despite our registration requirement,
by the end of 2004 only 22,000 had registered. 190 More recently, in a 2006 report
by the World Bank's Ole Andreassen, competition from the informal sector (i.e.
unregistered MSBs) is cited as a chief obstacle to those running legitimate
remittances businesses in the US.191 If we don't do better, we risk sending a signal
that reads we can 't do better. As such, it is only logical for MSBs to join their
informal peers.
With examples like these, and there are more, how can we be so involved in
training and in funding AML/CFT programs abroad in nations that refuse
anything beyond superficial institution of policy while so poorly performing at
home? If the difficulty is in the identification of illegal remitters, perhaps we
could take notice of how the formal remitters garner business. In the same
Andreassen article, the following data was presented: "[m]ost firms market their
service through newspaper advertisements (47.83 percent), radio (37.88 percent),
189. See Int'l Monetary Fund, Combating the Abuse of Alternative Remittance Systems:
International Best Practices Annex 4, in REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS FOR HAWALA AND OTHER
REMITTANCE SYSTEMS 102, 105 (International Monetary Fund 2005).
190. CASSARA, supra note 4, at 201.
191. Ole E. Andreassen, Fin. Sector, The World Bank, Remittance Service Providers in the United
States: How Remittance Firms Operate and How They Perceive Their Business Environment, at i.,
(June 2006).
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and community events (40.91 percent) [and word of mouth (19.4 percent)].', 192 I
am willing to bet that illegal remitters use the very same methodologies as their
legal counterparts. As such, to find these individuals we need to listen to the local
AM radio stations, read ethnic newspapers, and get out into the community. All of
the above, however, requires personnel, which in turn requires funding. And, to be
frank, I'm not sure that we are that dedicated to this mission.
I don't mean to suggest that the US government has failed since 9/11. Any
attempt to paint the situation as such would be a blatant mischaracterization. In
fact, just 3 years ago, in the "Final Report on 9/11 Commission
Recommendations," the war against terrorist financing was the only category to
receive an 'A' grade. 193 Despite these accomplishments, however, what worries
me now is the level to which this once urgent push to stamp out terrorism finance
has been both tempered by initial successes and sidetracked by disconnects
between senior level managers and agents. As George Friedman - the founder of
Strategic Forecasting Inc. (better known as Stratfor) - once said "The weakness of
the US is not our soldiers, nor their numbers, but the vast distance that separates
American leaders from those who fight."'
194
In 2002, for example, then-Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill flew halfway
across the world to visit a Citibank branch in Bahrain that specialized in Islamic
finance. 195  As an aside, this is not an industry that needs our promotional
assistance given that (1) by 2004, Islamic banks boasted $260 billion in assets and
another $400 billion in investments, 196 and (2) lax sectoral regulation continues to
be a major security gap globally. Regardless, in the words of then-Treasury Under
Secretary for International Affairs, John Taylor, "The fanfare of a cabinet
member's visit helped us publicize . . . what Islamic finance was all about."'
197
While I'm sure at the policy-level this fanfare - along with the establishment of a
"visiting scholar in Islamic Finance" chair and the institution of an "Islamic
Finance 101" class at Treasury to promote understanding was trumpeted in the
name of political correctness, at the agent-level these things are seen for what they
really are, distractions to enforcement objectives.
Also at the senior management level, and with more damning consequence, I
again point to the disappearance of initiative once FATF Special
Recommendations were purportedly adopted abroad. Particular leaders have
apparently formed the view that good legislation is equivalent to good result so
long as specious public efforts are demonstrated. Problem states that "aspire" to
adopt the recommendations are forgiven for failure of implementation as long as
they agree to host a hawala conference, or chair an event on Islamic finance, or
promote "outreach." Shaukat Aziz, both former Pakistani finance minister and
192. Id. at 29.
193. TAYLOR, supra note 49, at 27.
194. GEORGE FRIEDMAN, AMERICA'S SECRET WAR: INSIDE THE HIDDEN WORLDWIDE STRUGGLE
BETWEEN AMERICA AND ITS ENEMIES 339 (Doubleday 2004).
195. TAYLOR, supra note 49, at 25.
196. CASSARA, supra note 4, at 205.
197. TAYLOR, supra note 49, at 25 (emphasis added).
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prime minister, was lauded for chairing just such an outreach event in Washington
in April 2002;198 clearly the Pakistanis have cracked down on hawala since that
day, right? Sultan Bin Nasser al-Suwaidi, governor of the Central Bank of the
United Arab Emirates, was praised for his willingness to host regional initiatives to
talk about illicit remittance; 199 clearly the UAE is no longer a corridor for terrorist
funds, right? The Saudi government in June 2004 promised to shut down all
charities abroad and to establish a "Charity Commission" to regulate the export of
all funds; 200 surely, four years after that announcement, that Commission is up and
running, right?
With regard to our initial successes, many millions of dollars have indeed
been frozen in the formal financial system since 9/11.201 True, some of those funds
can be considered the low-hanging fruit of the financial underworld, but many of
those dollars -the hard targets - were captured by creative, groundbreaking efforts
by Treasury and others. One such program was the SWIFT operation. SWIFT: the
Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication, is a Brussels-
based banking consortium that routes 11 million transactions a day between banks,
brokerage houses, and stock exchanges. 20 2 By monitoring the $6 trillion a day and
the more than 7,800 financial institutions that use this service, the Treasury
Department, the FBI, and the CIA were able to identify multiple terrorist cells both
in the US and abroad.20 3
Unfortunately, the New York Times, in 2006, chose to publish a story
exposing this ongoing, highly classified program.20 4 Believe it or not, the bad guys
read The Times too. As such, the program was effectively hamstrung by this
irresponsible decision to go to print. And, if this disclosure was not demoralizing
enough, we acquiesced in the establishment of an external audit to ensure that
collection programs were not "inappropriate. 20 5 Perspective: we place external
audit requirements on ourselves and yet we allow MSBs to self-regulate.
F. U.S. Regulation: Informal Sector
Despite unavoidable overlap, thus far we have focused on formal sector
regulation. However, Section 359 of the Patriot Act also includes informal value
transfer systems (IVTSs).2 °6 IVTSs operate either in parallel to the formal sector -
through underground banking and money transmission services or in tandem with
the formal sector through the holding of "settling accounts" in traditional
financial institutions. The latter form offers tremendous insight into the
198. Id. at 17.
199. Id. at 60.
200. Dan Murphy, Saudi Crackdown on Charities Seen as Incomplete, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
June 9, 2004.
201. See Eric Lichtblau & James Risen, Bank Data is Sifted by U.S. in Secret to Block Terror, N.Y.
TIMES, June 23, 2006.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. 31 U.S.C.A. § 5312 (2001).
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complacency and, at times, overt criminality of the formal financial sector, e.g.
BCCI and Banco Delta Asia (more on this later). The former, which include
alternative remittance systems like hawala, are much more difficult to deal with,
for by avoiding the formal sector altogether they avoid BSA freezing, despite the
fact that BSA requirements are still applicable. In fact, Osama bin Laden, in a
Pakistani press interview, is quoted as saying, "Al Qaeda is comprised of modem,
educated young people who are as aware of the cracks in the Western financial
system as they are of the lines in their own hands. These are the very flaws in the
Western financial system which is becoming a noose for it."
20 7
Recently, we have begun to adopt more creative monitoring programs to
cement these "cracks" (e.g. trade-based money laundering). Trade Transparency
Unities (TTUs), for example, now analyze import/export data in search of
discrepancies in documentation and actual trade volumes. 20 8  "By comparing
specific declared imports and exports from both sides, determining indications of
possible overinvoicing, underinvoicing, fraudulent trading practices, export
incentive fraud, and other illegal techniques is a relatively simple process. 20 9 This
is particularly helpful in a world in which spot checks from customs agents have to
compete with "rush delivery" services from FedEx to UPS to freight forwarders to
free trade zone (FTZ) expediters. Analysis after-the-fact thus enables the
discovery of discrepancies that were not made patent to customs agents in real-
time.
TTUs are indeed likely to help in the tracking of everything from textiles to
diamonds to gold. However, even here efficacy is premised upon cooperation by
foreign customs agencies and assumptions that diamonds and gold, for example,
are traded, rather than smuggled, across borders. Further, the effectiveness of
TTUs depends not only upon the willingness of foreign governments to share
information, but on their ability to accurately collect and communicate that data.
In poorer countries, countries that are disproportionately using underground
banking and trade-based value manipulation, limitations with regard to both
technology and personnel are very real obstacles. Lastly, import/export data
obfuscation, willfully or accidentally, through comingling and/or mislabeling in
FTZs, for example, furthers potential inaccuracies.
With regards to cash couriers, little has changed for the better. Yes,
technology has been employed at entrance and exit points to detect large quantities
of currency. And, yes, CMIRs provide hefty penalties for not reporting the cross-
border movement of cash or bearer negotiable instruments (e.g. stocks, bonds,
etc.), but only if such amounts are greater than $10,000. 210 As stated above, I feel
this amount is far too high for a blanket approach.
207. CASSARA, supra note 4, at 179.
208. Id. at 226.
209. Id. at 225.
210. 31 C.F.R. §103.30 (2009).
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At a minimum, risk modeling needs to be incorporated with regards to the
end-destination of each voyage. The amount of money that a private individual
can carry on his/her person from the US to Singapore should not be the same
allowable amount for travel to Sudan, for example. The money, which is badly
needed in many of these regions I concede, can still reach these countries, but
through the financial system. Further, I was careful to distinguish private
individuals from not-for-profit workers and other governmental and quasi-
governmental groups.
Ultimately, yes, a criminal/terrorist could fly to a "safe" country with $10,000
in tow only to then hop on another plane headed to Syria or Iran. But, that
criminal/terrorist now has to purchase two plane tickets (a layover would not
suffice, for the focus would be on the end-destination), thus doubling both his/her
operational cost and paper-trail. Doubling the paperwork alone increases the
chance of eventual detection and apprehension.
With regard to the abuse of charities, the IRS and the FBI are making very
real progress. 211 Their efforts, however, are hampered by both noncooperation
abroad (as mentioned supra) and by the complexities involved. For example, in a
case coming out of Russia, a foreign national gave money to a charity, a company
(receiving money from other charities) also gave money to that same charity, that
charity then gave money to other charities (both legitimate and illegitimate), and
one of those recipient charities then finally distributed the money to individuals in
cash, wire transfer, courier, and goods form.
212
With this level of intentional confusion, one can imagine just how tough of a
task investigation really is, much less prosecution. Add to this, the cross-border
transmissions of funds. Sophisticated criminals utilize nation-states, failed states,
and even Indian (Native American) reservations to take advantage of any
perceived jurisdictional tolerance. Any international dimension then increases
tracking difficulties in orders of magnitude. This holds true even when dealing
with cooperative, technically capable countries.
V. CONCLUSION
A. Disincentivized Cooperation
There is a section in FinCEN's Money Laundering Prevention: A Money
Services Business Guide entitled "MSBs Can Help Fight Money Laundering. 213
This section title, in my opinion, is a perfect summation of US/Jeffersonian dogma.
We assume that MSBs want to help fight money laundering when it is, in fact, in
their financial interest not to. Given an absence of enforcement, this holds true
even in the face of hefty civil and criminal penalties for noncompliance.
Regulatory hurdles cost time and money (e.g. registration in the UK costs £60
211. Paul O'Neill, Secretary, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Remarks on Next Terrorist Asset List
(Jan. 9, 2002), http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/po9l0.htm.
212. FATF, TERRORIST FINANCING 26 (Financial Action Task Force/Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development 2008), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/28/43/40285899.pdf.
213. MONEY, supra note 181, at 10.
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pounds - approximately $113 -per premises), 214 and auditors bring unwanted
attention. This attention then scares off clients that seek anonymity both for
cultural and criminal reasons.
In a similar vein we assume that countries in the Persian Gulf, for example,
want to cooperate on AML/CFT initiatives when, in fact, it is in their political
(domestic and regional), religious, and financial interests not to. In Saudi Arabia,
for example, "the financial sinews of al-Qaeda [flow] from numerous supporters in
the Kingdom, and the Saudi government [is] loath to trigger the consequences of
restraining these supporters. 215 This is true both in the context of direct support
and in terms of more peripheral contributions via charitable giving. In fact, the
fragility of Saudi desire/ability to manage the latter is particularly vacant for a
variety of religious and historical reasons.
In 1744, Muhammad Abd al-Wahhab and Ibn Sa'ud formed a ruling
coalition.2 16 The Saudi royal family, for its part, agreed to uphold a particularly
virulent, uber-conservative Wahhabi jurisprudence. The Wahhabis, also known as
"the asserters of the divine unity (al-Muwahhidun or AhN al-Tawhid),217 in
upholding their portion of the bargain, agreed to provide religious legitimacy to the
crown so long as shari 'a - Islamic law - remained supreme. 218
Under Saudi law, the Nizam Asasi ("Basic Regulation"), a constitutional
equivalent - actual constitutions are avoided so as not to offend the Wahhabi ban
on manmade legislation,219- governs, not UNSCRs not FATF recommendations
and not even Saudi royal decrees in many instances. Article 7 explicitly states as
much: "[T]he Prophet's tradition and the Qur'an and Sunnah reign supreme over
all other state regulations."22 ° While Article 48 later cedes some discretionary
authority to the ruler, it too is qualified, "The system of judges which is applied to
all cases presented before it is shari'a rules according to the teachings of the Holy
Qur'an, the Sunnah, and the regulations set by the ruler, provided they do not
contradict the Holy Qur'an and the Sunnah (alteration in original)." 221
214. See David Faulkner, U.K. Regulation of Money Service Businesses, in REGULATORY
FRAMEWORKS FOR HAWALA AND OTHER REMITTANCE SYSTEMS 42, 44 (International Monetary Fund
2005).
215. See CASSARA, supra note 4, at 233.
216. NATANA J. DELONG-BAS, WAHHABI ISLAM: FROM REVIVAL AND REFORM TO GLOBAL JIHAD
34 (Oxford University Press 2004).
217. SHAYKH JAMAAL AL DIN ZARABOZO, THE LIFE, TEACHINGS AND INFLUENCE OF MUHAMMAD
IBN ABDUL-WAHHAAB 280 (Ministry of Islamic Affairs 2005), available at http://www.sultan.org/
books/wahhabism.pdf.
218. See generally DELONG-BAS, supra note 217.
219. LIAM GEARON, HUMAN RIGHTS & RELIGION: A READER 139 (Sussex Academic Press 2002).
220. FRANK E. VOGEL, ISLAMIC LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM: STUDIES OF SAUDI ARABIA 3 (Ruud
Peters & Bernard Weiss eds., Brill 2000).
221. Id.
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Charitable giving (zakat) is not only encouraged under shari'a, it is mandated
as one of the five pillars of Islam.222 This, as previously mentioned, is exactly
what makes regulation so contentious in the eyes of the proletariat - those
especially susceptible to radical Islamic messages and, more importantly, to the
powerful Wahhabi leadership - the authors of those extremist messages. This is
particularly true when the US - seen as a Christian (rather than secular) country in
the Middle East - is painted as targeting Saudi charities with religious connotations
(e.g. Al Haramain, meaning "the two holy places, '223 i.e. Mecca and Medina).
As such, and as made frighteningly clear by the May 2003 al-Qaeda attack in
Riyad, the Saudi royal family is in no position to impose regulations that may be
deemed a violation of Qur'anic teachings. Lastly, even if the Saudis established
the long-promised Charity Commission, thus moving beyond superficial
condemnation of charitable exploitation, two obstacles remain. The first: citizens
would be free to ignore such attempts at regulation under Article 48 of the Nizam
Asasi, upon direction from their religious leaders.224 The second: no amount of
hypothetical regulation would keep a wealthy Saudi businessman from personally
writing checks, so to speak, to individuals or organizations of his choosing.
The Emirates, on the other hand, appear to fight full compliance in the name
of profit margins and regional sensitivities rather than religious fervor. As an
example, at a soi-disant Islamic bank I was told that I could not open an account
without a residence permit. A permit, however, as it was made clear to me, could
materialize for a small fee. From May 15 to 16, 2002, the UAE hosted the Abu
Dhabi Declaration on Hawala 5  That meeting was followed by the Second
International Conference on Hawala in April of 2004.226 In both instances the
UAE was applauded for their "efforts. 227 Upon the June 2008 announcement of
the addition of 13 new AML/CFT regulations, the following appeared in the
Financial Times: "Western officials have lauded the UAE's move to regulate
hawala .... ,228 Unconditional praise continued even after a curiously timed - the
day before the World Customs Organization (WCO) was to meet - declaration by
the director general of the UAE's Federal Customs Authority which voiced an
"urgent need" for regional ports to combat smugglers.2 29
222. DELONG-BAS, supra note 217, at 247; see also Five Pillars of Islam, BBC Religion & Ethics
(2002), http://www.bbc.co.uk/religion/religions/islam/ practices/fivepillars.shtml.
223. See Saudi-US-Relations.org, Saudi-US Relations Information Service, The Hajj in
Perspective: A Conversation with David Long (Jan. 23, 2005), http://www.saudi-us-
relations.org/newsletter2005/saudi-relations-interest-01-23.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2009); see also
OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ISLAM (2007-08), available at http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/
opr/tl25 /e810?_hi -l&.pos=l3.
224. GEARON, supra note 220.
225. See Faulkner, supra note 215, at 94.
226. Id. at 96.
227. See id.
228. Simeon Kerr, UAE Brings in New Rules to Fight Money Laundering, FIN. TIMES, June 23,
2008, at 8, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/Obdbfd4dc-40bb-1 Idd-bd48-0000779fd2ac.html.
229. Gregor McClenaghan, Customs Combine to Fight Crime and Facilitate Trade, THE NAT'L,
June 25, 2008, http://thenational.ae/article/20080624/NATIONAL/680171428.
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And yet, Dubai was the transit route of much of the funding for the September
11, 2001 attacks, and served as both A.Q. Khan's - the "godfather" of the
Pakistani nuclear bomb - equipment source and cubbyhole for illicit profits.
230
The infamous al-Barakaat remittance service was headquartered in Dubai, 231 and
Dubai's Gold Souq - the largest in Arabia232 - is widely known for its use in money
laundering. 233 The Petroline FZC company - used to pay the Iraqi government
millions of dollars in bribes to secure "oil for food contracts," thus circumventing
UN sanctions - was based in the UAE.234 So too were the backers of the Bank of
Credit and Commerce International (BCCI): Sheik Zayed bin Sultan al-Nahyan
(Ruler of Abu Dhabi and 77 percent owner of the bank), Sheik Khalifa bin Zayed
al-Nahyan (son of Sheik Zayed), Sheik Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan (son of
Sheik Zayed), and Kemal Adham (former head of Saudi intelligence). 235
BCCI, the largest Muslim bank in the world at the time, essentially
institutionalized hawala; "the bank arranged for a deposit in the local currency at
one end and a withdrawal in a different currency at the other, without an audit trial
or paperwork - a basic form of money laundering." 236 As lax regulation began
attracting the money of more sophisticated criminals like Abu Nidal, Manuel
Noriega, Munther Bilbeisi, and intelligence operatives, BCCI added more layers
and shells to accommodate. To illustrate:
[A] subsidiary called BCCI Overseas, based in the Cayman Islands, was
100 percent owned by BCCI Holdings in Luxembourg. The senior
Cayman company was a British charity, called ICIC Foundation, which
owned an investment company, ICIC Foundation Cayman, which
owned 35 percent of BCCI's Geneva-based bank, Banque de Commerce
et Placements (the rest was owned by BCCI Holdings S.A. - the main
Luxembourg company - and Union Bank of Switzerland). The ICIC
Foundation also was an investor in BCCI; it borrowed $74 million from
an affiliated company, ICIC Overseas, to acquire 9 percent of BCCI
shares. Other Cayman investors in BCCI Holdings were the ICIC Staff
Benefit Trust and theICIC Staff Benefit Fund - pension funds for BCCI
237
In 2008, the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) warned
the Dubai Mercantile Exchange for its lack of adequate reporting and
transparency.238 Many authors have written about the abuse of FTZs in the UAE
230. See CASSARA, supra note 4, at 123.
231. WARDE, supra note 185, at 97.
232. TERRY CARTER & LARA DUNSTON, DUBAI 17 (Lonely Planet 2007).
233, See generally Dubai: Hawala's Law Hooray?, World Money Laundering Report Online (Feb.
26, 2007), http://bankinginsurancesecurities.con/WMLRO.Com/Articles/worid-money-laundering
-report _online_news/Dubai-hawala-s-last-hooray (last visited Feb. 5, 2009).
234. Richard Lawson, Foreign Cases that Could Haunt Bhutto, BBC News (Oct. 29, 2007),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/southasia/7064052.stm (last visited Feb. 5, 2009).
235. MARK POTTS ET AL, DIRTY MONEY 10-11 (National Press Books 1992).
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238. See CFTC Limits, FIN. TIMES, July 8, 2008, at 2, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/O/
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generally, and Dubai's Jebel Ali in particular.2 39 And, as best illustrated in a recent
Portfolio article by Christopher Stewart, smuggling, with government
acquiescence, continues unabated despite the UAE Federal Customs Authority
director general's "urgent" call for action.24 °
According to the article, 30 to 40 percent of the $1 1 billion in goods sent from
the US to the UAE make their way to Iran - in violation of both US and UN
sanctions. 2 4 1 "Some exports are innocuous, like refrigerators and stoves; others,
such as high-speed computer chips, military hardware, and nuclear components,
are more ominous., 242 As Michael Jacobson, senior fellow at the Washington
Institute's Stein Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, puts it "[t]hey're
reluctant to go too far, in part out of fear of antagonizing Iran, but mainly because
of the bottom line. 243
The Stewart article is important here beyond simply chronicling just how little
meaning sanctions have to our allies. It also illustrates, yet again, this disjuncture
between the efficacy of freezes and designations in the formal sector compared
with that of the informal sector. For example, the Treasury Department designated
Bank Saderat and Bank Sepah for funding Hezbollah and facilitating Iranian
missile procurement, respectively.244  One might assume that this pair of
designations would cripple these institutions, as such a designation did to Banco
Delta Asia, thereby precipitating a crisis of sorts in Iran. That assumption,
however, would be wrong. Such designations, while painful, are blunted by
informal "solutions" (e.g. the smuggling of goods and the usage of hawala).
In a 2008 Financial Times (Tehran) article, Daniel Glaser, the deputy
assistant secretary of terrorist financing at US Treasury, claimed that the fact that
hawala business is booming is proof positive that sanctions are working. 245 This is
a bit like bragging about how sturdy your three-sided fortress is; what about the
back door? Secretary Glaser continued: "[i]f what our sanctions and the
international sanctions have done is to push organizations like the Quds force [an
elite, self-funded Iranian unit that perpetuates terrorist movements abroad] out of
the international financial system and into costlier, riskier and less efficient
systems, then that is a good thing. 246 I would counter that statement by asking if
that's what our sanctions have in fact done. Arguably, hawala is cheaper (not
costlier), just as safe, and more efficient in terms of time and paperwork.
9d7ab8ea-4c87-1 I dd-96bb-000077b07658.html.
239. See generally Christopher S. Stewart, The Axis of Commerce, PORTFOLIO MAG., Sept. 2008,
available at http://www.portfolio.com/news-markets/intemational-news/portfolio/2008/08/13/US-
Trades-With-lran-Via-Dubai.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Andrew Davenport, Draining the Financial Swamp, 12 THE J. OF INT'L SECURITY AFF. 27
(2007), available at http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2007/12/davenport.php.
245. Anna Fifield, How Iranians are Avoiding Sanctions, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2008, available at
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6ca69788-0a48-11 dd-b5bl -0000779fd2ac.html.
246. Id.
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Note: my intention in this section was not to single out Saudi Arabia and the
UAE for reproach. In fact, if not for page limitations, I could write volumes on the
current apathy and duplicity of our "allies" abroad. Doing so, however, would be
redundant with regard to this central premise: the system, as-is and as presented, is
broken. Otherwise-friendly nations in the Middle East and in Asia have very little
incentive to cooperate with our AML/CFT programs, period.
B. Incentivized Cooperation
The US and European partners must find alternatives to financially
contentious AML/CFT program implementation. In theory, while individuals in
poorer nations benefit from informal flows (in cash, courier, or trade form), the
governments of those nations do not. In fact, hawala-type systems were
developed, in part, to avoid perceived corruption by circumventing officialdom.
As such, one would imagine that these governments are eager to recapture this lost
revenue by cracking down on the informal sector, but this does not appear to be the
case. Perhaps the problem is that governments fail to see just how profitable
regulation could be.
As a first step, one might point out the extent of lost revenue, thus motivating
cash-strapped governments to commit to often substantial enforcement
expenditures. In Bangladesh, for example, 40-50 percent of annual government
revenues are generated through customs duties.247  In dollar terms, that's
approximately $3.4 billion.2 48 One would assume that these kinds of figures would
demonstrate to the Bangladeshi government, for example, that by allowing duty
manipulation/avoidance (commonly used in the settling stage of the hawala
process) a primary source of their funding is threatened.
On the other hand, governments may very well be aware of the extent to
which informal financial systems thrive in their countries. There is even evidence
to suggest that they may be encouraging, for a price, such sub-rosa activity. In a
2005 survey of 73 official remittance firms (i.e. those that have registered and
presumably comply with all additional MSB regulations) in the US, nearly half of
those operators cite recipient country corruption as a major obstacle to business. 249
By extension, if corruption is that prevalent in official circles, the "hush money"
required of illegal operators must be greater in both occurrence and amount.
In the same 2005 survey, the median firm processed $5 million in transactions
per month. In strictly financial terms, with numbers this large it's obvious just
how profitable graft, even in small percentages, could be for non-cooperative
governments. Further, and in the social policy context, by allowing injections of
unregulated, untaxed dollars to reach their populations, regimes feel freed, to some
extent, from having to provide public services to their people. This is particularly
247. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 11, at 6.
248. See CIA, supra note 32.
249. Andreassen, supra note 192, at 5, 11.
250. Id. at 15.
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true when, as in the case of Afghanistan, 80 percent of all healthcare and
educational services are provided by NGOs.25'
A second way to entice non-cooperative governments to enforce AML/CFT
policy is to have them partner with formal financial institutions in the private
sector. This is precisely what occurred between the United States and Mexico. I
argue, however, that the institutionalization of the MEX/US remittance corridor,
this formalizing the informal, isn't replicable. This is principally so because the
sheer volume of money, and thus the incentive for the private sector to participate,
doesn't exist in any other bilateral relationship.
"In 2002, Mexico was the largest recipient of formal remittances flows in the
world. 2 52 By 2003, remittance flows reached $13 billion, thus surpassing both
foreign direct investment (FDI) to Mexico and tourism-related revenues.253 This
was made possible because policymakers at the highest levels insisted on
regulatory harmonization. This coordination was so involved that an FDIC-
Consulate General of Mexico joint task force was even established to educate
migrant workers on their remittance options.254
At the individual level, on the US side, the Treasury Department "asked the
Federal Reserve to work with Mexico to improve the payments system between the
countries, which it did. At [Treasury's] suggestion the World Bank also got
involved .... ,,55 The Mexicans, for their part, simultaneously strengthened the
security of, and access to, Mexican Consular I.D. Cards (Matricula Consular de
Alta Seguridad). With Treasury and the Fed on board, and with the Mexican
government guaranteeing the fidelity of new security features on the cards, Wells
Fargo, Citibank, Bank of America, US Bank, HSBC, Washington Mutual, Banco
Popular, and others all facilitated remittance senders.256 Ultimately, remittance
volumes encouraged harmonization which encouraged broad competition for
business which sent the prices for such services plummeting. As a result, workers
stopped using the informal sector in droves.257
This corridor formalization is exactly what the World Bank's Sam Maimbo
has called for: "an effective strategy for isolating illicit funds being transferred
through the hawala system is to encourage legal transfers to migrate to
conventional financial instruments."258  That said, Mr. Maimbo admits the
following: "[t]he effectiveness of this strategy depends on the ability of formal
251. Michael A. Cohen, Maria Figueroa KtipcOi & Parag Khanna, The New Colonialists, 167
FOREIGN POL'Y 74, 74 (2008).
252. Raul Hernandez-Coss, Comparing Mature and Nascent Remittance Corridors, in
REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS FOR HAWALA AND OTHER REMITTANCE SYSTEMS 17, 18 (International
Monetary Fund 2005),
253. Raul Hernandez-Coss, Lessons from the US-Mexico Remittance Corridor on Shifting from
Informal to Formal Transfer Systems 5 (World Bank Publications 2005) [hereinafter Lessons].
254. Id. at 14.
255. TAYLOR, supra note 49, at 27.
256. Lessons, supra note 254, at 11,
257. Id. at 21.
258. Maimbo, supra note 35, at 62.
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financial instruments to compete with the hawala dealers with respect to exchange
rates, speedy service, and coverage of areas that now lack banking services. 2 59 As
stated earlier, trade volumes are simply too low elsewhere to create this kind of
extraordinary bilateral facilitation. And, without such governmental support,
traditional financial institutions are unlikely to invest the time and money to induce
the kind of migration to conventional financial instruments that Maimbo is calling
for. Further, even where substantial flows might exist, the security challenges
involved automatically rule out involvement by the likes of HSBC, Bank of
America, and other majors.
It must be noted that even in the case of the US/MEX corridor, coverage areas
are still limited principally to urban centers. Thus, the draw of door-to-door
hawala delivery still remains for underserviced rural communities even where
there is extraordinary governmental cooperation. It must also be noted that any
US, World Bank, and IMF involvement automatically complicates program
acceptance in the Middle East and in South Asia.
Dr. Hamed El-Said and Dr. Jane Harrigan summarize the reasons for this in
their 2006 Middle East Journal article "Globalization, International Finance, and
Political Islam in the Arab World. 2 60  Point one: the conditions attached to
international aid stemming from "official organizations, particularly those based in
Washington" often demand a decline in social welfare spending.261 Point two:
Islamist groups are eager to fill the gap by providing their own support through
religious charities.262 Point three: Islamist groups then exploit the withdrawal of
the state from the welfare sphere, thus calling into question the political legitimacy
of the regime. 63 As an aside, this is particularly troubling giving that US foreign
policy promotes democracy worldwide. As such, the results of those democratic
elections, if/when held, are sure to reflect such charitable giving - or lack thereof.
In sum, NGOs are not the answer because "none ... is anxious to perform so
well that it works itself out of a job. 264 Traditional financial institutions in the
private sector are not the answer for the dearth of incentives and plethora of
security challenges aforementioned. And, perhaps the World Bank and the IMF
are excludable for the way in which they are allegedly perceived in the Muslim
world. All of that being said, what alternatives then remain to incentivize
(financially, culturally, religiously, politically) governments to push business away
from hawaladars? Answer: micro-lenders.
259. Id.
260. Hamned El-Said & Jane Harrigan, Globalization, International Finance, and Political Islam in
the Arab World, 60 THE MIDDLE E, J. 444, 446-47 (2006).
261, Id. at 446,
262. Id.
263. Id. at 446-47.
264. Cohen, supra note 252, at 74.
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C. Micro-Lenders as an Alternative
In 1983, Muhammad Yunus, with the support of the Bangladeshi government,
founded Grameen Bank.2 65 Grameen, as a micro-credit institution, lent very small,
uncollateralized sums to the poorest of individuals - to women in particular - in
rural communities. 266 Distributions were hand-delivered by bankers that lived in
the surrounding areas, spoke the local dialects, and lived by the same cultural
norms. 2 67 Dispersals were not contingent upon skills training and nor were they
hampered by superfluous administration and consultancy.26 8  In fact,
micromanagement enmity led young Grameen to butt heads with the World Bank
on more than one occasion. There was even a public rebuke of then-World Bank
president Barber Conable during a televised conference in 1986.269
While the World Bank did end up funding the Grameen Replicator Trust - a
fund to establish Grameen-type programs globally, the Polli Karma Sahayak
Foundation - a micro-credit wholesaler, and Consultative Group to Assist the Poor
(CGAP) and other Grameen initiatives, 270 this initial confrontation actually bought
Grameen a bit of "street credit" with poorer nations that may or may not have
shared the concerns listed in the Said-Harrigan article. And, while US officials
like Jimmy Carter and Hillary Clinton did eventually visit Grameen branches, only
Bengali officials were in attendance at the opening ceremony. Further, the
ceremony, held in Jamurki, Tangail, was begun with recitations from the Qu'ran.271
A note on sharia compliance. With an ultraconservative Iranian regime now
in power, it is of particular interest that an adviser to Ahmadinejad on women's
affairs said the following: "There is nothing in shariah law or the Qu'ran against
what [Grameen is] doing., 272  Many Islamic scholars feel that Grameen is
exempted from the religious injunction on charging interest (riba) because those
being charged interest also own stakes in the bank27 3  "The purpose of the
religious injunction against interest is to protect the poor from usury, but where the
poor own their own bank, the interest is in effect paid to the company they own,
and therefore to themselves. 274
This theatre, whether by design or not, earned our Nobel Laureate vast
cultural and religious dividends. Yunus was able to neutralize the concerns of Drs.
El-Said and Harrigan with nothing more than a low key opening ceremony and a
superficial tiff with a World Bank official. By allying with the government of
Bangladesh - the government at one point owned 60 percent of the bank -
Grameen was able to ensure its political survival. With an equity position, the
265. Muhammad Yunus, BANKER TO THE POOR 119 (Public Affairs 2003) (1999).
266. Id. at 57-58, 71
267. See id. at 100-01, 106.
268. Id. at 140-41
269. Id. at 142-43.
270. Id at 164, 166, 168.
271. Id. at 123.
272. Id. at 110.
273. Id.
274. Id.
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government was incentivized to make the project work, to ensure economic
success. Simultaneously, by underwriting the project, the government reaps the
benefit of appearing empathetic and effectual.
With a proven track record in not only Bangladesh, but in India, Nepal,
Vietnam, China, Latin America, and Africa, I suggest that we encourage micro-
credit organizations to expand into the remittance field. We can promote these
groups as official alternatives to hawala. Micro-lenders, as with hawaladars, are in
a unique position to address all four informal sector incentives: (1) the absence of
formal sector alternatives, (2) cultural familiarity, (3) affordability, and (4)
anonymity. Further, as these micro-lender-MSB hybrids (MLMSBs) pair up with
their respective government partners, thus linking their financial fates, one would
expect to see a crackdown on market competitors (i.e. the informal sector). Market
dominance would replace any revenue (think bribes) that would be lost in
AML/CFT enforcement, and would bolster the credibility of these regimes with
their own people.
1. Formal Sector Alternatives
By their nature, micro-lenders are located in rural areas that are isolated from
capital and professional services. 275 These are the very communities over which
hawaladars now hold a monopoly. Remember that even with the US/MEX
corridor, the formal sector was unable to reach beyond urban centers. Micro-
lenders are able to thrive in these regions where traditional institutions cannot, and
do not want to, operate.
2. Cultural Familiarity
Micro-credit staffers embody the trust element that is so essential to the
success of hawala, for they too are from the communities which they serve.
Language proficiency and cultural understanding provide access to these outlier
villages and inspires trust and, thereafter, community participation. In addition, in
many micro-lending models borrowers are simultaneously shareholders. By
owning the organization, or branch of that organization, it's no longer viewed as an
intrusion, but as an addition to the community.
3. Affordability
Micro-lending institutions are able to keep their costs down by utilizing local
resources and by conducting no-frills operations. With local staffers and Spartan
offices, these organizations can operate at a fraction of the budgetary and
infrastructural requirements of their more traditional peers. And, with government
partners, MLMSBs should receive preferential lending and tax incentives.
Further, the availability of turnkey technologies now allows these businesses
to operate more efficiently, without duplication of process or personnel. This
would also help in keeping track of AML/CFT due diligence and security features.
Yes, regulation -much of which micro-credit institutions now manage to avoid -
costs money. But, an expansion in services would offset an expansion in the cost
275. See id. at 121, 141
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of compliance via cross-selling. For example, many recipients of micro-credit are
simultaneously recipients of remittances. Further, many recipients of remittances
need to exchange those monies into local currency. Lastly, the adoption of risk-
based-modeling with regards to transfer amounts276 would exclude many of the
transactions that now occur, thus limiting the amount of actual AML/CFT
reporting required.
Without doubt, the initial period of service expansion would be difficult both
in terms of money and personnel. But, USAID and World Council of Credit
Unions (WOCCO) provide capacity-building support. 277  WOCCO further
provides, via its International Remittance Network (IRnet), "a vehicle by which to
send and distribute remittances at low cost, '278 thus blunting an inevitable increase
in marketing costs that MLMSBs would incur on the sending side. In addition,
SWIFT can provide direct funds transfer, and commercial bank and transmitter
partnerships can supply "access to international payment networks, foreign
exchange access, and risk management expertise. 2 79
The bottom-line, however, is that none of the above can occur without one of
a few things occurring, the first being a radical change in policy and regulation that
would allow the creation of MLMSBs. The second would be a change of legal
status, thus morphing micro-lenders into versions of full-fledged financial
institutions. The third would be a series of micro-lender-private-sector
partnerships with those that already have the appropriate legal status and licensure
to conduct expanded financial services. With a dearth of research in this area, I am
not in a position to recommend one action above another. I would only add that, as
Pankaj Ghemawat writes in his latest book,28° contrary to Thomas Friedman's
assertions, the world is not flat. 281 As such, what might work well in India might
not work at all in Pakistan or Bangladesh or Malaysia.
4. Anonymity
With government partners, MLMSBs would escape much of the desire for
anonymity that illegal hawaladars (and by extension, their customers) now seek.
276. Transactions that are below 'X' amount do not match criminal/money laundering transmission
profiles and thus should be excluded from many of the AML/CFT reporting requirements. CHINYERE
EGWUAGU ET AL., AML/CFT Regulation: Implications for Financial Service Providers that Serve Low-
income People 5 (Consultative Group to Assist the Poor & World Bank 2005),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTAML/Resources/396511-1146581427871 /AML-implications
complete.pdf.
277. Anne Hastings, Address at the Global Microcredit Summit in Halifax, Nova Scotia: Entry of
MFIs into the Remittance Market: Opportunities and Challenges (Nov. 13, 2006),
http://www.microcreditsummit.org/papersWorkshops/23-Hastings.pdf.
278. Id. at 29.
279. Id. at 31; see Jennifer Isem, Rani Deshpande & Judith van Doom, Crafting a Money Transfers
Strategy: Guidance For Pro-Poor Financial Service Providers, 10 OCCASIONAL PAPER 20
(Consultative Group to Assist the Poor 2005), available at http://www.cgap.org/gm/document-
1.9.2704/OccasionalPaper.l 0.pdf.
280. See PANKAJ GHEMAWAT, REDEFINING GLOBAL STRATEGY: CROSSING BORDERS IN A WORLD
WHERE DIFFERENCES STILL MATTER (Harvard Business School Press 2007).
281. Id. at 10.
VOL. 37:3
2009 HAWALA, MONEY LAUNDERING, AND TERRORISM FINANCE
Illegal immigrants will continue to associate formal financial institutions with
governmental organs, but MLMSB alliances with receiving countries are unlikely
to invoke this same trepidation. Pakistan, for example, is unlikely to report the
legal status of a U.K. remitter to authorities in England; Pakistan, after all, benefits
from the money being sent home. Further, the receiving government would be in
no position to adjudge the legality of a remitter living abroad. Lastly, "anonymity
by default" becomes a lesser obstacle because micro-lenders, by training and by
practice, are accustomed to dealing with, and putting at ease, individuals with
lower levels of formal education.
D. Conclusion
Nothing, including the creation of MLMSBs, will prove to be a panacea if
enforcement does not follow. While our country develops cutting-edge national
security programs, far too often the production stage is both where policy begins
and ends. Granted, enforcement dollars are finite, but I fear that inaction is
regarded as safer (politically) and has, therefore become the bureaucratic default.
Further, I have decided that lack of execution in this particular area either
stems from a loss of interest, or from deliberate misdirection regarding the recent
implementation of a secret program that is many, many times more effective than
was SWIFT. I am a cynic by nature, and unfortunately that means that I believe
the former to be true. Sexier topics naturally prevail in an election season,
however, given that terrorists tend to stage attacks around election cycles (e.g.
Spain and Pakistan), let's hope that I'm wrong.
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SACRIFICIAL LAMBS OF GLOBALIZATION:
CHILD LABOR IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
DR. RANEE KHOOSHIE LAL PANJABI*
I. INTRODUCTION
The idea of progress has dominated global thinking for the past few centuries.
Politically, progress has enshrined concepts of human rights and brought freedom
and democracy to many parts of the world that had previously only known
absolutism and autocracy. Economically, the notion of progress has knit the world
via the pathways of globalization into an inter-dependent unit where people engage
in an international division of labor involving all levels of manufacturing and
service provision. The resulting growth of human-developed technology has
shrunk the world in terms of communications and dissemination of knowledge on a
scale never conceived before.
With this development of a vast and powerful international market place there
should have been a greater sharing of profits and the benefits. Unfortunately, this
has not been the case. Socially, globalization has brought greater comprehension
of diversity and the necessity for tolerance of the infinite variety of cultures that
flourish on this amazing planet. However, economic "progress" has been largely
at the expense of the most vulnerable elements of almost every society. Those
elements, the poor, the illiterate, and particularly the children of the poor have paid
a terrible price so that we in the richer countries might enjoy an orgy of
consumerism at reasonable prices. Our need to buy and consume, but always at
very low prices, has required that food and manufactured goods be produced to sell
inexpensively but still provide sufficient profit. One methodology to achieve this
aim is to utilize either very cheap labor - hence the export of manufacturing from
the West to the developing world - or worse, much worse, to use slavery and child
labor, and pay almost nothing to those who make our goods and harvest our food.
This research demonstrates that child labor prevails across the planet, in both
rich and poor countries. Although it may be decreasing in some parts of the world,
that is no comfort to those children caught in its brutal grip. This research has also
verified the extent of international concern about this terrible practice, which robs
the childhood of thousands.. The Economist stated that of "all the alleged sins of
. Dr. Ranee K.L. Panjabi is a Labor Relations Arbitrator and a Full Professor of History at
Memorial University of Newfoundland, Canada. This article is dedicated to my mother, Lata K.L.
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globalization, child labour has been among the most scorned."'  Far from the
promise of progress for those victims of globalization, this new internationalized
marketplace has resuscitated the horrors of the past, such as slavery, human
trafficking, and child labor-widely perceived as one of the most insidious of all
crimes- against the most vulnerable and defenseless members of every society.
To be fair, we have progressed to the point of internationally outlawing child
labor in a number of high-sounding and well-meaning legal instruments.
Unfortunately, most countries only pay lip service to these instruments, while
turning a blind eye to the prevalence of a practice that dooms thousands of children
around the world to a life of back-breaking labor, brutal mutilation, physical and
sexual torture, and emotional and psychological trauma. The International Labour
Organization (ILO) has deemed the "economic exploitation of children . . . an
insult to humanity."2 Any search for the reason why, in a world so dedicated to the
concept of progress, such egregious human rights violations persist, only leads to
the realization that children "are employed because they are easier to exploit and
they can be paid less," if they are paid at all.3
This article seeks to emphasize the nature of the problem, the immense scope
of child labor internationally, and to remind us that we already have verbal
commitments and laws. What we need is a greater will to promote their
implementation, and rid our world of this terrible crime that brutalizes so many
children. Space constraints restrict this article to dealing specifically with two
manifestations of child labor: first, agriculture, which involves most of the children
who are forced to work; and second, the labor roles of children in warfare as child
soldiers and as sex slaves, porters and spies. Extensive research has clarified the
idea that child labor cannot be eradicated in a vacuum which disregards societal
breakdown caused by poverty, environmental degradation, civil strife, and
economic turmoil. An analysis and assessment of the situation has yielded some
ideas whereby the developed world can act multilaterally and meaningfully to
make a difference in the developing world's poorest countries, many found in
Africa. With a new American administration, and a president committed and
dedicated to the politics of change, a new look at multilateral solutions might
provide answers that can make a viable and long-term difference. With no oblique
pun intended, it is obvious that internationally child labor is a 'motherhood' issue.
The child labor practices that prevail across the planet, even in the progressive
democracies of the Western world, have few defenders, and a vast number of
detractors. If the ultimate goal is still international progress, then child labor is a
self-defeating practice in terms of the future of our planet. We cannot go on
exploiting children and basing our economies, even partially, on the ill-gotten
1. Sickness or Symptom?, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 5, 2004, at 73.
2. INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION [ILO], Facts and Figures on Child Labour 2 (1999),
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/comp/child/download/pdf/statistics.pdf [hereinafter Facts and
Figures on Child Labour 1999].
3. Ximena de la Barra, Defeating the Trends: In Search of a Better Future, in 4 ADVANCES IN
EDUCATION IN DIVERSE COMMUNITIES: RESEARCH, POLICY AND PRAxIS 477, 484 (Carol Camp Yeakey
et al. eds., 2006).
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fruits of child labor. If all of us can determine individually, nationally, and
internationally not to allow this practice to prevail; we will secure a decent future
for this entire planet. This is a major and significant issue of human rights. Any
assumptions we have of being 'progressive' in this twenty-first century are
eradicated by our acceptance of a form of ruthless exploitation that brutalizes the
most helpless in our world to enhance our own creature comforts. The
International Labour Organization has stated that the "effective abolition of child
labour is one of the most urgent challenges of our time."4  If we fail in this
endeavor to rid the world of this heinous crime, we doom the future of the entire
planet. Rarely has true progress-idealistic progress, progress that is meaningful
and valuable-been grounded in exploitation, acquiescence, and indifference to the
fate of children.
II. DEFINITIONS
It has been correctly emphasized that "[t]here is no universally accepted
definition of 'child labor.' Varying definitions of the term are used by
international organizations, non-governmental organizations, trade unions and
other interest groups. Writers and speakers don't always specify what definition
they are using, and that often leads to confusion.",
5
National, cultural, and societal norms dictate the parameters that define
"childhood" as a distinct time in the life of a human being. Childhood is thereby
distinguished from adulthood, which can occur at different times, depending on
gender, culture, social value systems, and laws of different societies. In a bid to
provide a degree of uniformity, while still giving the nod to national divergence on
this grounding issue, the United Nations has set the parameter for childhood at age
eighteen, "unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained
earlier."6 States ratifying the ILO's Minimum Age Convention are required to
specify a minimum working age.7 The results have determined that countries in
the developing world set the parameter at fourteen years, while developed
countries tend toward age fifteen.8
Definitional discussions about child labor point to the necessity to distinguish
between labor that provides a child with a useful set of skills for earning a living in
adulthood, a type of education, and labor that includes assisting the family in
household chores or farm work, geared to familial survival and economic
progress. According to author and Director for the Elimination of Child Labour at
the International Labour Organization, Guy Thijs:
4. ILO, Facts on Child Labour (June 2005), http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inf/
download/child/childday05.pdf [hereinafter Facts on Child Labour 2005].
5. Images of Child Labor: Photography for Social Change, Child Labor: Frequently Asked
Questions, http://www.childlaborphotoproject.org/childlabor.html.
6. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, art. 1, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (Nov. 20,
1989).
7. Id. at art. 32.
8. Global Child Labour Figures Fall, B.B.C. NEWS, May 4, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/low/in-depth/4973088.stm.
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participation in certain types of light work, such as helping parents care
for the home and family for short periods in the day, or teenagers
working for a few hours before or after school or during holidays to
earn pocket money, is considered to be part of growing up for boys and
girls and a means of acquiring basic survival and practical skills.
9
Although a very broad definition would encompass any work performed by
children, it is universally recognized that some forms of work involving family
chores have a positive role to play in child development 0 As John J. Tierney Jr.
has explained, "the type of child labor that has become the focus of international
concern is the abusive, unhealthy, commercial exploitation of children that
interferes with their education."" The problems of child labor relate to
exploitative labor, which is usually unpaid and unrecompensed and deprives
children of any meaningful future and degrades them in every way imaginable.1
2
The International Labour Organization has estimated that mentally, emotionally,
and physically degrading child labor affects one in six children in the world
today. 13 The complexity of defining such work has been admitted by the United
Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF); which explained in
its 1997 Report on the State of the World's Children that such work has to be
gauged along a linear continuum, comprising destructive work at one extreme and
beneficial work at the opposite side. 14 Between these polar opposites exists a
range of work typologies that "need not negatively affect a child's development.'
15
Unfortunately, whether the particular child labor is a constructive preparation
for adulthood or the worst form of exploitation is usually a subjective assessment,
often based on cultural and societal norms, which can defeat the best intentions of
international laws and covenants. The framers of the United Nations Convention
on the Rights of the Child were quite aware of this dilemma, and of the fact that
severe exploitation could be passed off as an apprenticeship for adulthood.'
6
Similarly, a child's contribution to working off a family's debt of indentured labor
could, depending on one's social values, be perceived as a useful and helpful form
of assistance to the family unit, rather than a cruel and heinous extension by
generation of bonded enslavement. Perceptions colored by national and cultural
norms cloud the definitions in this debate. The ultimate eradication of exploitative
child labor will depend largely on a realization that, although national standards
differ, there has to be international acknowledgment and effective implementation
9. Guy Thijs, National Policies and Programmes, in ACTION AGAINST CHILD LABOUR 3, 4
(Nelien Haspels & Michele Jankanish eds., 2000); Global Child Labour Figures Fall, supra note 8.
10. John J. Tierney Jr., Regulated Child Labor is Necessary in Developing Countries, in CHILD
LABOR AND SWEATSHOPS 24, 27 (Ann Manheimer ed., 2006).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Facts on Child Labour 2005, supra note 4.
14. UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN FUND [UNICEF], THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S CHILDREN:
WHAT IS CHILD LABOR 24 (1997), available at http://www.unicef.org/sowc97/report/ [hereinafter
STATE OF THE WORLD'S CHILDREN 1997].
15. Id.
16. G.A. Res. 44/25, supra note 6, at art. 32.
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of the principle that child labor, that is exploitative in a universally-recognized
manner, is unacceptable in this twenty-first century. We cannot allow definitional
disputation to dominate the debate over the eradication of this practice. One way
to cut the Gordian Knot of such bickering is perhaps to work globally toward the
implementation of compulsory education for all boys and girls through high
school. Should this goal ever be achieved, children would automatically be
removed from sweatshops, brothels, mines, and quarries, where they labor and
despite employer and parental objections, be placed in school for most of the day.
The World Development Report concluded in 2007 that there are approximately
130 million children, between the ages of fifteen and twenty-four years old, who
are unable to read and write.1 7 A consistent universal effort to deal with this
problem of mass illiteracy and child labor would simultaneously address two major
problems that afflict the world's children and the future development of the planet.
One of the most comprehensive definitions of child labor that the vast
literature provides is that selected by Guy Thijs, who has explained that child labor
comprises work that is "mentally, physically, socially or morally dangerous and
harmful to children," and is "work carried out to the detriment and endangerment
of the child, in violation of international law and national legislation."1 8 It is
important to emphasize that definitional disputes ought not to detract us from the
main task at hand, namely the urgent alleviation of the the lot of the most
vulnerable and helpless members of our society.
III. SCOPE OF CHILD LABOR
According to Cathryne L. Schmitz, the "work of children is a global issue."
1 9
Whether perceived through the lens of geography, economic activity, international
division of labor, or through any investigative prism, the results are staggering in
terms of the numbers of children who are exploited and the range of work they
perform. Arguably, children constitute a very significant component of the global
economy, and comprise its most exploited element. It has been estimated that, as
this new century began, approximately two billion persons--one-third of the
people--on this planet were under the age of eighteen, with one-tenth being under
the age of five.20  Approximately 90 percent of these youngsters live in the
developing world.2' In its 2005 Facts on Child Labour, the International Labour
Organization estimated that about 73 million of working children were younger
than ten years of age.22
Statistics vary depending on the researcher's established parameters in
individual inquiries. Kebebew Ashagrie attributed this to an absence of
17. WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT: DEVELOPMENT AND THE NEXT GENERATION,
REP. 35999, 37 (2006), available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServ
er/WDSP/IB/2006/09/13/000112742_20060913111024/Rendered/PDF/35999WDROcomplete.pdf.
18. Thijs, supra note 9, at 4.
19. CATHRYNE L. SCHMITZ ET AL., CHILD LABOR: A GLOBAL VIEW I (Cathryne L. Schmitz et al.
eds., 2004).
20. de la Barra, supra note 3, at 478-79.
21. Id. (citation omitted).
22. Facts on Child Labour 2005, supra note 4.
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appropriate survey methodology concerning child labor, which is "a hidden or
invisible phenomenon," and concluded that there is "a wide variety of guesstimates
as to the number of working children under fifteen years of age, ranging from 200
to 400 million worldwide. 23  Clearly, while determining the existence of
exploitative child labor in particular situations can be a challenge, enumerating the
practice statistically is even more difficult, given that the work frequently occurs
under the radar and is hidden from law enforcement and non-governmental
agencies. It is not easy for enumerators to persuade perpetrating employers to
cooperate when the latter are aware that their use of children is against national and
international laws. The plethora of international instruments has at least
disseminated the realization that the practice is frowned upon, and that there are
elements around the world that seek its eradication. However, this awareness, in
those who perpetrate the exploitation of children, has led to a more clandestine and
more invidious methodology for utilizing child labor. As with slavery and
trafficking, child labor forms part of the illegal, underground economy in many
countries, and is therefore much more difficult to deal with and to eradicate. 4 The
inconsistent statistics are indicative of the unfortunate success of perpetrators of
this practice at camouflaging their activities. The varying enumerations
notwithstanding, the conclusions are similar and frightening. Too many children
are trapped in this terrible form of exploitation. No world that strives for
progressive improvement can countenance such egregious violations of the rights
of children.
Complicating any attempt at statistical clarity is also the fact that some
children work full time, others for a few hours, and others only seasonally.
Moreover, the designation of exploitative child labor can vary depending on the
economic sector, the familial financial circumstances, individual employers, and a
host of other variables that can bedevil any cohesive attempt to establish firm
statistical data. Additionally, the age groups of children being considered
statistically can vary depending on individual enumeration systems, from very
wide inclusive boundaries to very restricted criteria. For instance, Zoe Chafe,
writing for the World Watch Institute, has commented that "[a]ll children who
report having worked at least one hour on any day during a seven-day period are
considered economically active.,
25
In a valiant effort to cope with this very challenging and complex situation of
enumeration the International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour and
the Statistical Information and Monitoring Programme on Child Labour
(IPEC/SIMPOC) coordinated "an internationally accepted definition of
employment," which focuses on paid and unpaid work performed by children in
23. Kebebew Ashagrie, Improving the Knowledge Base on Child Labour, in ACTION AGAINST
CHILD LABOUR 117, 117 (Nelien Haspels & Michele Jankanish eds., 2000).
24. See generally Ranee K.L. Panjabi, Born Free Yet Everywhere in Chains: Global Slavery in the
Twenty-First Century, 37 DENV. J. INT'L L & POL'Y 1 (2008).
25. Zoe Chafe, Child Labor Harms Many Young Lives, WORLD WATCH INSTITUTE, Nov. 8, 2007,
http://www.worldwatch.org/node/5479.
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the formal and nonformal economies in rural and urban areas.26 The definition
excludes work that children perform in their own homes.27 Although the
IPEC/SIMPOC contribution has been very significant, the challenges of
quantifying and analyzing the fundamental problems remain, particularly with
respect to those economic activities that are illegal.
There are numerous attempts at shedding light on both the scale and the
proliferation of this type of abuse of children. The Christian Children's Fund has
estimated that about 218 million children, aged five through seventeen, are
engaged in child labor-excluding child domestic labor.28  More tragic is the
organization's estimate that about 126 million of these children are engaged in
hazardous labor including working in mines or in situations involving pesticides,
chemicals, and dangerous machinery.29
These statistics can be compared with the data of the International Programme
on the Elimination of Child Labour working in tandem with the Statistical
Information and Monitoring Programme on Child Labour.30 Excluding children
who work in their own homes, this group estimated paid and unpaid economic
activity by children in rural and urban areas.31 Their very important 2002 report
concluded that 352 million children, between the ages of five and seventeen years,
were working as of the year 2000.32 It was found that as many as 73 million of
these children were under ten years old.33 A few years later, the American
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO)
estimated that, as of November 2007, over eight million children were trapped in
the most insidious manifestations of child labor, specifically "slavery, trafficking,
debt bondage, forced military service, prostitution and pomography." 34 With an
obvious view to highlighting one of the most heinous precursors that leads to a
childhood of forced labor, the International Labour Organization, in its June 2005
Facts on Child Labour, estimated that over a million children were victims of
trafficking.35
Although "the developed countries of the world are far from innocent of the
plagues of exploitative child labor and human trafficking, 36 the problem is far
26. SCHMITZ, supra note 19, at 5.
27. Id.
28. CHRISTIAN CHILDREN'S FUND, CHILD LABOR 4 (June 2008), http://www.christianchildren
sfund.org/uploadedFiles/PublicSite/news/Newsroom/Current/DevEd%20EducationChild%20Labor_
Youth%20VersionFinal(1).pdf.
29. Id.
30. ILO, Every Child Counts: New Global Estimates on Child Labour (2002),
http://www.ilo.org/ipecinfo/product/download.do?type=document&id=742 [hereinafter Every Child
Counts].
31. Id. at 29.
32. Id. at 5.
33. SCHMITZ, supra note 19, at 5.
34. Posting of James Parks to AFL-CIO Now Blog, Time to End Child Labor Now (Nov. 13,
2007), http://blog.aflcio.org/2007/11/13/time-to-end-child-labor-now.
35. Facts on Child Labour 2005, supra note 4.
36. 4 ADVANCES IN EDUCATION IN DIVERSE COMMUNITIES: RESEARCH, POLICY AND PRAXIS xv
(Carol Camp Yeakey et al. eds., 2006).
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more extensive in the developing world, where-by one estimate-there are
approximately 1.3 billion young people, the "most ever in history. 37 It is fairly
obvious to any researcher in this field that statistical enumeration of the problem is
far from precise. However, there can be no doubt that the evil of child labor
prevails on a gigantic scale, and that the world needs to act decisively, not simply
to frame and formulate pronouncements and conventions, but to act to end this
brutal practice.
It is clear that the practice prevails globally, with no country exempt from this
violation of the human rights of children. UNICEF, in its 2007 Progress for
Children report, emphasized the economic activities of children between the ages
of five and fourteen.38 Based on regional data relating to 2006, the Report found
that the worst exploitation of children occurred in Sub-Saharan Africa with 35
percent of children engaged in labor.39 Such economic exploitation of children
affected 13 percent of children in Asia, 11 percent in Latin America and the
Caribbean, 7 percent in East Asia and the Pacific Region, 9 percent in the Middle
East and North Africa.4 ° UNICEF concluded that approximately 158 million
children work globally, an overwhelming majority of them in the developing
world.41 The high estimated percentage for Africa notwithstanding, the largest
number of working children are located in Asia, where in 2005 an astounding 127
million children fourteen and younger were at work.4 2 As of June 2005, the
International Labour Organization estimated that 2.5 million children worked in
developed economies and another 2.5 million worked in the transition economies
that appeared after the fall of the Soviet Union.43  The practice is so globally
prevalent that it will require a multilateral approach and international will to
eradicate and eliminate this human rights violation.
On a more positive note, several enumerators have found some signs of
decline in child labor. Globally, the estimated 246 million laborers between the
ages of five and seventeen in 2000 had dropped to an estimated 218 million by
2004.44 This drop is significantly lower than the 246 million reported by the ILO
in its 2002 Report.45 The ILO concluded in 2006 that there was a noticeable drop
in Latin America and the Caribbean over the previous four years.46 In that region
it was estimated that the number of working children had dropped by two-thirds
between the ILO's Reports of 2002 and 2006, with Brazil showing a remarkable 60
37. WORLD BANK, supra note 17 at 4.
38. UNICEF, 6 PROGRESS FOR CHILDREN: A WORLD FIT FOR CHILDREN STATISTICAL REVIEW 43
(2007), http://www.unicef.org/progressforchildren/2007n6/files/Progress for Children- _No._6.pdf
[hereinafter PROGRESS FOR CHILDREN].
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Facts on Child Labour 2005, supra note 4.
43. Id.
44. ILO, Facts on Child Labour 1 (2006), http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/-
--dcomm/documents/publication/wcms_067558.pdf [hereinafter Facts on Child Labour 2006].
45. Global Child Labour Figures Fall, supra note 8.
46. Facts on Child Labour 2006, supra note 44.
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percent drop in the number of working children aged five to nine years old. 47 Most
recent estimates by the ILO suggest that about 5 percent of Latin American
children aged five to fourteen are working.48
While numbers fell in Latin America, there was little change in Africa.4 9 In
its 2005 Facts on Child Labour, the ILO recorded that sub-Saharan Africa had the
largest proportion of working children; numbering 48 million and comprising
about one-third of children fourteen and younger.5° In Asia there were still 122
million children working, a decline of only five million51 over a four year period
with specific reference to children aged five to fourteen years.52 Asia is the most
densely populated part of the world, and it has the highest number of child
laborers.53
Much more research and attention has to be directed toward the prevalence of
child labor in populations at risk, such as indigenous peoples of various societies,
both in the developing and developed world. These marginalized groups 54 have
standards of living so low and their grip on survival is so fragile that parents are
often persuaded and coerced into selling their children, so that the remainder of the
family may eat for a few weeks. Additionally, the prevalence of a massive refugee
crisis, affecting virtually every country in the world, has further endangered
children. Families disrupted and uprooted from their homes and lifestyles are
more likely to be compelled to send children to labor as a means of survival.55
Sometimes, children are separated from parents as families flee from armed
conflict. In such situations children can easily be kidnapped and enslaved. 56
Countries torn asunder by war, terrorism, and civil conflict are particularly prey to
internal and external refugee crises.5 7 In these situations the plight of children
becomes really dire. Child labor cannot really be eradicated permanently until the
conditions that render children so vulnerable are also addressed multilaterally.
Unfortunately all the high-sounding phrases of international covenants become
meaningless and almost farcical in the context of armed conflict, rebellions, and
wars which destroy the fabric of societies, the unity of families, and provide more
child laborers for exploitation in the economic markets of this globalized world.
The range of economic activity undertaken by children is indicative of the
extent to which the global marketplace has come to rely on this egregious form of
human exploitation. In some countries there is scarcely an economic enterprise
that does not participate in some form of child labor. The ILO estimated that, as of
June 2005, 70 percent of working children were involved in agriculture,
47. Global Child Labour Figures Fall, supra note 8.
48. Facts on Child Labour 2006, supra note 44.
49. Global Child Labour Figures Fall, supra note 8.
50. Facts on Child Labour 2005, supra note 4.
51. Global Child Labour Figures Fall, supra note 8.
52. Facts on Child Labour 2006, supra note 44.
53. Facts and Figures on Child Labour 1999, supra note 2, at 2.
54. See SCHMITZ, supra note 19, at 3-4.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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commercial hunting, fishing and forestry; 8 percent in manufacturing; and 7
percent in personal service, which includes domestic work.58 In 2006 the same
organization estimated that 70 percent were still involved in agriculture, 22 percent
in the service sector, and 9 percent in industry, which includes mining,
construction, and manufacturing work.59 Quantifying and evaluating the economic
involvement of children on a global basis is rendered complex by the variety of
occupations in which there is apparently scope for the beneficial or exploitative use
of young people. Alessandro Cigno and Furio C. Rosati point out that "[c]hilden
throughout the world are engaged in a great number of activities classifiable as
work. These range from fairly harmless, even laudable, activities like helping out
in the home, to physically dangerous and morally objectionable ones like
soldiering and prostitution. 60
Hence, children can work without pay by helping out at home or by working
on family farms. Additionally, they can supplement family income by engaging in
handicraft making, and participating in village cottage industries. 61 Children in the
developing world are frequently apprenticed to artisans crafting hand made goods
like brass ware, jewelry, carpets, embroidery, and leather goods, made largely for
the consumption of tourists.62 The economic conditions of such children can range
from very benign to very dangerous, depending on the type of work, the employer,
and a number of other variables. At its best, such work can provide children with
useful skills and the ability to earn a living as adults. At its worst, this type of
situation can deteriorate into a form of slavery with little or no pay, barely enough
food, and brutal living conditions. Moreover, children in these situations can
develop permanent economic and even psychological dependence upon the master
craftsman.
The developed world also participates in the exploitation of children. Where,
as in the United States of America, there are large farms that require seasonal
labor, children form part of migrant families that harvest crops and perform
agricultural chores. Agricultural pursuits constitute a major part of child labor, and
many of the serious violations of children's rights occur in rural economies.
63
This utilization of child labor in agriculture is prevalent in many developing
nations like India and China, as well as regionally in South-East Asia, Africa, and
parts of Latin America.64 The situation is particularly serious when children form
part of families that are bonded to a moneylender for debts, sometimes of less than
one dollar. Generations of peasants have, in the developing world, been swindled
58. Facts on Child Labour 2005, supra note 4.
59. Facts on Child Labour 2006, supra note 44.
60. ALESSANDRO CIGNO & FURIo C. ROSATI, THE ECONOMICS OF CHILD LABOUR 1 (2005).
61. State Child Labour Rehabilitation Welfare Society, Forms of Child Labour,
www.tnchildlabour.tn.gov.in/forms.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2009) [hereinafter Forms of Child
Labour].
62. Id.
63. Press Release, ILO, Child Labour Persists Around the World: More Than 13 Percent of
Children 10-14 are Employed, ILO/96/18 (Jun. 10, 1996), available at http://www.ilo.org/global/About
theILO/Mediaand-publicjinformation/Press releases/lang--en/WCMS_008058/index.htm.
64. Id.
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out of any meaningful life and financial independence, working for years, eking
out a bleak life on bare subsistence, unable to break the liability of indenture
because they lack the literacy and the legal skills to demand their rights. On
occasion, children and their labor form part of the payment for the debt that is
owed, a situation that leads to the worst excesses of slavery and brutalization.65
Research from many countries demonstrates how widespread is the use of
child labor. Children are put to work in a variety of enterprises, from the notorious
making of footballs in Pakistan,66 to stone-breaking, and rag-picking. According
to one study, there are over three hundred such occupations in just one country,
Bangladesh.67
It has appropriately been stated that "child labor is not confined to any
particular economic sector.",68 Children can be found in every type of economic
enterprise, whether working as servants, field hands, miners (where they are
exposed to lead, mercury and other dangerous metals),69 or as divers for pearls or
in deep sea fishing. Children are also often found making toys, garments, and a
multitude of other consumer goods that the wealthy world enjoys. 70 Children who
work at making shoes are consistently "exposed to solvents, glues, and curing and
cleaning agents.,, 71 Additionally, children can be found in service industries such
as tourism, cleaning and cooking at restaurants, and even professionally begging
on the streets for the benefit of a gang leader.72 "They carry out a multitude of
activities such as hauling wood and water, brick making, wrapping cigarettes,
domestic chores, and child care .... They are exploited in the commercial sex
industry and engaged in the drug trade." 73 Author Alan D. Woolf has discovered
child labor in "wholesale and retail stores, personal services, transportation,
storage, communications industries, construction, and mining and quarrying
activities. 74 According to Woolf, in "some countries, scavenging and recycling
from community waste dumps is an economic necessity for poverty-ridden
families, '75 and children troll the garbage, hunting for materials that can be sold.
Most tragic of all is the plight of homeless children, many of them orphans
who live on the streets and work in terrible environments, doing just about
65. Forms of Child Labour, supra note 61.
66. Sherin Khan, Awareness-Raising, in ACTION AGAINST CHILD LABOUR 273, 277 (Nelien
Haspels & Michele Jankanish eds., 2000).
67. Id.
68. Carol Camp Yeakey & Judith Brooks Buck, Small Hands: Global Dimensions of Child Labor
and Exploitation, in 4 ADVANCES IN EDUCATION IN DIVERSE COMMUNITIES: RESEARCH, POLICY AND
PRAXIS 295, 296 (Carol Camp Yeakey et. al eds., 2006).
69. Alan D. Woolf, Child Labor Hurts Children's Health and the Economy, in CHILD LABOR AND
SWEATSHOPS 32, 33-34 (Ann Manheimer ed., 2006).
70. See Camp Yeakey & Brooks Buck, supra note 68.
71. Woolf, supra note 69, at 33.
72. Id.
73. SCHMITZ, supra note 19, at 4.
74. Woolf, supra note 69, at 33.
75. Id.
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76
anything in order to survive, sometimes caring for and protecting younger
siblings. These children are prey to all kinds of criminals, and even to police
brutality in many developing world countries." Their plight is the most tragic and
studying and assessing their conditions a real challenge because they have no fixed
homes.
The international scope of the problem has to be emphasized, along with its
tragic particular economic manifestations. No country is immune from the taint of
child labor. The agrarian economy utilizes children extensively in all parts of the
world. Small enterprises found all over the world depend on children to maximize
their profits. Child soldiers are mainly found in areas of turmoil such as Sudan,
Uganda, and Afghanistan. Countries such as Thailand and the Philippines, which
are both popular tourist destinations, tend to lure child predators from around the
world. Wherever there are economies in peril, street children appear-working as
hawkers, beggars, and child prostitutes. Where globalization has knit the world
together into an inter-connected unit, the evils of globalization have proliferated
across the world. Eradicating some of these problems will require international
effort and universal commitment to action.
If we do not act expeditiously and with determination, there will be many
million more children who will lose not just their childhood, but possibly their
health and their lives. As Camp Yeakey and Brooks Buck explain: "[w]ith
economic globalization tying national economies more closely together, awareness
of the incidence of child labor in Third World nations is growing rapidly in
industrialized countries. 78 However, awareness is not sufficient. There has to be
action as well. If the new American administration can provide the initiative to
generate a multilateral dedication to eradicating child labor, and dedicate some part
of its abundant expertise to promoting universal compulsory education through
high school; it will demonstrate that the United States of America is not just a
military superpower, but also a superpower in terms of human rights and human
benefit.
A. Poverty and Child Labor
It is a truism that child labor prevails because poverty prevails. As Jeremy
Seabrook has commented: "the great majority of children work because their
families are poor."7 9 It is evident that "[p]overty is undoubtedly a dominant factor
in the use of child labour." 80 Like poverty, from which it is born, child labor has
always been with us. The concept of making children work is as old as human
history. Indeed, the notion of setting aside childhood for education and play is the
newer concept, constructed as part and parcel of our commitment to progress.
76. SCHMITZ, supra note 19, at 4-5.
77. See generally id. (discussing 15 countries and the criminals to which children are prey in
each).
78. Camp Yeakey & Brooks Buck, supra note 68, at 295.
79. JEREMY SEABROOK, CHILDREN OF OTHER WORLDS: EXPLOITATION IN THE GLOBAL MARKET
51(2001).
80. ECLT Foundation, Causes of Child Labour, http://www.eclt.org/about/overview.html (last
visited Feb. 10, 2009).
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Educated children, it is widely felt, advance not just themselves, but the world. It
is also a truism that society advances as its population acquires more knowledge,
skills, and understanding of the world. In that context, child labor is regressive and
antithetical to the notion of progress.
The prevalence of child labor tragically highlights the continuing existence of
grinding poverty in our world. It is both a symptom of that poverty, and a
consequence of the failure of many governments to act to alleviate this problem.
As Ximena de la Barra has pointed out, "[p]overty begets child labor, begets lack
of education, begets poverty and lack of fulfillment of personal aspirations as well
as aspirations of a significant contribution to society. 81 UNICEF has explained
that "[c]hildren living in the poorest households and in rural areas are most likely
to be involved in child labour. 82
Although there are significant pockets of abject poverty in every country in
the world, the extreme forms of this affliction of intense poverty dominate parts of
Latin America, Africa, and Asia, where, correspondingly, child labor also
prevails.83 To provide only one example of the dimensions of this problem, it has
been estimated that over 40 percent of the population of the Philippines lives
below the poverty line. Consequently, the prevalence of child labor in that country
should not cause any surprise.
84
At the beginning of this new millennium, approximately 2.8 billion people,
one-half the population of the planet, live on less than two dollars per day.8 5 Of
this vast number, 1.2 billion can be classified as being in a state of "extreme
poverty," subsisting on less than one dollar per day.8 6 The enormity of the task
ahead in eradicating child labor becomes obvious with the realization that more
than half of the poor people in the world are children,8 7 a grim statistic that should
inspire the leaders of the world to act decisively and urgently to remedy this
terrible situation. Although UNICEF has argued that it is a myth that "child labour
will never be eliminated until poverty disappears,"8 8 the nexus between the two has
to be considered vital to any progressive multilateral plan for the future betterment
of our planet. Although poverty is by no means the only cause of child labor, it is
certainly an important factor, and one that has to be weighed in any serious
analysis of the subject. As Cathryne L. Schmitz has commented, "[p]overty is the
major precipitating factor, but education, rigid social and cultural roles, economic
greed, family size, geography, and global economics all contribute. 8 9  The
contrast between have and have-not can be gauged by the statistics prepared by the
81. de la Barra, supra note 3, at 484.
82. PROGRESS FOR CHILDREN, supra note 38, at 43.
83. Child Labor Public Education Project, Causes of Child Labor, http://www.continuetolearn.ui
owa.edu/laborctr/child-labor/about/causes.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2009).
84. See Teresita Silva, Preventing Child Exploitation on the Streets in the Philippines, 360
LANCET 1507, 1507 (2002), available at http://www.crin.org/docs/ChildHope.pdf.
85. de la Barra, supra note 3, at 482.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. STATE OF THE WORLD'S CHILDREN 1997, supra note 14, at 20.
89. SCHMITZ, supra note 19, at 1.
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United Nations Development Programme in 2003, and cited by Ximena de la Barra
who explained that "the richest 5% of the world's people receive 114 times the
income of the poorest 5%. The richest 1% receives as much as the poorest 57%
and the 25 million richest Americans have as much income as almost 2 billion of
the world's poorest people." 90
The recent economic crisis that has beset the entire world has further
endangered the children of the very poorest of families. With rising food prices,
those who have subsisted on one or two dollars per day can no longer eke out
enough food for the entire family. In such conditions of economic meltdown, the
poorest are the most fragile and their children become the most vulnerable. World
Vision has pointed out that in Mongolia the price of staple foods has doubled since
2007, with potatoes costing five times more. 9' It is hardly surprising that nearly
eight thousand children in Mongolia work in mines.92
In such circumstances, where finding enough food to eat is the ultimate daily
challenge, it is not unduly surprising that parents become dependent on the money
their children can earn. Jeremy Seabrook explained this dilemma, stating that
"[parents] are not transfixed by materialism, they are not greedy or selfish - they
simply see no other pathway to survival; and the children absorb this lesson in the
daily experience of empty bellies and frequent sickness."
93
The nexus between child labor and poverty was aptly expressed by American
social worker and activist Grace Abbott who explained, "[c]hild labor and poverty
are inevitably bound together and if you continue to use the labor of children as the
treatment for the social disease of poverty, you will have both poverty and child
labor to the end of time."94
Although poverty and child labor are linked in a very clear and defined
relationship, it is also important to emphasize that other factors have been
articulated for the prevalence of this terrible violation of children's rights. One of
the best definitions of the varied causation involved can be found in the
Declaration and Agenda for Action of the First World Congress Against
Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children held in Sweden in August 1996. 95
Although the causes mentioned are specific to sexual exploitation, the reasoning
can very aptly be extrapolated to cover the entire subject of child labor. The
Congress determined that a "range of other complex contributing factors include
economic disparities, inequitable socio-economic structures, disfunctioning
families, lack of education, growing consumerism, urban-rural migration, gender
90. de la Barra, supra note 3, at 482.
91. Justin Douglas et al., Child Labor Increases as a Result of the Global Food Crisis, WORLD
VISION, Aug. 2008, http://www.worldvision.org/news.nsf/news/child-labor-200808?Open&wvsrc=ene
ws&lpos=fea txt-publicationindexCHILD-LABOR.
92. Id.
93. SEABROOK, supra note 79, at 51.
94. CHRISTIAN CHILDREN'S FUND, supra note 28, at 4.
95. First World Congress Against Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children, Aug. 27-31, 1996,
Declaration and Agendafor Action, 6, U.N. Doc. A/51/385 (Sep. 20, 1996).
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discrimination, irresponsible male sexual behavior, harmful traditional practices,
armed conflicts and trafficking of children.,
96
The eradication of child labor is linked to an improvement in the lot of the
poor. Even if the latter task seems beyond the grasp of any governments or
international organizations, that should still not affect their will to alleviate the
lives of the millions of children trapped in this terrible plight of working from a
very young age. It is easy to suggest that all world leaders and bureaucrats have to
do is implement their own commitments and words with respect to the rights of
children. The global dependence on child labor must also be seen as ultimately
detrimental to the progress of every nation that now seeks to profit from such
young workers. If moral suasion fails, a pragmatic sense of responsibility to the
global economy would dictate that we not doom our world's future generations by
seeking quick profits now, while imperiling the health and well being of the adult
workers of tomorrow. The ILO has commented very aptly that "[w]orld political
and social stability and security is difficult to envision if such large numbers of
people continue to be trapped in cycles of poverty or see few opportunities in a
global system that seems discriminatory and unfair., 97 For those who deem the
nexus between poverty and child labor a myth, it might be appropriate to point out
that very rarely on this planet do rich children work, and certainly not in the
gruesome conditions that afflict the children who form the subject of this article.
According to the International Food Policy Research Institute, a study in 1996
established that "child labor declines as a country's income rises." 98  When
families have enough adult-generated income so that they are not dependent on
their children, child labor is eliminated. The experience of the developed world
since the nineteenth century establishes this truism.99  Cathryne Schmitz has
explained that "[p]ersistent poverty fuels the perpetuation of abusive child labor.
When the income level of a country increases, the incidence and proportion of
child laborers decrease." 100
Finally, while in no way diminishing the other causes of child labor-
including a desire for consumer goods, cultural traditions, even religious
traditions-this article emphasizes poverty because it is without a doubt the most
pervasive and most insidious reason why millions of children forfeit their
childhood to help their families survive and their employers thrive.
There is a national dimension as well to the issue of poverty and its linkage to
many societal ills like trafficking, slavery, terrorism, drug use, crime, and child
labor. Far from lessening the wealth disparities between rich and poor nations, it
96. Id.
97. ILO, Report of Director General to the 91 st International Labour Conference, Working Out of
Poverty (2003), available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---
dcomm/documents/publication/kdOO 116.pdf.
98. International Food Policy Research Institute [IFPRI], Children at Work, IFPRI FORUM, Sept.
2006, at 10, available at http://www.ifpri.org/pubs/newsletters/ifpriforum/ifl 6.pdf.
99. The Economist, Free Trade Will Result in Less Child Labor, in CHILD LABOR AND
SWEATSHOPS 40, 42 (Ann Manheimer ed., 2006).
100. SCHMITZ, supra note 19, at 2-3.
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seems as though the globalized market place has blessed some countries, and
sometimes particular groups in those nations, while neglecting other regions and
nations altogether. India is often cited as the classic example. The country has a
flourishing and growing middle class dedicated to assertive consumerism, but it
also has a languishing pool of rural poor who are exploited and brutalized much as
they were when the British ruled India until 1947.101 The global expansion of
multi-national enterprises has favored parts of India because the democratic
traditions of government, the existence of a well-educated and skilled labor force
and the pervasiveness of English as a functioning language, enable these foreign
corporations to outsource work from the West at much lower labor cost. 0 2 In turn,
Indian manufacturers sub-contract some of the toughest parts of their production
chain. It is in these sectors that child labor and other similar abuses can creep into
the process.10 3 The international production system now in place is viewed as
desirable by governments. These governments compete avidly with tax write-offs
and other inducements to bring foreign corporations to their countries.,0 4 Low
labor costs and minimal regulatory supervision are perceived as advantages. Both,
however, are very detrimental to the objectives of eliminating and eradicating
employment evils like slavery and child labor. Often, when the benefits offered to
the foreign corporation have expired, the company moves elsewhere in response to
an equally welcoming invitation, issued by the cash-poor representatives of
another developing country. 10 5 The economic losses sustained by the first nation
can be devastating as jobs literally vanish overseas overnight. Governments find
their tax base dwindling, and resort to borrowing money from the world's markets,
an action that necessitates belt-tightening, and the reduction of vital programs like
health, education, and child services. 0 6 The downward spiral eventually reaches
into almost every family, and when the savings evaporate the only method to
sustain the family is for every person who can work to do so. This is how
globalization and the proliferation of an international market can, on occasion,
result in an increase in child labor and other such evils. It is only when
globalization is implemented with a conscientious commitment not to exploit, but
to mutually benefit, that poverty might diminish and its manifestations like child
labor can be eliminated.
B. Child Labor in Hazardous and Dangerous Occupations
If the world collectively believes, as near-universal adherence to the
Convention on the Rights of the Child would indicate, that child labor has to be
eradicated, the first priority has to be to free children from the torment of what are
deemed to be hazardous occupations-including those that are now categorized as
the worst forms of labor because they pose such threats to the health and moral
welfare of children. According to Michele Jankanish, the "worst forms of child
101. Id. at 106-07.
102. Id. at 103.
103. See generally id. at 103-04.
104. Child Labor Public Education Project, supra note 83.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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labour" perceived by the ILO include, slavery, trafficking, debt bondage and
serfdom, military recruitment of children, abuse of children for prostitution,
pornography, drug trafficking, and any other type of work which threatens the
"health, safety and morals of children."'10 7 Author Carol Yeakey has appropriately
emphasized the difficulties involved: "The challenge of preventing and eradicating
extreme violations of children's rights illustrate the layers of want, discrimination
and exploitation that drive humanity's poorest children into obscure and dangerous
worlds."' '
According to the ILO, any child under eighteen is deemed under-age for
hazardous work when health, safety, and morals are concerned. 10 9 Additionally
some occupations are deemed as the worst forms of child labor. While the process
of categorization is significant in terms of enabling appropriate classification and
enumeration, the important point to note is the extent of human misery and
degradation involved in any form of exploitative labor for the most vulnerable
element in any society, its children.
Concern expressed in many countries about the plight of children exposed to
so many different types of hazards impelled the International Labour Organization
to initiate a Convention on the Worst Forms of Child Labour, which was adopted
in 1999.' l° This initiative made the elimination of the worst forms of child labor
an urgent priority."'
It was estimated as of 2005 that of the 246 million children at work,
approximately 171 million worked in hazardous situations or conditions that were
deemed dangerous for their welfare. 12  Of this figure, the majority--or 111
million children-were under the age of fifteen,' 13 a fact that highlights the urgent
requirement for the world to take effective action to eradicate child labor globally.
The category universally deemed as the worst form of child labor had, as of the
2005 data, 8.4 million children in its grip." 14  The authors Cigno and Rosati
appropriately described this statistic as "stunning."' '15  The scope of this very
serious human rights violation includes forced and bonded labor, which enslaved
5.7 million children."16  An estimated 1.2 million children were victims of
107. ACTION AGAINST CHILD LABOUR 47 (Nelien Haspels & Michele Jankanish eds., 2000).
108. CAROL CAMP YEAKEY & JUDITH BROOKS BUCK, 4 ADVANCES IN EDUCATION IN DIVERSE
COMMUNITIES: RESEARCH, POLICY AND PRAXIS xv (Carol Camp Yeakey et al. eds., 2006).
109. Global Child Labour Figures Fall, supra note 8.
110. ILO, Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, No. 182, June 17, 1999, available at:
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?C 182; ILO, Worst Forms of Child Labour
Recommendation, No.190, June 17, 1999, available at: http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-
lex/convde.pl?R190.
111. Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, supra note I11.
112. International Center on Child Labour and Education, How Many Children Work?
http://www.knowchildlabor.org/child-labor/facts.php (last visited Mar. 1, 2009) [hereinafter How Many
Children Work?].
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. CIGNO & ROSATI, supra note 60, at 1.
116. Every Child Counts, supra note 30, at 10.
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trafficking; 0.3 million were forced into armed conflict; 1.8 million into
prostitution and pornography; and 0.6 million into drug production and
trafficking.11 7 In these and other occupations, children are inevitably exposed to
diseases, stunting of normal growth, toxic chemicals, and a variety of dangerous
perils. To give only one example of such dangers, in Liberia children assist their
parents in the occupation of rubber-tapping, working for up to twelve hours a day,
"carrying heavy buckets of pesticide-laden latex on their heads."'"
There are some indications of possible improvement. The ILO estimated that
between its reports of 2002 and 2006 the numbers of children working in
hazardous conditions fell by 26 percent.' 19 From an estimated 171 million in 2000,
the figure dropped to 126 million in 2004, and the decline for children from five to
fourteen was higher, at 33 percent. 120  Lest such indicators of possible
improvement lead to a sense of comfort about this problem, 126 million children
almost form the equivalent of the population of Japan as estimated for 2008.121
C. Child Labor in Agriculture
Although time and space constraints preclude any detailed analysis of child
labor on a sector-by-sector basis, some assessment of the problem in agriculture
has to be addressed because the overwhelming majority of children labor in this
field-no pun intended. The United States Department of Labor has concluded
that "[m]ore of the world's working children are employed in agriculture than in
any other sector."'' 22 In 1999 the ILO estimated that agriculture was the dominant
occupation for child laborers, averaging 70 to 74 percent, and rising as high as 90
to 95 percent in some countries. 123  In 2007, the United Nations Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimated that 70 percent of child labor, about 132
million children between five and fourteen years old, was concentrated in the
economic sector of agriculture.1 24 Children comprise one-third of the worldwide
agricultural work force. 125 It is a truism that "child labor rates are higher in rural
areas, where the work is predominantly agrarian."'
126
117. How Many Children Work?, supra note 113.
118. Zoe Chafe, supra note 25.
119. Global Child Labour Figures Fall, supra note 8.
120. ILO, Report of Director General to the 95th International Labour Conference, The End of
Child Labour: Within Reach 6-7 (2006), available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm
/ilc/ilc95/pdf/rep-i-b.pdf.
121. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: Japan, https://www.cia.gov/library/publi
cations/the-world-factbook/geos/ja.html#People (last updated Feb. 24, 2009).
122. JOAQIN F. OTERO, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, 2 BY THE SWEAT AND TOIL OF CHILDREN: THE USE
OF CHILD LABOR IN U.S. AGRICULTURAL IMPORTS & FORCED AND BONDED CHILD LABOR 29 (1995),
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123. Facts and Figures on Child Labour 1999, supra note 2, at 4.
124. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Giving Children Back Their Youth,
(June 12, 2007), http://www.fao.org/newsroom/en/news/2007/1000591/index.html.
125. U.N. Official: End Child Labor On Farms, UPI, June 13, 2007,
http://www.upi.com/TopNews/2007/06/13/UN-officialEnd-child-labor on-farms/UPI-
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Historically, children helped their parents by working on family owned and
operated farms. In the twentieth century the growth of large agribusiness
corporations placed significant economic strains on small farms and plantations.
Globalization has continued and accelerated the colonial trend whereby diverse
farming of a variety of crops was abandoned in favor of cash crop production. The
involvement of peasants and farmers, who had been self-sufficient for centuries,
into the cash economy, sweeping across the world, resulted in serious
repercussions which unfold to this day. The change from independent production
and usage of food crops to sale of one cash crop and purchase of goods made by
others, exposed farmers to a wider spectrum of consumables, but also placed them
at the mercy of those who set the prices for cash crops, primarily speculators and
middle-men in Western countries. From the perspective of the individual farmer,
the economic law of supply and demand poses even more problems. A farmer
who labors hard, and produces a larger than normal crop, often finds that the
overall price diminishes when he attempts to sell the produce. Additionally, when
a number of farmers are simultaneously selling their harvest, prices drop and
middlemen reap the benefit.127 Dependence on the fickle ups and downs of world
market pricing makes farmers extremely vulnerable. The historical emphasis on
agricultural sustainability has now been replaced by a concentration on
profitability. Sandy Hobbs has commented that:
[The] consequence is to increase and intensify the level of exploitation
needed in order for [farmers, peasants] to compete with large
agribusinesses. Essentially this means that families have to work longer
and harder for smaller returns and have to employ the labor of all their
family members for longer and more intensive periods. Children in
rural and peasant sectors of the world economy remain a vulnerable and
exploited source of labor as a consequence.
12 8
When families lose their land for economic reasons, or because of their
inability to compete with agribusiness, the ensuing disruption can sometimes result
in the children being the only employable members of that unit. Because they are
more nimble for a variety of tasks, more passive, easily exploited, and incapable of
defending their rights, children are a more desirable work force, particularly for
agricultural labor.
The ILO in Convention No. 138 on the Minimum Age for Admission to
Employment and in Recommendation No. 146 established a minimum age of
fifteen years, but allowed underdeveloped economies to lower that minimum age
to fourteen.12 9 The Convention sought to address the issue with respect to
-plantations and other agricultural undertakings mainly producing for commercial
purposes," but excluded family holdings geared to local consumption. 130
127. See generally SEABROOK, supra note 79.
128. SANDY HOBBS, CHILD LABOR: A WORLD HISTORY COMPANION 6-7 (1999).
129. ILO, Minimum Age Convention, art. 2.3-2.4, No. 138, June 19, 1976, available at:
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ageconvention.htm; ILO, Minimum Age Recommendation, No.
146, June 25, 1973, available at: http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.pl?R146.
130. ILO, Minimum Age Convention, supra note 130, at 5.3; ILO, Minimum Age
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The labor of children also assists large agribusiness enterprises in the
harvesting of crops and in other work, much of it very dangerous for their health
and development. UNICEF has estimated that children involved in commercial
agricultural work constitute about a third of the work force in some countries. 131 In
Brazil, children are put to work harvesting cane for sugar plantation companies,
where they are required to use machetes that put them at risk of being mutilated. 1
3 2
According to one estimate, approximately one-third of the workers in El
Salvador's sugarcane plantations are children younger than eighteen.
1 33
There has been significant concern in the United States of America,
particularly in agricultural areas of California, about the utilization of child labor
from migrant families who work seasonally harvesting crops. Based primarily in
Mexico and Central America, these migrants bring their children to the United
States, where "[d]ire poverty forces many farmworker parents to risk their
children's educational future by asking them to help augment family income
helping to harvest crops."1 34  The exposure of children to exhausting work,
inclement weather, pesticides, fertilizer, and other perils can result in life-long
health and developmental problems. Accusing the United States Government of
failing to protect these children, Human Rights Watch pointed out that "[h]undreds
of thousands of children work under dangerous and grueling conditions as hired
laborers in US agriculture. These children risk serious illness, including cancer
and brain damage, from exposure to pesticides and suffer high rates of injury."'
' 35
The same organization pointed out that children in agriculture suffer 40 percent of
work-related fatalities involving minors, 136 and it concluded that "[a]griculture is
the most dangerous occupation open to minors in the United States.'
137
The ILO found that "in rural areas, more children die of exposure to
pesticides than from the most common childhood diseases put together. ' 138
Children in the developing world who are employed in agriculture "tend to have
lower weight and life expectancy at birth, higher mortality and morbidity rates,
greater incidence of malnutrition, and lower school enrollment and completion
rates than do urban children. This combination of risks makes rural working
children especially vulnerable."
139
Recommendation, supra note 128.
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132. Id.
133. El Salvador: Child Labor on Sugar Plantations, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, June 9, 2004,
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The National Consumers League (founded 1899), through the Child Labor
Coalition, complained in 1999 about the "dismal" record of the United States
Congress with respect to supporting international anti-child labor initiatives.1 40 In
fairness, it has to be pointed out that the United States has allocated approximately
$30 million per year to international programs working to end exploitative child
labor. 141 Given the scale of the problem, it will take more than money to improve
this situation.
The utilization of children in agricultural enterprises of all types is global. In
Tanzania, children are expected to perform a variety of tasks on tobacco
plantations, including clearing the fields, sowing the seedlings, fertilizing the
plants, and plucking tobacco leaves. 42 Children are exposed not just to extremely
tiring work, but to possible snake bites, sickness, and injuries.1 43 Children are paid
twelve cents per day in Madagascar for picking vanilla orchids between 4:00 a.m.
and 7:00 a.m. and for harvesting vanilla beans.144 A 1999 survey of child work
activities in South Africa concluded that labor in commercial agriculture qualified
as high-risk for children. 145 In Egypt, small children are selected to pick delicate
jasmine flowers at night because the essence is the purest at this time.146 These
children work barefoot in the mud without lights, and are subject to caning if they
stop to avoid the swarms of mosquitoes prevalent in those fields.1 47 Jasmine is a
favored ingredient in the expensive perfumes and cosmetics that adorn women in
the developed world. In Mexico, approximately fifty thousand children between
the ages of five and fourteen work each year to harvest tobacco, and expose
themselves to pesticides and nicotine as they work. 48 Children in India, employed
to roll a form of local cigarette, suffer high rates of tuberculosis and other lung
diseases. 149 In Egypt, where the cash crop is cotton, over one million children
work to remove insects from the cotton plants. 50  Children in Ecuador have
worked in banana plantations, while airplanes sprayed fungicides from above.
151
In some Latin American and Asian farms children are tasked to hold up flags to
140. Press Release, Child Labor Coalition, Child Labor Abuses Remain a Problem in the U.S., The
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guide planes spraying pesticides. 152  These child workers rarely wear any
protective clothing and suffer direct exposure. 153
An idealized version of agrarian life envisions children working in a healthy
outdoor environment, getting lots of fresh air and exercise, and developing
physically because of these benefits. The reality is that one in eight children in
agriculture suffer some consequent form of injury or illness. 154  Economists
Alessandro Cigno and Furio C. Rosati have concluded that a "child working on a
farm is exposed to dangerous tools and machinery, to chemicals, to water, soil and
animal-borne infection, to heavy lifting and poor posture, as well as to heatstroke
and sheer exhaustion."'1 55 Where, as in most parts of Africa, agriculture is the
mainstay of the economy, the possibility of alleviating the problem of exploitative
child labor becomes a real challenge, a problem compounded by tribal and ethnic
warfare, refugee crises, terrorism, food shortages, drought and famine, as well as
diseases such as HIV/AIDS.1 56
Any research of the terrible conditions, to which children working in
agriculture are regularly exposed, can only lead to the conclusion that the work
definitely falls under the category of "hazardous." Accordingly, the provisions of
the Convention on the Worst Forms of Child Labour should apply. These
provisions state that the exposure of children to hazardous labor is a matter of
urgency, and one requiring expeditious action toward elimination and eradication.
There can be little doubt that agricultural work, involving long hours, night labor,
exposure to dangerous machinery, and exposure to hazardous substances and
chemicals, would qualify under the ILO's Recommendation No. 190.
One of the great tragedies of globalization is that the widespread
dissemination of consumer products and foods-a desirable outcome-has been
achieved by the exploitation of children and slaves in many parts of the primary
producing countries. In recent years, there has been considerable publicity about
the connection between the Western world's favorite delectable treat, chocolate,
and brutal and oppressive labor practices in the countries where cocoa beans are
grown.'57 The shock and outrage in the West have been genuine. Who could have
associated the pleasurable consumption of chocolate in our Western world with
causing so much misery in African nations like the Ivory Coast and Ghana, which
provide the raw material for this most wondrous of sweets? The Ivory Coast
produces approximately 43 percent of the cocoa of the world, but has utilized over
152. ILO, Child Labour in Agriculture 1 (1999), http://www.ilo.org/public/english/comp/child/dow
nload/pdf/agriculture.pdf.
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100,000 children, some of them slaves, in this task. 158 That our love for chocolate
should encourage slavery and child labor proved to be an inducement for some
international action. In 2001, a meeting of major stakeholders resolved to
eliminate the worst forms of child labor in cocoa production., 59 A year later in
2002, the International Cocoa Initiative Working Towards Responsible Labour
Standards for Cocoa Growing was founded under Swiss law in order to deal with
the agenda of eliminating child labor and slavery in cocoa production.' 60 African
heads of state also acted by holding summits on cocoa in 2006 and 2007. The
African leaders eventually resolved to act to eliminate the worst abuses of child
labor from cocoa farms. 161 However, in June 2007 proponents of the Global
March Against Child Labour reported that approximately 284,000 children still
worked in cocoa production in West Africa.' 62  Meanwhile, the Dutch
manufacturer Royal Verkade decided to use 100 percent Fair Trade cocoa and
sugar in its sweets,' 63 a telling and important example of corporate reaction to the
expression of outraged world public opinion. Should more corporations pledge to
remove child labor and slavery from their product lines, the profit motive-which
fuels these two evils in the primary producing nations-would immediately
disappear.
Such victories as the Royal Verkade decision are few, but they are significant.
These victories highlight the fact that when governments are slow to respond,
public opinion, the media, and the Internet can make a very meaningful and
constructive difference. Were child labor to become a major topic in international
media outlets, the naming and shaming of perpetrators might well result in some
alleviation. The last thing any multinational corporation needs is adverse
publicity, associating the company with malevolent practices such as slavery and
child labor. The challenge, however, is to bring these issues to the forefront of
media attention, and to ensure persistent publicity about the problem.
The exposure of dangerous and hazardous work in agriculture is rendered
more complicated by the isolation of agrarian life; by the relatively smaller
population base; and by the prevalence of the "company town" phenomenon. In
such situations, one corporation acts as the sole source of employment, and the
workers are in constant fear of jeopardizing that situation, which at least brings
them some work and income, albeit with hazardous conditions.
158. Id. 3-4.
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It is also true that governments, particularly in developing countries, lack the
resources to monitor the agricultural sector. 164  This enables all types of
irregularities to persist, and laws are routinely overlooked because there is
effectively no enforcement mechanism on site. Rural laborers, particularly in the
developing world, are rarely unionized and hence their exploitation is even
easier. 165 As the United States Department of Labor concluded: "[t]he use of child
labor in agriculture is thus, to a large degree, invisible - uncounted, often
undocumented, and little understood."
' 166
Globally, as the ILO has complained, "protective legislation is limited in
agriculture."' 167  Even where laws exist, implementation is problematic. The
problem is the same with respect to small family farms and larger plantations and
agribusiness enterprises. Family farms are widely dispersed, scarcely regulated,
and part of the informal economy. Quantifying and monitoring the work children
and adults perform on family farms is next to impossible without vast bureaucratic
teams of inspectors, well beyond the fiscal capacity of most nations in both the
developing and developed world. Plantations, particularly those engaged in cash
crop production, often hire an adult worker - usually a migrant - who comes,
accompanied by children, to accomplish the daily quota of work. The registered
worker is the adult. The children, even though they work all day, do not even
figure on the documentation and they are not directly paid. When farm owners are
inclined to hire undocumented immigrants, the problems of verifying the role of
children become even more complex.
There is also a serious lack of knowledge in the rural sectors of most societies
regarding the short and long-term health risks of certain practices, such as working
with chemicals. Many small farmers and peasants, as well as farm workers, are
barely literate, and lack the knowledge that would help to protect themselves and
their children from exposure to toxic materials. Ironically, it is only when the
middle and upper classes get sick from eating a particular contaminated food such
as spinach or lettuce that the issues of hygiene in the fields and pertaining to the
crops are rigorously investigated.
One consequence of the deterioration of rural patterns of life, and of
traditional village societies has been the migration to cities and towns of the
youngest and brightest children. 168  The diminution of any chance of an
economically viable way to make a decent living in the villages pushes young
people to urban centers, both for individual and for family survival. Urban centers
have grown with resulting slums, over-crowding, inadequate water and sewage
facilities, filthy living conditions, and crime, resulting in the drastic deterioration
of the standard of living. The problem is most pronounced in the poorer countries
164. OTERO, supra note 123, at 29.
165. See, e.g., Jadir Atunes, Brazil: The WTO and Lula's 'Struggle' for the G-20, WORLD
SOCIALIST WEB SITE, Jan. 24, 2007, http://www.wsws.org/articles/2007/jan2007/braz-j24.shtml,
166. OTERO, supra note 123, at 22.
167. Child Labour in Agriculture, supra note 153, at 2.
168. See, e.g., U.N. Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Kyrgyzstan: Increase in
Rural Youth Migration to Cities, Aug. 17, 2005, http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?Reportld=28893.
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of the world, where, by one estimate, in 1950 approximately 17 percent of the
population was urban.1 69 By 2000, this had jumped to 40 percent, and it is
forecasted to rise to 57 percent by 2025.170 This rapid movement from rural to
urban areas has increased the incidence of child labor. 171 Although most children
labor in the agricultural sector, ironically, the destruction of agrarian life results in
additional risks to such children who wind up begging on the streets, or living lives
of abject poverty in the slums of large cities like Mumbai, India; Djakarta,
Indonesia; and any number of other similar places.
The destruction of rural life globally has also resulted in a worldwide flow of
migrants searching for work in richer parts of the world. This globalized labor
movement has led to the phenomenon of remittance families-whether in India,
Cuba, Mexico, the Philippines, or in many other parts of the world-where parents
and younger siblings are left behind, subsisting largely on the regular influx of
money sent home by the member who has gone abroad to work. 172  Their
dependence on the departed family member is critical to their survival. Any
diminution of that inflow of capital subjects the family in the home country to a
lower standard of living. This is why an economic crisis, causing high levels of
unemployment in the United States of America, can have dire consequences in
rural India, villages in Africa, small towns in Central America, and in various parts
of the world, where the loss of employment of the outside family member can push
the entire dependent group to poverty and its consequent ills, such as child labor
and slavery. Whether in a hundred years globalization will be perceived as a
blessing or a curse remains to be seen. There have been benefits, but the problems
do require urgent international attention if the world economy is to thrive.
Although the problems of child labor are quite daunting given the scope and
number of children involved, globalization itself provides us with the tools to
address this. I am not here considering the international law instruments, and
domestic laws that prohibit such practices. Extensive research in this area can
generate a sense of resignation to the reality that such laws are routinely violated
and transgressed across the planet, and that such conventions and legal directives
are not necessarily going to be the panacea once envisioned for the world's
children. These fine words are inspirational, and do provide an international
standard and an ideal to be achieved. In the field, no pun intended, these words are
quite meaningless without some very strong supports. These would, in a
committed and dedicated program to implement the international conventions,
include economic assistance to small farmers to sell their crops at a fair market
value, providing for consistent family income and enabling parents to hire adult
workers instead of utilizing their children; the building of rural schools with
provisions for electricity and computing services in rural areas, enabling children
to participate in online educational programs and spend their day learning, even
169. CHILD LABOR: A GLOBAL VIEW 3 (Cathryne L. Schmitz et al. eds., 2004).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. See John Page & Sonia Plaza, Migration Remittances and Development: A Review of Global
Evidence, 15 (Supp. 2) J. OF AFRICAN ECONOMIES 245, 246 (2006).
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while they are at home; the foundation of small credit banks with fair interest rates
to prevent farmers from resorting to money-lenders and loan sharks; the insistence
that agribusiness enterprises globally document, account for, and pay every
employee on the basis of established wage structures. Additionally, such
enterprises must be compelled to provide on-site benefits such as drinking water,
safety clothing, day care for infants, toilet facilities for field workers, and so on.
There is a role for local governments in certifying that the agricultural
products sold on the world market are not tainted by either slavery or child labor.
This type of certification, now used in some economic sectors, would provide one
of the best assurances that child labor is not being used. When employers realize
that the cheap labor of children hinders, rather than facilitates their sales, they are
unlikely to employ them. Were sovereign governments to dictate severe penalties
for such use, including confiscation of the enterprise and even jail terms for
perpetrators, the resort to child labor and slavery could be considerably decreased.
For those who would doubt that governments around the world would be honest
enough in the certification process as to meaningfully inspect and verify the
compliance of enterprises with the law, one might point to the fact that we are
blessed today with a world-wide communications network that is so all-
encompassing that, if an infraction occurs in one country, the knowledge is
disseminated globally in seconds.
If our farming communities around the world are equipped someday soon
with electricity and computers, even if government servants become bribed
accomplices in the commission of such crimes, the entire community could act to
generate worldwide exposure. It is evident that even the most troubled parts of the
world, specifically in Africa, have adopted technological innovations like the cell
phone with an enthusiasm that is quite amazing, and have now utilized that gadget
for ever more innovative purposes such as transfers of money and so on.173 Where
globalization has caused a proliferation of the problems associated with child labor
and the misery that ensues, it might be timely to utilize the tools and methods of
globalization to remedy the problem, and alleviate the lives of millions of our most
precious persons-the children of our world.
The first step would have to be taken with respect to child labor in agriculture.
Aside from the sheer numbers of children engaged in agriculture, a significant
proportion of such work is hazardous in a number of ways for child physical
development and wellbeing. As Jennie Dey DePryck, Chief of the United Nations
Food and Agriculture Organization's Rural Institutions and Participation Service,
has stated: "[i]f we want to eliminate the worst forms of child labour, greater effort
needs to be made to address child labour in agriculture."
1 74
D. Child Labor in Armed Conflict
Any assumption that the world was a more peaceful place during the latter
half of the twentieth century because the Cold War had somehow averted a Third
173. See, e.g., Shashank Bengali, Cell Phones Power Financial Revolution in Africa, MCCLATCHY
WASH. BUREAU, Feb. 10, 2009, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/world/story/61909.html.
174. Child Labour Worldwide, supra note 157, 17.
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World War, is belied by the fact that in that period there were well over a hundred
wars. These wars ranged from tribal and ethnic conflicts fought in small
geographical areas, to significant and deadly national conflicts such as those
between India and Pakistan and between Israel and various Arab states. Indeed,
one consequence of the Cold War was the emphasis on the patron-client
relationship between the two superpowers (U.S.A. and U.S.S.R.) and smaller, less
powerful nations that depended on these mighty nations for arms, financial aid, and
support at the United Nations. 175 Superpowers fought each other to the last drop of
the client state's blood. Whether the arena was Central America, or the Middle
East, or Africa, the deadly conflicts destabilized countries that were desperately
trying to create viable governing systems after their long and economically
draining experience with colonialism. Ironically, when the superpowers personally
got involved in conflict, such as the American experience in Vietnam and the
Soviet debacle in Afghanistan, the consequence was more than painful both
militarily and on their national psyche.
War-ravaged states were prey to economic predators such as the raiders who
looted diamonds in Africa and sold them for guns, resulting in global concern
about the so-called "conflict diamonds." The instability of governments,
particularly in Africa, put civilians at the mercy of bands of thugs who roamed the
countryside looting, pillaging, and destroying homes and crops. While the period
between 1945 and the present has not seen a global war, it has been witness to
extreme terror, genocide, and human rights violations in a number of countries.
These modern manifestations of war rarely adhere to any traditional rules of war,
or any prohibitions against the abuse of civilians. Whether the particular conflict is
classified as a rebellion, an act of terrorism, guerrilla warfare, civil war, a war to
pursue national self-determination, or any other title, for civilians the consequences
are invariably horrifying. Commenting on the changing nature of modern warfare,
Radhika Coomaraswamy, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for
Children and Armed Conflict, has explained that the distinction "between civilians
and combatants is becoming increasingly blurred.' '176 The intra-state nature of
these conflicts, and the religious and ethnic polarization that promotes such
violence have resulted in wars that are far more brutal and more directed at civilian
targets. 177 UNICEF has estimated that civilian casualties of such conflicts in recent
decades account for over 90 percent of the associated deaths, with approximately
half of those being children. 
178
175. Kingsley Banya & Juliet Elu, The Dilemma of Child Soldering in Sub-Saharan Africa, in 4
ADVANCES IN EDUCATION IN DIVERSE COMMUNITIES RESEARCH, POLICY AND PRAXIS 177,181-82 (Carol
Yeakey et al. eds., 2006).
176. Press Release, Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Children and
Armed Conflict, Human Rights Council: Changing Nature of Warfare Makes Children More
Vulnerable (Sept. 9, 2008), http://www.un.org/children/conflict/pr/2008-09-09189.html [hereinafter
Changing Nature of Warfare].
177. See generally Banya & Elu, supra note 176 at 177-206.
178. UNICEF, Children in Conflict and Emergencies, http://www.unicef.org/protection/index-arm
edconflict.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2009).
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Most horrifying of these human rights violations has been the proliferation of
the use of children in armed conflict. This has resulted in utilization of children by
rebels, military detention of children, and the emergence of child suicide bombers.
This crisis has in recent times prevailed in parts of Africa, Asia, Latin America,
Europe, and the Middle East. 179 In most of these regions, the use of children is
ongoing. Special Representative Coomaraswamy highlighted the activities of
Burma, Sudan, and Uganda, and the recruiting of children by the Tamil Tigers in
Sri Lanka and by rebel groups in Colombia, Burma, and Sudan.180
In a number of countries children have been kidnapped and forced to become
child soldiers, a clear and egregious violation of international law, and a practice
that involves state and non-state actors, conventional armies, and terrorist groups.
It is quite difficult to enumerate with absolute precision the numbers of children
involved, and hence the statistics diverge. The Coalition to Stop the Use of Child
Soldiers concluded in its Global Report 2008 that the "military recruitment of
children (under-18s) and their use in hostilities is a much larger phenomenon that
still takes place in one form or another in at least 86 countries and territories
worldwide.1 81 In October 2008, the United States Department of Labor estimated
that there were over 300,000 children under the age of eighteen fighting as child
soldiers in over thirty countries.182
Children have also been used to perform menial chores for armies on the
move. They have been brutally used as sex slaves by these marauding paramilitary
bands. The range of activities inflicted on children is very extensive. They are
"used in armed conflict as soldiers, spies, guards, human shields, human
minesweepers, servants, decoys and sentries. ' 83  Children have been tortured,
raped, mutilated, humiliated, and degraded on a scale that is almost
incomprehensible in terms of the horrors to which they have been subjected.
Cathryne Schmitz has estimated that a combination of poverty, isolation, and
upheaval make children vulnerable. She has also emphasized the large numbers
involved, stating that as "many as three hundred thousand child soldiers as young
as eight years of age have recently been used in at least thirty-three armed conflicts
globally."' 184 The widespread nature of this brutal phenomenon can be gauged by
the efforts of the United States Department of Labor to fund research and
initiatives dealing with child soldiers in Afghanistan, Liberia, Sierra Leone,
Uganda, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Rwanda,
179. Changing Nature of Warfare, supra note 177.
180. Id.
181. Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, Child Soldiers: Global Report 2008, 12 (2008),
http://www.childsoldiersglobalreport.org/files/country-pdfs/FINAL_2008_GlobalReport.pdf
[hereinafter Child Soldiers: Global Report 2008].
182. U.S. Dep't of Labor: Bureau of Int'l Labor Affairs, Children Affected by Armed Conflict,
www.dol.gov/ilab/programs/ocft/armedconflict.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2009) [hereinafter Children
Affected by Armed Conflict].
183. U.S. Dep't of Labor, Bureau of Int'l Labor Affairs, The Worst Forms of Child Labor, in
CHILD LABOR AND SWEATSHOPS 21 (Ann Manheimer ed., 2006).
184. SCHMITZ, supra note 19, at 7.
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and the Philippines.' 85 The Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda has particularly
targeted children for recruitment in its war against the Ugandan Government. 
86
Some children who attempted to escape were ruthlessly clubbed or bayoneted to
death. '87
Once captured, these children have been subjected to bestiality of a kind that
is beyond description. As part of their initiation into the environment of violence,
they can sometimes be forced to kill members of their own families.' 88 In addition
to committing murder, children are made to witness gruesome torture to
desensitize them to violence. In order to turn them into willing killers, they are
required to indulge in mutilation, often of young children and babies, cannibalism,
and the commission of genocide, as occurred in Rwanda in 1994. Approximately
twenty thousand civilians, half of them children, suffered forcible amputation,
some at the hands of child soldiers, during the bloody and brutal war between 1991
and 2002 in Sierra Leone. 189
Children involved in armed conflict are routinely given access to drugs to
numb them sufficiently to tolerate the brutality they witness. In an interesting and
compelling study authors Kingsley Banya and Juliet Elu have described the
phenomenon of child soldiers, with particular reference to Africa. They point out
that "child soldiers become model soldiers. They are preferred because blessed
with great endurance, the ability to survive on relatively little food and water, child
soldiers accept orders with few questions."' 90
Most shocking of all is the fact that children are being forcibly recruited, not
just into the paramilitary bands of roving renegades, which have terrorized millions
of civilians, but also into national armies. According to an article in the
International Herald Tribune, "Burma's military regime may have the largest
number of child soldiers in the world. Thousands of children serve in Burma's
national army, swept up in massive recruitment drives to offset high rates of
desertion and a lack of willing volunteers."' 91 Jo Becker, Children's Rights
Advocacy Director for Human Rights Watch, has deplored the fact that China's
influence in favor of its ally, the military regime that rules Burma, has precluded
the United Nations Security Council (in which China occupies a permanent seat)
from acting decisively to rectify the Burmese Government's abuse of its
children. 192  Burma has simply denied that it utilizes child soldiers. Becker
concludes: "[i]t's hard to decide whose actions are more shameful - Burma's
185. Children Affected by Armed Conflict, supra note 183.
186. Armed Conflict: Child Casualties of War, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 2006,
https://1 99.173.149.140/reports/2001/children/9.htm.
187. Id.
188. Aisling Ireland, Sierra Leone - Human Rights, BELLAONLINE, http://www.bellaonline.com/
articles/art24082.asp.
189. Greg Campbell, Blood Diamonds, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL USA,
http://www.amnestyusa.org/amnestynow/diamonds.html.
190. Banya & Elu, supra note 176, at 184.
191. Jo Becker, Child Soldiers and the China Factor, INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, Sept. 12,
2008, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/09/12/opinion/edbecker.php.
192. Id.
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exploitation of children as soldiers or the Security Council's failure to condemn the
practice."'
193
In August 2008 the Secretary General of the United Nations reported that in
Chad children continued to be recruited into the Chadian National Army, despite
commitments by the government of that country to stop this practice and
demobilize children. 194 The ongoing conflict in Darfur has resulted in recruitment
of children by both the government and the rebels. 195 Sima Samar, United Nations
Rights Rapporteur in Sudan, condemned the widespread use of children in the
conflict, labeling the practice a "clear violation of international human rights
law.
' 196
Pointing out that recruitment of children is a war crime, UNICEF revealed the
plight of thousands of Colombian children forced into armed groups. UNICEF has
reported that, "[i]n 2003, according to the UN Secretary General, 7,000 children in
Colombia were in the ranks of armed groups, and an additional 7,000 were
involved in urban militias." '197
Children as young as five have been kidnapped and conscripted in countries
like Nepal.198 The possible use or abuse of children by terrorist organizations has
also garnered much attention in recent years. Some religious schools in Pakistan
were reportedly recruiting and training children as young as seven for work as
militants and suicide bombers.199 The youth of these child warriors makes it
difficult for an opposing conventional army to fight back in a determined manner.
For instance, in the Philippines government forces were urged whenever possible
to arrest rebel child soldiers and hand them to social workers.2 °0
For those children trapped in this cycle of violence, the road back is extremely
difficult. They suffer from a variety of psychological and physical problems; their
health is severely compromised. The emotional scars on such young minds
continue for years. Kidnapped girls in particular are the victims of continuous rape
and some become mothers while in captivity. Demobilization has been the goal of
193. Id.
194. Letter from Steve Crawshaw, United Nations Advocacy Director, to UN Security Council
members on Child Soldiers in Chad, Sept. 3, 2008, available at http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/09/
03/letter-un-security-council-members-child-soldiers-chad.
195. Opheera McDoom, Khartoum, Darfur Rebels Use Child Soldiers-UN Rights, REUTERS, July
10, 2008, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/MCD055318.htm.
196. Id.
197. UNICEF, Armed Groups in Colombia Stealing Childhood From Girls and Boys Alike, Aug.
25, 2008, http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/colombia_45354.html.
198. See generally Ex Nepalese Child Soldiers More Likely to Have Mental Health Problems,
THAINDIAN NEWS, Aug. 13, 2008, http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/entertainment/ex-nepalese-
child-soldiers-more-likely-to-have-mental-health-problems_1008341 3.html.
199. U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Pakistan: Child Soldiers in Swat
Valley, May 26, 2008, http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportD=78400.
200. Joel Guinto, Palace: Child Warriors to be Avoided Unless They Fire First, INQUIRER.NET,
Sept. 18, 2008, http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/nation/view/20080918-161456/Palace-Child-
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UNICEF, but accomplishing this aim has been a challenge.20 1  Father Mark
Hickey, a priest working in Sierra Leone to help demobilized child soldiers,
commented that they "have a total disdain for civilian life., 20 2 Often their home
communities are frightened about inviting trained killers into their midst. Children
brought up in a culture of bestiality and violence find it hard to accommodate
themselves to the ways of peace and nonviolence. An untold number are drug
addicts and even addicted to violence, and developing countries, where such child
soldiers are a problem, lack extensive counseling services to guide reintegration
back into normal life. When one compares the difficulties that confronted adult
Vietnam War veterans in their adjustment back to American life, one can
appreciate how much more complex the challenges are facing demobilized child
soldiers.
The practice of using children to fight war continues on a global basis, despite
the fact that it is a war crime prohibited by the Geneva Convention, which prevents
recruitment under age fifteen,20 3 and by the Convention on the Rights of the
Child.20 4 Compulsory recruitment of children is classified as one of the "worst
forms of child labor" according to the International Labor Organization's
Convention No. 182 adopted in 1999.205 Additionally, the UN Optional Protocol
on the Use of Children in Armed Conflict precludes recruitment of children under
the age of eighteen.20 6 This international law instrument entered into force in
2002.207
In 2004 and 2005, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolutions
1539 and 1612, respectively, "[c]alling for the establishment of a monitoring and
reporting mechanism on children and armed conflict," an agenda that has been
implemented and has resulted in far more international awareness about the
problem.20 8 There has been no dearth of global concern about this aspect of child
labor, one of its worst manifestations. It is important to note that, although the
problem of the abuse of children in military labor is very prevalent in Africa, such
action is contrary to the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child,
which enjoins signatories to "take all necessary measures to ensure that no child
shall take a direct part in hostilities and refrain, in particular, from recruiting any
child.,
20 9
Responding to universal anxiety about the plight of thousands of child
soldiers and camp followers, the United States Department of Labor in 2003
hosted an international conference of stakeholders on the issue of Children in the
201. Child Soldiers Riot in Burundi, THE TIMES, May 14, 2008, http://www.thetimes.co.za/News
/Article.aspx?id=766259.
202. Banya & Elu, supra note 176, at 199.
203. Id. at 191.
204. UNICEF, Armed Groups in Colombia, supra note 198.
205. See Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, supra note 111.
206. U.S. Dep't of Labor, supra note 184.
207. UNICEF, Children in Conflict and Emergencies, supra note 179.
208. Child Soldiers: Global Report 2008, supra note 182, at 14.
209. Org. of African Unity, African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child art. 22, July 11,
1999, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990).
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Crossfire: Prevention and Rehabilitation of Child Soldiers.21° On October 3, 2008,
United States President George Bush signed the Child Soldiers Accountability Act,
which criminalized the recruitment or usage of soldiers under fifteen, and
permitted American prosecution of any individual on United States soil, even if the
affected children were in another country.21' The level of American interest in this
matter can be gauged by the fact that this legislation passed unanimously through
both the House of Representatives and the Senate.212 Its sponsor, Illinois Senator
Richard Durbin stated that:
[The] United States must not be a safe haven for those who exploit
children as soldiers. Period. The use of children as combatants is one of
the most despicable human rights violations in the world today and
affects the lives of hundreds of thousands of boys and girls who are
used as combatants, porters, human mine detectors and sex slaves. The
power to prosecute and punish those who violate the law will send a
clear signal that the U.S. will in no way tolerate this abhorrent
213practice.
Although there have been a number of expressions of concern, and the
production of significant international directives prohibiting the military usage of
children, the practice continues and it is unlikely to end in the near future.
Exposing thousands of children to such extreme forms of violence and degradation
will undoubtedly make for a difficult transition to normal life once the wars that
have enslaved them come to an end. Children find it far harder to reintegrate into
society than adults.214 Having become accustomed to basing their reactions on
violence, any adjustment to a more flexible range of non-violent responses is
difficult. Sometimes they are so damaged by the violent world in which they
operated that their communities and villages cannot accept them back. By not
acting decisively to prohibit this terrible abuse of young people, the international
community dooms, not just the future of these victims, but the possible path back
to peace for their entire societies. Carol Bellamy, Executive Director of UNICEF,
has stated that "[c]hild soldiers are a symptom of the wider problem, the complete
neglect of whole generations."-
215
IV. INTERNATIONAL LAW ON CHILD LABOR
Michele Jankanish aptly emphasized the ILO's assertion, stating that
"[a]lthough the fight against child labour will not be won through legislation, it
certainly cannot be won without it."216 However, it has to be realized that if law
210. Children Affected by Armed Conflict, supra note 183.
211. Child Soldiers Accountability Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-340, § 2242, 122 Stat. 3735,
3735-36 (2008), available at http://npl.ly.gov.tw/pdf/6579.pdf.
212. United States: Bush signs Law on Child Soldiers, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Oct. 3, 2008,
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alone were able to achieve the effective elimination of child labor, the world would
have nothing to worry about with respect to this crisis. M.K. Pandhe, President of
the Centre of Indian Trade Unions, explained that the "problem of child labour
cannot be tackled by just enacting a law as it does not touch the fringe of the cause
of its existence," which is poverty.2 17 Unfortunately though there are numerous
laws, internationally and within states, and innumerable expressions of adherence
and commitment, the implementation of these progressive words falls far short of
the promises being made.218 Perhaps the entire world has to come to the
realization that this sort of resort to words, without effective action, is stealing the
childhood of millions of children who, if they survive, will grow up to be
disaffected, disenchanted, and emotionally scarred adults. Such a realization might
generate sufficient will to carry out the progressive legislation that already exists.
If we fail to take urgent action in this regard, and continue to exploit children in
our zeal for cheap food and consumer goods, we ought not to be unduly surprised
if the consequential problems of economic unrest, grinding poverty, terrorism,
rebellion, and civil war continue to plague our planet.
By not addressing child labor now, we doom more than simply those children
at risk. We also imperil our own future in the West, and-most importantly-that
of our children and grandchildren who will undoubtedly pay the price in global
societal breakdown for our failure to deal with this crisis. An awareness of our
complicity in this tragedy-we are after all the consumers of the products made by
these children-may assist us to realize, that individually and collectively, we have
to demonstrate enough moral commitment to outlaw this terrible exploitation, not
just in word but in deed as well. This section will discuss a few of the significant
international conventions that concern child labor, and then, in a separate segment,
deal with the most important of all international law instruments, the Convention
on the Rights of the Child. No article of this length can cover the plethora of
international instruments that deal with the subject of child labor. However, the
highlighting of selected examples of such international law on the subject can
establish the important point that the legal foundation for the elimination of this
heinous practice has already been laid. The problem is not with the absence of
law, but with its non-implementation.
International efforts to curb child labor have a long and intricate history.
Space and time constraints prevent a full detailed analysis of all the measures
approved by the world community. With respect to the twentieth century, it is
noteworthy that as early as 1919 an international convention addressed the issue of
child labor, and passed the first Minimum Age (Industry) Convention No. 5 which
directed a minimum age of fourteen for children working in industry. 219 Seventy-
43 (Nelien Haspels and Michele Jankanish, ed., 2000) (citing Child Labour Law and Practice, in
CONDITIONS OF WORK DIGEST (Int'l Labour Org. 1991)).
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two countries ratified that document.220 The convention was followed by a number
of international agreements, which elucidated minimum age requirements for
specific economic sectors such as agriculture, 1921; fisheries, 1959; and work
underground, 1965.221
In 1924 the League of Nations, predecessor of the United Nations, adopted
the Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child.222 That document stated that
"mankind owes to the child the best that it has to give," and directed that children
be provided with a normal development, and that the "child must be put in a
position to earn a livelihood, and must be protected against every form of
exploitation. 2 23 The issue of exploitative child labor was specifically addressed
by the ILO in its 1930 Convention No. 29, which prohibited all forms of "forced or
compulsory labour., 224 This has been called "one of the most widely ratified ILO
Conventions," and yet the evil practice persists. 225 In 1956 the United Nations
called for the abolition of the exploitation of children under eighteen.226  The
United Nations continued its interest in this issue with the 1959 Declaration of the
Rights of the Child, which, in Principle 9, specified that "the child shall be
protected against all forms of neglect, cruelty and exploitation. He shall not be the
subject of traffic in any form. 227 With reference to the instant issue of child labor,
this Declaration was forthright: "The child shall not be admitted to employment
before an appropriate minimum age; he shall in no case be caused or permitted to
engage in any occupation or employment which would prejudice his health or
education, or interfere with his physical, mental or moral development. 228
In its landmark 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the
United Nations General Assembly, in Article 8, forbade compulsory labor.229 That
same year the adoption by the United Nations of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights drew global attention to the issue of child
labor in Article 10, which directed nations to "protect young people from
economic exploitation and from work that might hamper or prevent their normal
development. 230 Both the 1966 Covenants entered into force in 1976.231
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221. ILO, International Law and Child Labour, supra note 220.
222. Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child, Sept. 26, 1924, League of Nations O.J. Spec.
Supp. 21, at 43 (1924), available at http://wwwl .umn.edu/humanrts/instree/childrights.html.
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225. See Panjabi, supra note 24 at 27.
226. Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and
Practices Similar to Slavery, art. l(d), Sept. 7, 1956, 18 U.S.T. 3201, 226 U.N.T.S. 3, available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/30.htm.
227. Declaration of the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 1386 (XIV), at Principle 9, U.N. GAOR,
14th Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doe. A/4354 (Nov. 20, 1959), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/25.htm.
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The ILO continued with its valiant efforts to address specific aspects of this
crisis by adopting the Convention on the Minimum Age for Admission to
Employment in 1973.232 This Convention, C138, which entered into force in 1976,
was an effort to eradicate child labor by requiring ratifying states to raise the
minimum employment age.233 The general standard, with respect to age, was
declared to be "not less than the age of completion of compulsory schooling," and
"in any case, shall not be less than 15 years." 234 For types of work likely to
endanger children, the minimum age adopted was eighteen years.235
The ILO also established the International Programme on the Elimination of
Child Labour (IPEC) in 1992, and by 2005 it was operating in eighty-six
countries.236 With the involvement of a variety of stakeholders including
governments, international agencies, community groups, and children and families,
IPEC has sought to implement its mandate through action, including "assessment
studies, capacity building, legal reform, awareness raising and social mobilization,
prevention, withdrawal and rehabilitation of children from hazardous work, and the
creation of alternatives for the families of child labourers."237
Continuing its extensive activity with respect to children in the labor force,
the ILO adopted the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work in
1998.238 Among other employment rights, this document called for the elimination
of child labor.23 9 Fulfilling its commitment to awareness-raising, in 2002 the ILO
declared June 12th as World Day Against Child Labour.240  Two years later a
global economic estimate concluded that the benefits of abolishing child labor
would be approximately $5.1 trillion.241 In its assessments of benefits, the ILO
suggested that benefits would accrue from the higher incomes earned by children
who were educated and healthier because they no longer worked in hazardous
conditions.242 By 2006, the ILO felt confident enough-possibly prematurely-to
announce that the end of child labor was within reach thanks to the global
movement against this practice.243
The worst forms of child labor, discussed in various sections of this article,
also evoked an ILO Convention No. C182 in 1999.244 This Convention requires
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ratifying states to eliminate the use of children in illicit activities, prostitution, and
the production of pornography.245 It also requires them to prioritize action against
the trafficking of children and all forms of forced labour, including the compulsory
recruitment of children in armed conflict.246 The Convention was adopted on June
17, 1999, and entered into force on November 19, 2000.247 It applies to all
economic sectors and covers all children under the age of eighteen.248
Because many children who become child laborers suffer the additional
trauma of being enslaved or bonded, either through capture or because of parental
debts, it is important to address the issue of child labor in tandem with the agenda
to abolish the crime of slavery. The ILO Committee of Experts annually highlights
the issue of bonded labor, including matters involving children. Additionally,
IPEC has noted that the issue of childhood labor bondage is an important agenda to
249pursue .
It has not been the intention in this section to enumerate every single
international instrument that has addressed the issue of child labor. Rather the
intent was to emphasize that there are plenty of detailed prohibitions in
international law to bring about the legally sanctioned eradication of child labor, if
only the world will find the will to abide by these commitments. There is little
dispute that the work of the ILO has been pivotal in bringing the world to
understand and appreciate both the scale of the problem, and guidance on how to
rectify the wrong. According to the ILO, "[o]ne reason why modem societies and
governments have not been more active in curbing the most harmful forms of child
labour is that working children are often not readily visible. It is a matter of 'out of
sight, out of mind."'
250
V. THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD (1989)
Of all the international law instruments dedicated to the eradication of child
labor and human rights violations involving children, the United Nations
Convention of 1989 is generally perceived as among the most important. The fact
that it has now been ratified by almost the entire world is a telling gauge of its
value to the international community. At time of writing this article, only two
countries have not ratified this instrument, Somalia and the United States of
America.25 1 The American position will be discussed later in this section. It took
approximately ten years from the time of proposal of this Convention to its
252adoption. However, once adopted in November 1989, it was signed and ratified
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248. Jankanish, supra note 217, at 74.
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expeditiously, and entered into force in September 1990.253 UNICEF explained
that this was the most "widely and rapidly ratified human rights treaty in
history. 254
A child is defined by this Convention as a person under the age of eighteen,
with due deference to variations in certain national law.255 This international law
instrument advances the idea of non-discrimination, emphasizes the best interest of
the child as a guiding principle, and enjoins governments to act to protect the
children of their state. The rights provided to children include an adequate
standard of living, an education, health and health services, and even the right to
256
relaxation and playtime. Children are protected from being used for the illicit
production of drugs, and in the trafficking of such substances. 25 7 With respect to
child labor, the Convention in Article 32 specifies that:
1. States Parties recognize the right of the child to be
protected from economic exploitation and from performing any
work that is likely to be hazardous or to interfere with the child's
education, or to be harmful to the child's health or physical,
mental, spiritual, moral or social development.
2. States Parties shall take legislative, administrative, social
and educational measures to ensure the implementation of the
present article. To this end, and having regard to the relevant
provisions of other international instruments, States Parties shall
in particular:
(a)Provide for a minimum age or minimum ages for
admission to employment;
(b)Provide for appropriate regulation of the hours and
conditions of employment;
(c)Provide for appropriate penalties or other sanctions
to ensure the effective enforcement of the present article. 58
Article 34 of the Convention calls for states to take all "appropriate national,
bilateral and multilateral measures to prevent" the exploitation of children for
unlawful sexual practices and pornography.259 Additionally, Article 35 prohibits
the abduction, sale, and trafficking of children for any purpose.260 The issue of the
use of children in warfare was addressed in Article 38, which calls on states to
ensure that children under fifteen do not participate in hostilities, that there shall be
253. G.A. Res. 44/25, supra note 6.
254. UNICEF, Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 252.
255. UNICEF, Fact Sheet: A Summary of the Rights Under the Convention on the Rights of the
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no recruitment under the age of fifteen, and that children affected by armed
conflict will be protected.26'
As is the usual practice with the United Nations, an elected Committee of ten
experts "of high moral standing" was established by this Convention to serve for
four years, and to receive regular reports from States Parties on the measures they
have taken to implement the provisions of the Convention.262
The Convention provides an inclusive system for the protection of children,
and the acceptance and early ratification of this instrument by most governments
testifies to the concern felt internationally about the need to protect this very
vulnerable element of society. That the provisions of the Convention have not yet
been fully or even adequately implemented ought not to detract from its
significance or from the importance of its near universal acceptance. It sets a
standard for all nations to follow if they wish to be members of the community of
nations. The Convention also provides very specific duties for national
governments. In this manner it ensures the continuation of viable family life
across the planet by protecting children.
The utilization of the Committee of experts reveals the United Nation's
determination to emphasize, and draw world attention to continuing abuses. In
2006 the Committee reminded signatories that the Convention exists to protect
children "from economic exploitation," and from hazardous child labor by
expressing serious concern about the persistence of corporal punishment, and other
forms of degradation involving child employees.
263
The position of the government of the United States of America on this
Convention has certainly raised eyebrows across the planet. After all, this
Convention has even been acknowledged and lauded by non-state actors such as
the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA).264  In failing to ratify this
international instrument, the United States has teamed with only one other country,
the violence-wracked, war-tom, and failing state of Somalia. Many feel the United
States' position is mystifying in light of the obvious commitment demonstrated by
previous American governments to the cause of eradicating child labor. United
States President Bill Clinton signed the Convention on February 16, 1995, but he
and his successor, President George W. Bush, did not initiate the process for
ratification by Congress. 265  At time of writing, December 2008, incoming
President-elect Barack Obama may be able to initiate the cumbersome ratification
process, which could bring the rights of the Convention into formal recognition in
American law. The president-elect did declare it "embarrassing to find ourselves
261. Id. at art. 38.
262. Id. at arts. 43-44.
263. Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 8: The Right of the Child to
Protection from Corporal Punishment and Other Cruel or Degrading Forms of Punishment, 42nd Sess.,
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264. UNICEF, Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 252.
265. Patrick Geary, United States: Is Obama's Win Also a Victory for Children's Rights?, CHILD
RIGHTS INFORMATION NETWORK, Nov. 5, 2008, http://www.crin.org/resources/infodetail.asp?ID=
18874.
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in the company of Somalia, a lawless land," and committed himself to reviewing
this matter.266
Two Optional Protocols followed the nearly universally accepted Convention
on the Rights of the Child. In May 2000, the United Nations adopted the Optional
Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflicts.267 This instrument
entered into force on February 12, 2002.268 The agreement expressed concern
about the "harmful and widespread impact of armed conflict on children," and
condemned the "recruitment, training and use within and across national borders of
children in hostilities by armed groups. '269 The Protocol directed state parties to
ensure that there would be no compulsory recruitment or involvement of persons
under the age of eighteen in armed conflict. It is important to note that a
concession was made to allow for voluntary recruitment under the age of
eighteen.270 However, non-state actors such as armed groups are precluded from
recruiting or using any persons under eighteen.271 Further provisions call for the
demobilization of affected children, social reintegration, and physical and
psychological recovery programs.272 The persistent use of child soldiers, and its
serious expansion at the turn of the century prompted concerns in the international
community that the provisions of the original Convention of 1989 were being
violated. The instant Protocol garnered support, most notably in the United States,
which ratified this instrument.273
American President George W. Bush also pledged his country to the Optional
Protocol on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, which
was adopted by the United Nations in May 2000.274 This Protocol was also ratified
by the United States. 275 The Protocol, which entered into force on January 18,
2002, articulated grave concern about the "significant and increasing international
traffic in children for the purpose of the sale of children, child prostitution and
child pornography., 276 The Protocol drew attention to the problems generated by
sex tourism, and to the particular threat to girls. It called on state parties to
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prohibit the "sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography. ' 277 It
urged signatories to criminalize the use of children in forced labor in their own
legal systems.278 Additionally, it proposed the seizure of assets obtained from
illicit activities. 279 Additional provisions suggested support services for victims,
and the strengthening of international cooperation to facilitate prosecutions.
280
Whether or not these extensive and notable international provisions to protect
children, particularly from exploitative labor in its many evil manifestations, will
result in the eradication of these human rights violations remains to be seen. It is
significant that as a milestone in international cooperation to protect our most
vulnerable members of society, the entire world has shown concern and a
conscience about the fate of children. The formulations of the United Nations can,
however, only be standards and guides. Implementation remains the responsibility
of sovereign member states of the United Nations. And they must act resoundingly
and decisively, and carry through on the commitments they made when they
signed and ratified these three all-important instruments of international law.
There is no point in becoming complacent because the world now has international
law to support this cause. Until the law is implemented globally, and the practices
eliminated universally, these instruments remain just well sounding and well
meaning words on paper.
VI. CONCLUSION AND ASSESSMENTS
This article began as an assessment of some aspects of the state of child labor
in recent years. It concludes with guarded optimism, and uneasy apprehensions
about the future. The 2008 economic meltdown, that has devastated the financial
structure of so many countries, does not bode well for the future of child labor.
When entire families are driven to starvation, and when poverty pervades entire
communities, allowing children to become educated can seem like a luxury--one
that no family in plight can afford. The premise of this research was to determine
whether or not the state of this problem is to be deemed positive or negative. The
conclusion, in terms that are deliberately cautiously optimistic, is that the situation
in some countries has definitely improved, and over-all child labor rates are
declining. However, for those young children in the grip of working as sex slaves,
as soldiers, as farm workers, as matchstick makers, as rug weavers, and in a host of
other economic activities, slight improvements provide no consolation. Their lives
are brutal, imperiled, cruel, and agonizing. No amount of fine-sounding phrases
from the United Nations will make the slightest difference to their lives until
strong and assertive action is taken at the local level to free them and provide them
and their families with an adequate standard of living.
This research also concludes with an advisory on the necessity for the
developed world to address the problem of global poverty in a more meaningful
and multilateral manner so that poor nations can become self-sufficient, and break
277. Id. at art 1.
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VOL. 37:3
CHILD LABOR IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
the cycle of destitution and degradation, which involves adults and children.
Although the incoming American president has a very large agenda, and has to
tackle many serious challenges, he has convinced the majority of Americans, and
inspired the rest of us to consider the limitless possibilities open to the human mind
and spirit.
Focusing on the "Yes We Can" approach, that has made history in the last
American election, this research leads to a possible direction for the international
community-hopefully with the enthusiastic support of the United States of
America. The proposal would be for a multilateral type of development plan,
broadly along the lines of the original Marshall Plan, for the least developed
nations of the world-those most at risk in terms of slavery and child labor. The
plan, also drawing participation from Europe, the industrializing Asian countries,
Canada, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and indeed any other country that wants to
be part of it, would provide effective assistance to any developing nation that
would undertake to guarantee the implementation of human rights; hold fair and
free, monitored elections; establish a democratic system of government; and
commit to ending civil conflicts. Plan members would then provide economic aid,
for a limited time, to those nations whose members dedicated themselves to
achieving their own freedom from oppression.
Additionally and more important, the Plan would provide qualifying
developing states with considerable expertise, according to their own needs and
requirements-an immediate advantage for the West, in terms of solving the high
unemployment rates in the developed world. Such expertise, mainly to teach
skills, could deal with everything from establishing infrastructure including
electricity, to teaching agricultural techniques, water conservation, environmental
consciousness, and other skills aimed at poverty reduction. Instead of a scattered
nation-by-nation donor approach to foreign aid, this would be a cohesive, global
approach, undertaken multilaterally, and concentrated-not on handouts, which
often disappear into the pockets of corrupt dictators-but on empowering entire
communities to become more aware of their rights and responsibilities. The goal
would be sustainable development and economic self-sufficiency. The training
and skills would be imparted to people on the understanding that they would, in
turn, train their fellow nationals and carry on the tradition. There is a saying
quoted so often at the United Nations that it has almost become a clich&. But like
all clichrs it bears a measure of truth that cannot be denied: "If you give a man a
fish, he will eat for a day. If you teach him to fish, he will eat all his life."
The key to success would have to be local participation, and an
acknowledgment that community concerns would have to be respected. Throwing
money at passive recipients only turns them into mendicants and wastes the funds.
The history of the twentieth century has proven that time and again. The new plan
would be contingent on local initiatives that control tendencies to violence and take
charge of law and order. Local populations will have to invest a great deal of
themselves in this plan to prove their worth before the rest of the world commits to
them. Countries under the sway of dictators like Zimbabwean President Robert
Mugabe would have to act decisively to establish visible proof of a democratic
government before they could be considered.
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There is no assumption being made here that the removal of corrupt dictators
and violent renegades will be easy. However, the peoples of each region will have
to act decisively to create acceptable conditions for their own betterment. Foreign
military intervention has not proven an effective long-term panacea for the ills of
dictatorship. Foreigners inevitably generate distrust and spark internal
polarization. The examples of Iraq and Afghanistan testify to the dangers inherent
in military interventions that are not simultaneously geared towards economic
development on a major scale. However harsh it may sound, the people of each
region or nation have to sort out their own situation with respect to the acceptance
or rejection of dictatorships and civil war. If they choose the path of human
rights-a path already deemed as desirable by most nations-then they qualify by
degrees of national achievement for the fundamental benefits of the Plan. It is true
that displacement of existing corrupt regimes will be difficult. It will be very
difficult, fraught with sacrifice and possible tragic loss of life. However, the
prevalence of dictatorships in so many poor countries also takes a toll on human
life and well being.
A study of twentieth century history could lead to the conclusion that people
only value freedom after they have fought for it and achieved it by their own
efforts. By giving people a reason to throw off their corrupt governments in favor
of self-rule, and by holding out the possibility of a better economic future for their
families and communities if they take this initial step, the outside world gives them
the incentive to make such bold action feasible and possible. When they have
sacrificed, and acted to establish their own locally acceptable form of democratic
government they will have a system they will cherish and fight to preserve. The
experience of the recent past demonstrates that democracy can very rarely be
imposed from outside, unless there is a strong will within the recipient nation to
live by and value that type of government.
President-elect Obama has articulated a desire for change in all realms of
policy and for new approaches. If the United States of America takes the moral
high ground-not in a superior or arrogant way, but to demonstrate its own best
qualities by assisting and helping those peoples abroad who have demonstrated an
ability to help themselves-then American expertise and aid, as part of a multi-
state contribution, would not be feared, or suspected as coming with political
strings attached. This democratic initiative would abandon the stale and
unproductive foreign policy dependence on realpolitik, in favor of an approach that
perceives America as part of a global community, where the realization prevails
that all of us on this planet have to work together for mutual betterment.
A globalized effort, hinging on participation by many nations with the simple
aim of raising the living conditions of the poor nations to an acceptable level,
would ensure that in the future both the rich and the poor cooperate, rather than
threaten each other. We in the West have already begun to realize that we cannot
continue to live as islands of prosperity, while all around us the people of other
regions live in grinding poverty and brutality. Our own ultimate security depends
on the success of bold new initiatives that can bring the world together, not rip it
asunder. If the "Yes We Can" President of the United States can undo, with one
stroke, a racial notion that prevailed through all of American history, it might not
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be all that daring to think that he and his team can generate dramatic global change
as well. If the Obama presidency will not be about politics as usual, then the
United States will no longer support dictators because of any realpolitik agendas.
It will seek instead the honest proliferation of democratic practices both at home
and abroad. American ingenuity, which turned a few colonies of rebels into a
superpower in less than two hundred years, could work equally significant miracles
for the dispossessed, the poor, the enslaved, and the children of the world. By
saving the world's children, America will save itself. Although its government
commands fear and suspicion in many countries, there is also an international
wellspring of affection for the American people. American culture similarly draws
enthusiastic approval, particularly among young people. If the new presidency can
utilize this good will to position the United States on a moral plane, rather than on
an expedient path in its foreign policy, it could literally change the entire world.
For example, this type of international plan applied to the ravaged continent
of Africa could make a meaningful difference to the lives of millions, and provide
them with the possibility of a better life and future. And lest these conclusions be
deemed naive, given the dangers the world is facing today-such as terrorism,
dictatorship, revolutions, civil wars, economic melt-down and so on-is it not also
true that America has always shown its best when facing very serious challenges
and threats? The fact that the whole world became fascinated and enthralled by the
2008 American election shows how interested people around the world are in this
amazing political phenomenon called the United States of America. While
American foreign policy has many external detractors, the American people
collectively command huge affection. Their decision to select a president who was
lauded globally before he had been elected nationally testifies to the world's
continuing absorption in all things American. The prevalence of American culture,
and its icons across the planet demonstrate that there is a role for this country not
as oppressor, but as friendly neighbor and benevolent helper. With American
initiative in a multi-lateral plan of the type sketched out, the world might some day
collectively prosper, instead of fragmenting and fracturing along political and
economic fault lines. There are huge advantages for America in changing its entire
approach to the foreign world. It could prove that there is a clear and direct
linkage between the United States and the best values of democratic traditions; that
America exists not to economically exploit poor countries for their resources, but
to help them to achieve a higher standard of living; that America devotes itself
initially to fulfilling human rights at home, and then to working toward such
achievement overseas. If America commits itself in such a manner, threats to the
United States, such as terrorism, could just possibly diminish. No one suggests
that any of this will happen overnight or very quickly. However, the forces that
have positioned themselves to destroy the United States-namely the
fundamentalists and terrorists-gain popular support because American
governments act in a manner that is either callous about the rest of the world, or
indifferent to external imperatives. When America is perceived globally as a
friend within the community of nations, not an international military power bent on
its own agendas, inevitably the popular support that is vital for the sustenance of
terrorism will diminish. This type of proposal, however idealistic it may sound, is
actually in America's self-interest. We have witnessed the utter failure of
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twentieth century style foreign policy. This new millennium has to come up with
approaches that are not merely reflections of thinking outside the box, but which
toss the box out in favor of innovative methods to approach the world.
And while naysayers might suggest that this is dreaming beyond the reach of
humanity, looking over human history, all that is best in the world started as a
dream, from where it progressed to an ideal, flowered into an idea, and after much
human thought, ultimately became reality. There are many manifestations of evil
prevalent in the world today. Exploitative child labor is just one such criminal
practice. However, though this research has shown a bleak picture of suffering, it
has also demonstrated universal concern and compassion hard at work, attempting
to eradicate this evil.
Child labor, like slavery, is one more manifestation of what humanity can sink
to when greed and avarice dominate. The eradication of child labor will prove
once and for all that humanity has the will to achieve positive change, and that it
has the grasp to reach for it. Given the risks that threaten not just the nations of the
South, but those of the North, can we really afford not to rid our world of these evil
practices?
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A WOMAN'S WORTH:
ACCOUNTING FOR WOMEN IN THE GLOBAL MARKET
MEGAN BERRY1
The manipulation of women's issues as an ideological and
political resource in the Third World nationalist history
commonly develops . . . into the manipulation of women
themselves as a socio-economic resource in Third World nation
states.2
I. INTRODUCTION
Globalization is increasingly shaping the goals and methods of international
actors in all realms of interaction: social, cultural, political, economic, etc. 3 The
term "globalization" has many definitions, but perhaps the most succinct is that
globalization is "the growing integration of economies and societies around the
world."4 As economies and societies become more interdependent, the problems
of developing countries become more intertwined with the conduct of developed
countries and, therefore, require mutual effort to minimize. Minimizing the
problems of developing nations requires creating and implementing programs and
policies that promote sustainable development.5
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Williams, and the Women's Legal Center in Cape Town, South Africa. The author served the Denver
Journal of International Law and Policy as Survey Editor in 2006-2007 and Executive Editor in 2007-
2008.
2. Ann Stewart, Juridyfying Gender Justice: From Global Rights to Local Justice, in LAW AND
DEVELOPMENT: FACING COMPLEXITY IN THE 21 ST CENTURY 36, 46 (John Hatchard & Amanda Perry-
Kessaris eds., 2003), quoting Geraldine Heng, "A great way to fly": nationalism, the state and the
varieties of third-world feminism, in FEMINIST GENEALOGIES, COLONIAL LEGACIES, AND DEMOCRATIC
FUTURES 31-32 (M. Jacqui Alexander & Chandra Talpade Mohanty eds., 1997).
3. E.g., JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, MAKING GLOBALIZATION WORK 4 (W.W. Norton & Company, Inc.
2006).
4. The World Bank Group, Globalization, http://wwwl.worldbank.org/economicpolicy/
globalization (last visited Feb. 18, 2009). For a more critical definition, see Nsongurua J. Udombana,
How Should We Then Live? Globalization and the New Partnership for Africa's Development, 20 B.U.
INT'L L.J. 293, 306 (2002) ("the growth of international capitalism - driven by market forces - and
capitalism is the ideology of the strong, based on selfishness and exploitation of resources, perpetuating
forced servitude across the world.").
5. Sustainable development is most often defined as development that meets "the needs of the
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs." Report of the
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It is widely acknowledged that sustainable development cannot be achieved
without investing in women and reducing the inequalities faced by women in both
developed and developing nations.6 The United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) has observed that trade, being the most important form
of globalization, can have significant implications for gender equality.
Additionally, globalization tends to be more harmful to women than men because
women are more likely to be targets of illegal labor practices such as low wages,
sexual harassment, and resistance to unionization.
8
This paper will focus primarily on the harmful effects economic
globalization 9 has had on women in Africa as a result of various international and
regional trade agreements and economic unions. 10 While there has been positive
progress in recognizing the important role women play in the global economy and
in economic development, there is a persistent gap between policy and practice.
Without the ability to rely on the rights they have been promised, women will not
be able to reach their full potential as individuals or help their countries to reach
their full potential as nations. Investing in women and accounting for them and the
work they do may improve the current generation's lives only marginally, but it
will provide the catalyst for improving the lives of this generation's daughters and
granddaughters and great-granddaughters, thereby enhancing those women's
contributions to their countries' economic progress and sustainable development.
Section one provides a brief history of women's status in Africa as a basis for
analyzing how this status has changed from the pre-colonial period, through
colonization and into today's post-colonial societies. Section two will then
present an overview of the empirical data available on the reality African women
face as a result of economic globalization. The third section of this discussion
analyzes a number of human rights agreements, international and regional
institutions and agreements, and the role of governments in promoting and
World Commission on Environment & Development, G.A. RES 42/187, Preamble, U.N. DOc.
A/RES/42/187 (Dec. 11, 1987).
6. See discussion infra section III.
7. United Nations Conference on Trade & Development (UNCTAD), Sao Paulo, Brazil, June 13-
18, 2004, Report of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development on its Eleventh Session,
73, U.N. Doc. TD/412 (Aug. 20, 2004), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/td4l2-en.pdf
(last visited Feb. 18, 2009) [hereinafter UNCTAD].
8. E.g., Liane M. Jarvis, Note, Women's Rights and the Public Morals Exception of GA TTArticle
20, 22 MICH. J. INT'L L. 219, 220 (2000). The author of this paper understands "resistance to
unionization" to mean women's inability to form unions because of such factors as lack of education,
lack of knowledge about unions, intimidation through physical or sexual coercion, and the high
turnover rate of female employees. See, e.g., Gurushri Swamy, The impact of international trade on
gender equality, 86 PREM NOTES (May 2004), available at http://ww-wl.worldbank.org/prem/
PREMNotes/premnote86.pdf.
9. Jarvis, supra note 8, at 220 (defining economic globalization as "the closer economic
integration of [countries] through the increased capital flow of goods and services, capital, and even
labor.").
10. The author recognizes that African women's experiences differ from country to country and
region to region; therefore, much of this paper will necessarily be written in broad terms. Where more
detailed data for a particular country is available, it will be used as much as possible to provide more
specific examples in support of or contradiction to the argument.
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protecting women's rights. The final section discusses the steps that have been
taken, are being taken, and still need to be taken to improve women's capacity to
participate in the global economy and contribute to sustainable development.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF AFRICAN WOMEN
Because women's status and duties varied from region to region in pre-
colonial African societies, it is inaccurate to say that all African women shared the
same experience. For example, in some societies, like the Tswana and Shona,
women were essentially legal minors; while in other societies, like the Mende and
Serbro, women could become chiefs." Regardless of their pre-colonial status, it is
generally accepted that the process of colonization resulted in women losing rights
they previously held.12 Colonialism produced a detrimental intersection of African
patriarchy and Western ideology regarding the subservient role of women. 13
For example, pre-colonial Igbo women and men were by no means equals, but
there was a level of respect inherent in the recognition of their separate spheres of
rights and duties.14 Women's status was independent of their husbands' status. In
this pre-colonial society, as was common in many pre-colonial African societies,
women's concerns and grievances were given voice through strong female
institutions and marketing networks. These parallel authority structures enabled
women to defend their rights and retain a level of autonomy in their societies.
15
The European colonists failed to appreciate, or chose to ignore, the delicate
balance of these parallel structures. Instead they viewed African society through a
European lens and proceeded to impose gendered roles on men and women.16
These imposed roles were not always accepted and, by and large, served to
dissolve the traditional social fabric of the Africans' lives.' 7 For example, in
11. E.g., APRIL A. GORDON, Women and Development, in UNDERSTANDING CONTEMPORARY
AFRICA 293, 295 (April A. Gordon & Donald L. Gordon eds., 2007).
12. Stewart, supra note 2, at 48; see also Susie Jacobs, Land Reform: Still a Goal Worth Pursuing
for Rural Women?, 14 J. INT'L. DEV. 887, 888-91 (2002).
13. FREDERICK COOPER, AFRICA SINCE 1940: THE PAST OF THE PRESENT, NEW APPROACHES TO
AFRICAN HISTORY 125 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2002).
14. See Uch6 U. Ewelukwa, Centuries of Globalization; Centuries of Exclusion: African Women,
Human Rights, & the "New" International Trade Regime, 20 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 75, 92-3
(2005).
15. Id. at 93-4; Gordon, supra note 11, at 295.
16. Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee (HSGIC), The New Partnership
for Africa's Development (NEPAD) Framework, Abuja, Nigeria, October 2001, 21 [hereinafter
NEPAD] ("Colonialism subverted hitherto traditional structures, institutions and values or made them
subservient to the economic and political needs of the imperial powers."), available at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/acp/60_04/pdf/atelier-educen.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2009);
see also Gordon, supra note 11, at 297.
17. One example of this dissolution of the social fabric, which is beyond the scope of this paper,
relates to the effect codification of customary law and the imposition of Western values had on
traditional marriage arrangements, i.e. multiple wives. For an interesting discussion on how formal
legislation recognizing only one wife per man has further harmed some African women and their
property rights see, e.g., Laurel L. Rose, Women's Land Access in Post-Conflict Rwanda: Bridging the
Gap Between Customary Land Law & Pending Land Legislation, 13 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 197, 208-11
(2004).
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Nigeria men were selected and trained to work in wage-earning positions with the
railroads while women were taught modem methods of homemaking and
childrearing. 8 Despite this, women often continued to engage in the more
traditional Yoruba practice of trading in order to continue to contribute to their
families' well-being. 19 Conversely, colonialism in Kenya forced Kikuyu and
Kamba women to engage in trading and marketing practices as early as the mid-
nineteenth century, which was a relatively unusual practice for this traditionally
patrilineal and patrilocal society.20 Although such shifts in social patterns evidence
the impact of colonialism, the brunt of colonialism's imposed prejudicial system is
most evident in two ways: provision of access to resources and the codification of
traditional, or customary, law.
In an attempt to integrate African societies into the global capitalist economy,
agriculture was commercialized. This commercialization had a tendency to
disadvantage women, the primary food producers, more than men. 21  First,
agricultural commercialization meant the introduction of cash crops and new
methods of farming, which were taught almost exclusively to men while women
continued to produce subsistence crops. Second, educational opportunities were
primarily available to men, meaning women were not provided with access to the
same skills and resources as men and were consequently barred from jobs in the
colonial administration.22 Finally, men were forced into the wage economy
through work on plantations, in the mines, or in towns while women remained in
the rural areas.2 3
The codification of customary law served to promote and institutionalize
these inequalities. Customary law is by nature an oral form of law, passed on by
word of mouth in communities; therefore, any attempt to codify or record it will be
limited by the static nature of this process. The customary practices were based on
ensuring order and norms in the best interest of the entire community. As such,
customary practices were not strict, unchangeable rules but rather a set of
malleable guidelines inclusive of tradition but also reflective of the changing
values and beliefs of the community at that time. 24 In today's society there are at
least two forms of customary law: official and living. The living law consists of
those nebulous, flexible, changing practices actually observed by African
18. COOPER, supra note 13, at 124.
19. See id.
20. Claire Robertson, Trade, Gender, and Poverty in the Nairobi Area: Women 's Strategies for
Survival and Independence in the 1980s, ENGENDERING WEALTH & WELL-BEING 65, 66 (Rae Lesser
Blumberg et al. eds., 1995) ("Trade in Nairobi.. .became a survival strategy for women seeking
independence from men.").
21. Gordon, supra note 11, at 297.
22. E.g., id.; Ewelukwa, supra note 14, at 89-90.
23. Ewelukwa, supra note 14, at 89-90.
24. Megan Berry, Gasa v. Road Accident Fund, No. 579/2006, Amicus Curiae Brief, Annexure A
(Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa, hearing date Nov. 19, 2007) (unpublished brief) (on file
with author).
25. SOUTH AFRICAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION (SALRC), REPORT ON CUSTOMARY
MARRIAGES: THE HARMONIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW AND THE INDIGENOUS LAW (Project 90) 18
(August 1998) [hereinafter SALRC].
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communities. The official law is the attempted codification of these practices
relied on by courts and other state organs.26  Because the official law is written
down and recorded, it is less susceptible to change and less reflective of the true
customary practices of a given community.2 7 The official version of customary
law has also been criticized as having been "invented"; that is, it describes less the
practices people were actually observing at the time of codification and more what
the colonial government thought they should be doing. 8
This tendency to impose Western or Northern values on African societies
through law continues today. Despite the good intentions supporting many
international treaties and agreements, modem attempts to introduce laws based on
international norms largely ignore cultural practices, thereby continuing a pattern
of neglect toward domestic values in post-colonial societies.29 In many countries,
independence did not always bring the expected positive revolution of economic
and political structures. In fact, despite African women's integral contributions to
many of the independence struggles, 30 many newly independent African nations
retained the same colonial structures and institutions that created and contributed
to women's subordination.
31
III. OVERVIEW OF AVAILABLE DATA ON GENDER AND TRADE
Women do two-thirds of the world's work, receive 10% of the
32
world's income and own 1% of the means ofproduction.
26. Id.
27. See Kim L. Robinson, The Minority and Subordinate Status of African Women under
Customary Law, II S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 457, 460 (1995) ("If the purpose of indigenous law is to
reflect the living cultures of African peoples, by definition, codified customary law cannot fulfill this
objective because it 'freezes' African life... When laws that allegedly reflect traditions cease to be
appropriate to people's lives they are obsolete and should be rejected.").
28. SALRC, supra note 25, at 19-20 ("[1]n principle, only the rules grounded on contemporary
social practice should be deemed valid."); see also Alice Armstrong et al., Uncovering Reality:
Excavating Women's Rights in African Family Law, 7 INT'L J.L. & FAM 314, 324-26 (1993)
(describing the terminology used in the codified version of customary law to support the argument that
it was invented. Colonialists termed levariate marriage "widow inheritance," transforming the view of
the institution from women being owed a duty of support to women as property).
29. Stewart, supra note 2, at 48.
30. See, e.g., Ewelukwa, supra note 14, at 78, 92-108 (discussing the causes and results of the Aba
Women's War of 1929 of the Igbo women in Nigeria); see also COOPER, supra note 13, at 125-26. See
generally, SEMBENE OUSMANE, GOD'S BITS OF WOOD 186-204 (Francis Price trans., Heinemann 1995)
(1960).
31. See, e.g., JEFFREY HERBST, STATES AND POWER IN AFRICA: COMPARATIVE LESSONS IN
AUTHORITY AND CONTROL 98-103 (Princeton Univ. Press 2000); Gordon, supra note 11, at 299.
32. United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), WORLD POVERTY DAY 2007:
INVESTING IN WOMEN - SOLVING THE POVERTY PUZZLE, FACTS & FIGURES, available at
www.womenfightpoverty.org/docs/WorldPovertyDay2007_FactsAndFigures.pdf [hereinafter
UNIFEM] (referencing the informal slogan of the Decade of Women).
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Women comprise roughly 70% of the world's poor. 33  In 2002, women
constituted 40% of the world's total economically-active population and carried
out about 70% of the informal work in developing countries. 34  Unfortunately,
women's actual and potential economic capacity generally goes under- or
unaccounted for in policy decisions.35 In this manner, women are considered as a
means to an end in products of trade, rather than as ends in and of themselves.36
Global trade and investment tend to favor large companies rather than small
and micro entrepreneurs, such as women working in the informal sector of the
economy.37 While trade tends to increase the availability of wage jobs for women,
numerous other factors counteract that increased availability, which results in
women remaining unable to benefit from the trade expansion. UNCTAD notes
that social norms linked to the traditional functions of men and women, both
within the home and in the workplace, are the root causes of gender inequality.39
These social norms directly and significantly impact women's ability to access the
necessary resources - i.e. capital financing, education, and land - to be competitive
in the economic market.4 °
A. Invisible Work
In the developing world, much of the work in which women are engaged is in
care services. Care services are those activities necessary for social reproduction,
33. Doris Mpoumou, The Proof is in the Numbers, The Power is in the Women, NEWS & VIEWS
15 (Women's Environment & Development Organization), March 1, 2002; Eugenia McGill, Poverty
and Social Analysis of Trade Agreements: A More Coherent Approach?, 27 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 371, 414-15 (2004).
34. UNCTAD, supra note 7, 5; African Caribbean Pacific - European Union (ACP-EU) Joint
Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution on gender issues, C., ACP-EU/3392/02/fin (March 21, 2002)
[hereinafter Cape Town Declaration].
35. See, e.g., Barbara Evers, Gender, International Trade and the Trade Policy Review
Mechanism: Conceptual Reference Points for UNCTAD 5-6, GLOBALIZATION AND POVERTY (2002),
http://www.gapresearch.org/govemance/BE%20evers%/o20unctad%20paperl.pdf.; COOPER, supra note
13, at 104 ("Unofficial cross-border trading networks... may well be doing more to create regional
trading relations than official efforts...").
36. Jarvis, supra note 8, at 224.
37. MARILYN CARR & MARTHA ALTER CHEN, WOMEN IN INFORMAL EMPLOYMENT
GLOBALIZING & ORGANIZING, GLOBALIZATION AND THE INFORMAL ECONOMY: How GLOBAL TRADE
AND INVESTMENT IMPACT ON THE WORKING POOR 2 (2001), available at
http://www.wiego.org/papers/carrchenglobalization.pdf; McGill, supra note 33, at 422.
38. Swamy, supra note 8, at I (explaining that the factors that may impede women's ability to
benefit from trade expansion include discrimination, lower skills, and gender inequalities in access to
resources); cf Elizabeth Gwaunza, Tsitsi Nzira & Virginia Chitanda, The Socio-economic and Legal
Implications of EPZs in Zimbabwe: Some Emerging Gender Concerns, in DEMANDING DIGNITY:
WOMEN CONFRONTING ECONOMIC REFORMS IN AFRICA 145, 159 (Dzodzi Tsikata et al. eds., 2000)
[hereinafter DEMANDING DIGNITY] (noting that the jobs generated for women by trade tend to reflect a
judgment on women's capabilities to perform certain tasks; hence, women are typically employed as
support staff in administrative offices or as packers and quality inspectors in textile and agricultural
factories, positions that pay less than the positions for which men were employed).
39. UNCTAD, supra note 7, 5.
40. E.g., id.; see also Swamy, supra note 8, at 3 ("An important institutional determinant of
women's gains from trade, particularly in agriculture, is the extent of their control over land, labor, and
the additional income generated by a switch to export crops.").
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or the "care and development of people and their capacity to work. 4 1 This sector
of the economy involves activities like subsistence farming, providing food,
healthcare, and education for the family, as well as cleaning and laundry. Barbara
Evers describes this "uncounted, unrecognized and undervalued" work as an
"invisible policy variable" because it is:
(i) An obligation which has costs in terms of time and energy
("work").
(ii) Not renumerated by a wage ("unpaid").
(iii) Indispensable for the continuation of the entire society ("social
reproduction").
(iv) An opportunity and a constraint for the achievement of food
security, improved agricultural productivity and ouput.
42
The expectation that women, rather than men, will perform these jobs is
promulgated by cultural, religious, and family norms in many societies.43 For
example, girls generally have to drop out of school at an earlier age than boys
because they are expected to help out at home or because they need to take care of
their own children. 4 Lack of education is one of the most crucial factors when
evaluating gender inequalities, for it ties together women's inability to access
resources in other sectors of society, such as training for skilled labor, and
inclusion in policy-making discussions.45
Engaging in care services requires a substantial amount of a woman's time;
thus reducing the amount of time she has available to participate in more formally
46 cnrbtst oe'
recognized economically-productive activities. This contributes to women's
inability to compete for higher paying jobs and thereby take advantage of
international trade schemes. A study in Tanzania reveals that reducing women's
time burdens results in a 10% increase in household cash incomes, a 15% increase
in labor productivity, and a 44% increase in capital productivity.47
41. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Comm'n For Asia and the Pacific [UNESCAP], Emerging Soc. Issues
Div., Gender and Dev. Discussion Paper Series, Discussion Paper: Women in International Trade and
Migration: Examining the Globalized Provision of Care Services 2, (February 2005) (drafted by Marina
Fe B. Durano), available at http://www.unescap.org/esid/ GAD/Publication/ DiscussionPapers/16/
Discussion%20Paper%2016.pdf.
42. Evers, supra note 35, at 6.
43. UNCTAD, supra note 7, 1 4.
44. See Robertson, supra note 20, at 67-68 (reporting that in Kenya the average number of years
of education among traders was 5.1 for women and 7.9 men, and stating that "Women lack education as
a result of a number of discriminatory factors, such as fewer and poorer schools, pregnancy terminating
school attendance, parental reluctance to allow schooling because of the labor value of girls, and the
poverty that forces that parental choice.").
45. See UNCTAD, supra note 7, 4 ("In many societies, cultural, religious or family norms
continue to confine women to certain roles and are barriers to their participation in economic life on an
equal basis with men ... the prevailing gender order gives more authority to men in society ... men
tend to exclude women from their decision-making networks.").
46. Evers, supra note 35, at 5 (reporting that women's work burden averages 20% more than men,
and even more in rural areas).
47. Id. at 405 (citing A. Tibaijuka, The Cost of Differential Gender Riles in African Agriculture: A
Cases Study of Smallholder Banana-Coffee Farms in the Kagera Region, Tanzania, 45 J. AGRIC. ECON.
69(1994)).
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There is a substantial amount of evidence supporting the fact that when given
access to resources, such as financial income, women invest more of those
resources into their families to meet basic needs and cannot, therefore, invest in
external resources as a means of production.48  This keeps women tied to
subsistence so that even when they are able to access the labor market they end up
poorer than similarly-situated men.49  For example, a study conducted among
traders in Nairobi reveals that the majority of female traders relied solely on their
own labor for their income and were not provided with supplemental income from
their spouses, whereas most of the male traders were able to supplement their
income with cash crops sold by their wives. 50 This knowledge should lead to the
conclusion that because women engage in such socially-responsible investment
practices, they should receive increased investment and that doing so is likely to
benefit national growth and development more than a comparable investment in
men.
51
B. The Informal Sector
The expectation that women will provide for the family, regardless of the
level of support received from a husband, propels many women into wage labor.52
Due to social norms and the gender-segregated nature of most developing
countries' labor market, women's engagement in the market is generally through
informal means such as market trading; therefore, the effects of trade
liberalization, which often result in an increase in export-oriented industry,
53predominately affect women.
The effect trade liberalization has on women often results in negative
economic consequences for the country in which those women live. An example
of how this process occurs can be witnessed by analyzing Zimbabwean cross-
border traders. These traders, who are predominantly women, cross the borders
into South Africa or Botswana on a weekly or monthly basis using a visitor's
visa.54 They buy goods in the receiving country, which they then bring back into
Zimbabwe to sell on the informal market. This hurts Zimbabwe's economy
because these traders spend the majority of their profits in the formal sector of the
receiving country, not in Zimbabwe.55 These traders are also able to sell their
foreign-bought goods more cheaply through Zimbabwe's informal market than
48. E.g., Helene Lambatim & Aichta Sy, Chad: Gender-Specific Impacts of Economic Reforms, in
DEMANDING DIGNITY, supra note 38, at 237, 244-45.
49. See Robertson, supra note 20, at 69-70.
50. Id.
51. See Rae Lesser Blumberg, Introduction: EnGENDERing Wealth and Well-Being in an Era of
Economic Transformation, in ENGENDERING WEALTH & WELL-BEING, supra note 20, at 1, 10.
52. See McGill, supra note 33, at 414-15.
53. See id. at 414-16, 421-24; see also Robertson, supra note 20, at 81 ("[W]omen undertook
trade in order to meet family needs ... not because they viewed trade as a career they might enjoy.").
54. SALLY PEBERDY & JONATHAN CRUSH, SOUTHERN AFRICAN MIGRATION PROJECT,
MIGRATION POLICY SER. No. 6, TRADING PLACES: CROSS-BORDER TRADERS AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN
INFORMAL SECTOR 26-27 (1998), available at http://www.queensu.ca/samp/sampresources/
samppublications/policyseries/Acrobat6.pdf.
55. Id. at 2.
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people would be able to buy them in the formal markets in Zimbabwe; thereby,
depriving the state of much-needed revenue.
Another reason export-oriented industries predominately affect women is
because women tend to have fewer rights to land, which means their land can be
taken from them by a large corporation for agricultural purposes or as development
space for factories. Women need their land not only for subsistence farming for
their families, but as a means for producing crops that can be sold on the informal
market. Because women also tend to receive less education and job-specific
training than men, they generally have fewer skills that are "marketable" in the
industrial sector. The informal agricultural market, therefore, is often their only
56
wage-eaming option.
C. Property Rights & Agricultural Liberalization
Generally speaking, the inequality in ownership and control of land is due to a
reliance on traditional norms regarding the appropriate roles of the sexes. 57 Most
traditional systems throughout Africa are patrilineal, meaning that land and
property inheritance favors male heirs. This pattern of male preference is realized
through marriage laws, inheritance laws, land reforms, inequalities in the markets,
and the concept of the male as being "head of the household., 58 Many of these
traditional practices are embodied in customary law, which, while not necessarily
promoting the status of women, was also not necessarily historically harmful to
them. In Kenya, for example, land was traditionally held communally and women
were able to bargain for access to land based on the notion of mutual obligations
and responsibilities.5 9 Because land in many African communities was viewed as
being held in trust for future generations, many families were reluctant to alienate
their land.60 Therefore, although women may not have owned their own land, they
were ensured access to and cultivation of it.
These traditional norms, and women's relative status, all changed with the
imposition of Western views of property law brought by colonization. European
colonizers emphasized private ownership of land.61  There was a focus on
registration of ownership, typically only in the name of the head of the household,
i.e. men.62 This focus on privatization, or individualization of property ownership
increased as African communities adopted the more Westernized market.
Individuals were more likely and willing to alienate land, thereby undermining the
56. See generally, e.g., McGill, supra note 33, at 414-24; UNCTAD, supra note 7; Swamy, supra
note 8.
57. Karen 0. Mason & Helene M. Carlsson, The Development Impact of Gender Equality in Land
Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT: TOWARDS MUTUAL REINFORCEMENT 114, 120 (Philip
Alston & Mary Robinson eds., 2005).
58. See id.
59. Renee Giovarelli, Customary Law, Household Distribution of Wealth, and Women 's Rights to
Land and Property, 4 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 801, 802 (2006).
60. L. Amede Obiora, Remapping the Domain of Property in Africa, 12 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 57, 64 (2000).
61. See Giovarelli, supra note 59, at 802.
62. See T.W. BENNETT, HUMAN RIGHTS AND AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW 123 (1995).
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traditional protections women had in terms of usufruct and collective
accountability.63 Along with the loss of communal ownership was women's loss
of bargaining ability and socio-economic security. Because land and livestock
from the point of colonization onward were generally held in a man's name and
because land and livestock were the focus of the Westernized market for property,
women's contributions to the household property were typically disregarded.64
Recent studies reveal that women head about one out of three households in
65Zimbabwe, but tend to have smaller farm sizes than their male counterparts.
While there are legal documents on the records granting equal land rights to
women, these rights are unenforceable due to the constitutional provision that
makes customary law superior to civil law in cases of conflict. Because customary
Zimbabwean law is patriarchal, women can never truly be secure in their land
holdings.66
Agricultural trade liberalization is perhaps the area that most directly harms
women. 67 The World Bank states that trade in agriculture benefits women by
increasing their ability to exercise control over land, labor, and the "additional
income generated by a switch to export crops. '68 This statement ignores the reality
that women in developing countries often lack access to the resources necessary to
make that switch, i.e. credit, education, and enforceable property rights.
Furthermore, public farm aid programs are typically not adapted to small-scale
production, such as the farming in which most women are engaged; hence, trade
liberalization of agricultural markets has historically benefited medium- and large-
scale farms, bypassing women.69 The World Bank also ignores the reality that
even if women could gain access to the necessary resources, they would still likely
need to engage in subsistence farming to support themselves and their families and
would be unable to make a complete switch to cash crops.70
It is this historical base and continued practice of discrimination against
women that the international community now seeks to improve. The next section
of this paper will discuss the efforts made by the global international community as
63. See Obiora, supra note 60, at 67-68; see also FAREDA BANDA, WOMEN, LAW AND HUMAN
RIGHTS: AN AFRICAN PERSPECTIVE 149 (2005).
64. See BANDA, supra note 63, at 132-33 (explaining that women's contributions to the household
property are generally consumable so she has nothing to show for her efforts. Also, domestic
contributions are not seen as being on par with financial contributions).
65. See INST. OF ENVTL. STUDIES (Zimbabwe), EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF FARMER
PARTICIPATORY RESEARCH AND EXTENSION IN NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN ZIMBABWE 2
(2001), available at
http://www.prgaprogram.org/modules/DownloadsP]us/uploads/PRGA-Publications/Natural-Resource-
Mgmt/Reports/ies-small-grant.pdf; LLOYD M. SACHIKONYE, LAND REFORM FOR POVERTY
REDUCTION? SOCIAL EXCLUSION AND FARM WORKERS IN ZIMBABWE 12 (2003), available at
http://www.chronicpoverty.org/pdfs/Sachikonye.pdf
66. See generally Magaya v. Magaya [199913 L.R.C. 35 (Zimb. Sup. Ct.).
67. See UNCTAD, supra note 7, 18-19, 25.
68. See Swamy, supra note 8, at 3.
69. McGill, supra note 33, at 422; Lambatim & Sy, supra note 48, at 244.
70. Robertson, supra note 20, at 69-70.
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well as the continental international community of Africa to ensure women's status
is equal to that of men.
IV. INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE
Long-term domination of all bodies wielding political power
nationally and internationally means that issues traditionally of
concern to men become seen as general human concerns, while
"women's concerns" are relegated to a special, limited
category.
71
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, which are
heavily influenced in their economic policies by the United States' blend of
neoclassical and neoliberal economic theory, have played a central role in
"developing" the economies of African states.72  This base in economic theory
means that the various institutions and instruments created to manage IMF and
World Bank funds assume that states will act rationally to ensure their own best
interests and that competition in the market will reward good performance and
penalize poor performance; therefore, the IMF and World Bank promote
deregulation, privatization, and the rule of the "free" market.73 Basing policy
decisions on this economic structure ignores the informal sector of the economy,
which is a major component of many African nations' national economies and the
dominant economic playing field for many women in these countries.74 The
following discussion of international documents provides support for the argument
that by ignoring the informal sector, the international community has consistently
and systematically marginalized and discriminated against women as rational
actors in the economic market.
Following the end of World War II, amidst a general feeling of world unity,
two major international instruments were created: The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights75 and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).76 The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights has become the foundation for modem
71. Jarvis, supra note 8, at 222.
72. See generally Dr. Kevin Archer, Lecture for International Political Economy class at the Josef
Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver (Fall 2006); NEIL J. SMELSER & RICHARD
SWEDBERG, THE HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY 4-6 (1994); ROBERT O. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S.
NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE: WORLD POLITICS IN TRANSITION (1977; DAVID K. LEONARD &
SCOTT STRAUSS, AFRICA'S STALLED DEVELOPMENT: INTERNATIONAL CAUSES & CURES 26 (2003).
73. See, e.g., Archer, supra note 72; Emmanuel Opoku Awuku, International Competition Law
and Policy in Developing Countries, in LAW AND DEVELOPMENT: FACING COMPLEXITY IN THE 2 1sT
CENTURY, supra note 2, at 99, 102.
74. See, e.g., CARR & CHEN, supra note 37, at 1, 3; Gumisai Mutume, How to boost trade within
Africa: Lower Barriers and Diversify Production, 16 AFR. RECOVERY 20, Sept. 2002, available at
http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/voll6no2/162reg3.htm ("For many years it has been
recognized that many countries' real economies have been mostly informal and much larger, more
dynamic and more regionally integrated than their official economies.") (internal quotation omitted).
75. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen.
mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948).
76. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-1 1, 55 U.N.T.S. 194
[hereinafter GATT].
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human rights, including the rights of women. In fact, it was the first formal
recognition of women's equality as a fundamental human right. The preamble
affirms the member states' faith "in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and
worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women."
Meanwhile, GATT was intended to create a third institution, the International
Trade Organization (ITO), which would operate alongside the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund to handle the trade side of international economic
cooperation. 78 GATT was to achieve this through the reduction of tariff barriers,
quantitative restrictions, and subsidies on trade. The concurrent creation of these
two documents reflects the general focus of the international community, namely:
human rights and economic issues are two separate spheres of international
concern, requiring separate documents and political bodies to govern them.
A. International Human Rights Norms
Since the Universal Declaration on Human Rights was adopted in 1948, a
number of subsequent international documents have acknowledged that women's
rights are human rights and, as such, should be protected and promoted. For
example, in 1979 the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).
79
The Convention recognizes that
discrimination against women violates the principles of equality of
rights and respect for human dignity, is an obstacle to the participation
of women, on equal terms with men, in the political, social, economic
and cultural life of their countries, hampers the growth of the prosperity
of society and the family and makes more difficult the full development
of the potentialities of women in the service of their countries and of
humanity. 80
Within two years, the Organization of African Unity adopted the African
Charter on Human and People's Rights (Banjul Charter).8 1 The Banjul Charter
incorporates the traditional values of African culture into a modem conception of
human rights and women's equality. In doing so, the Banjul Charter affirms
77. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 75, at preamble (demonstrating that the
Universal Declaration of Human rights has numerous statements asserting the inherent equality of men
and women).
78. Due to the impossibility of some national legislatures, namely the U.S., to ratify the ITO
Charter, the institution never came into being. Thus, the GATT Agreement "became the only
multilateral instrument governing international trade from 1948 until the WTO was established in
1995." World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO: Basics, The GATT years: from Havana to
Marrakesh,_http://www.wto.org/englishlthewto-e/whatise/tif e/fact4_e.htm (last visited November 15,
2008).
79. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, G.A. Res
34/180, U.N. Doc A/RES/34/180 (Dec. 18, 1979), entered into force Sept. 3, 1981 [hereinafter
CEDAW].
80. Id. at preamble.
81. See African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev.
5 (June 27, 1981), 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), entered into force Oct. 21, 1986 [hereinafter Banjul Charter].
82. Id. at preamble ("Taking into consideration the virtues of their historical tradition and the
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African leaders' beliefs that all people are equal before the law and that parties to
the charter should make efforts to eliminate all forms of discrimination, including
discrimination against women.
83
Continuing along these lines and building on numerous conventions and
declarations signed in the interim, the international community adopted the Beijing
Declaration at the Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995 .84 This
declaration acknowledges that while there has been some advancement in women's
rights, inequalities between men and women persist, resulting in "serious
consequences for the well-being of all people. 85 This document further reiterates
that women's rights are human rights and that
[e]radication of poverty based on sustained economic growth, social
development, environmental protection and social justice requires the
involvement of women in economic and social development, equal
opportunities and the full and equal participation of women and men as
agents and beneficiaries of people-cent[e]red sustainable
development.
86
African leaders recognized the validity of this statement and the reality that,
despite ratification of numerous regional and international instruments, African
women were continuing to be victims of discrimination and marginalized in
development efforts. Therefore, the Heads of State or Government of the Southern
African Development Community (SADC) 87 signed the Protocol to the African
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (the
Protocol) in 1997.88 While this instrument asserts many of the statements that have
come to be expected in documents promoting women's rights, such as equality
before the law and the right to personal integrity; it also includes provisions that
recognize the specific problems faced by African women, such as unequal access
to employment and education, inadequate food security, and the need to include
women in the process of formulating cultural and developmental policies. 89
values of African civilization which should inspire and characterize their reflection on the concept of
human and peoples' rights.").
83. Id. at arts. 2, 3, 18.
84. Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing, China, Sept. 15, 1995, Final Declaration, 8,
10 available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/beijing/beijingdeclaration.html [hereinafter
Beijing Declaration].
85. Id. 5.
86. Id. 16.
87. For information regarding the formation of the SADC, see infra text accompanying notes 88,
89.
88. African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, Protocol to the African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, Sept. 13, 2000, preamble,
CAB/LEG/66.6 (entered into force Nov. 25, 2005) ("Noting.. women's essential role in development...
Recogni[z]ing the crucial role of women in the preservation of African values based on the principles of
equality, peace, freedom, dignity, justice, solidarity and democracy ... Concerned that despite... solemn
commitment to eliminate all forms of discrimination and harmful practices against women, women in
Africa still continue to be victims of discrimination and harmful practices...").
89. See generally id.
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However, the fact that this Protocol took over ten years to enter into force exhibits
the very lack of commitment by African leaders the Protocol sought to rectify.
The creation of the United Nations' Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
has been one of the most recent developments in international recognition of
women's rights. 90 The MDGs place issues of gender equality at the center of any
discussion regarding development by declaring that the MDGs cannot be realized
without advancing gender equality. 91 In pursuit of achieving the MDGs, the
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has created an agenda to make
gender equality a reality through gender mainstreaming and women's
empowerment. 92 Incorporating gender into the core development discussions is no
longer an option; it is an important necessity. As the UNDP points out, gender
discrimination is at the center of endemic poverty, low economic growth, and poor
governance; therefore, "[g]ender equality is not merely a desirable by-product of
human development; it is a core goal in its own right."93
B. International & Regional Institutions
The wave of African states' independence occurred primarily during the
1960s. Over the course of the next two decades a number of regional and
international institutions affecting both trade and gender developed. The first Pan-
African multidisciplinary institution,94 the Organization of African Unity (OAU),
was established in 1963 to promote greater coordination and cooperation of
African states.95 In July 2003, the African Union (AU) replaced the OAU as the
90. See United Nations Millennium Declaration, G.A. Res. 55/2, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., U.N.
Doc A/Res/55/2 (Sept. 18, 2000).
91. U.N. Dev. Programme (UNDP), Gender and Poverty Reduction, Key Initiatives: Women's
Empowerment - access to markets, lands and assets and the assessment of inheritance, marital laws and
social norms, http://www.undp.org/poverty/genpov.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2007); UNITED NATIONS
DEVELOPMENT FUND FOR WOMEN (UNIFEM), Resource Guide for Gender Theme Groups, at 3, Jan.
2005, available at http://www.unifem.org/attachments/products/ResourceGuideGenderThemeGroups
.20051 1_eng.pdf ("Gender equality and women's empowerment are Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs) in their own right and central to all other development efforts.").
92. U.N. Dev. Programme [UNDP], Gender Equality Practice Note, 4 (Nov. 2002) (prepared by
Jan Vandemoortele, Aster Zaoude, Dasa Silovic, & UNDP), available at
http://www.undplao.org/whatwedo/bgresource/poverty/GenderequalityPracticeNote.pdf [hereinafter
Gender Equality Practice Note].
93. Id.
94. The Southern African Customs Union originated in 1889 and is one of the oldest formal
trading blocks on the continent; however, the OAU was the first post-independence organization of
African Heads of State. DANIELLE LANGTON, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS ON UNITED STATES-
SOUTHERN AFRICAN CUSTOMS UNION (SACU) FREE TRADE AGREEMENT NEGOTIATIONS:
BACKGROUND AND POTENTIAL ISSUES, Order Code RS21387, at 3 (2007), available at
http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/crs/RS21387.pdf; see also Department of Foreign Affairs,
Southern African Customs Union (SACU), History and Present Status Department of Foreign Affairs,
Southern African Customs Union (SACU), History and Present Status,
http://www.dfa.gov.za/foreign/Multilateral/africa/sacu.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2007).
95. Organization of African Unity (OAU) Charter states that the objectives of the union are: (1) to
promote the unity and solidarity of the African States; (2) to co-ordinate and intensify their cooperation
and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa; (3) to defend their sovereignty, their
territorial integrity and independence; (4) to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa; and (5) to
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governing pan-African unit. 96 The founding documents of both the OAU and the
AU recognize the equality and dignity of all people, including women.97
The Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) was
established in 1980 with four primary objectives: 1) to reduce Member States
dependence, particularly, but not only, on apartheid South Africa; 2) to implement
programmes and projects with national and regional impact; 3) to mobilize
Member States' resources, in the quest for collective self-reliance; and 4) to secure
international understanding and support. 98  In 1992 the Heads of State and
Government of the SADCC signed a Declaration and Treaty creating the Southern
African Development Community (SADC). 99  The SADC member states
coordinate on a wide array of social and economic policies and projects to promote
self-reliance and an improved quality of life for all. l0 The SADC was just one of
the many regional African organizations formed during the 1990s to promote
cooperation among member states for improved economic status. Some of the
other important unions are: the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
(COMESA)I°.; the East African Community (EAC)10 2; and the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS). 103
promote international cooperation, having due regard to the Charter of the United Nations and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Organization of African Unity (OAU) Charter art. II, May 25,
1963, 479 U.N.T.S. 39 [hereinafter OAU Charter].
96. Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU), opened for signature July 11, 2001, OAU Doe.
CAB/LEG/23.15.
97. Id. at preamble, arts. 3, 4; OAU Charter, supra note 95, at preamble ("Conscious of the fact
that freedom, equality, justice and dignity are essential objectives for the achievement of the legitimate
aspirations of the African peoples.").
98. Southern African Development Community (SADC), SADC History, Evolution and Current
Status: The Origins, Southern African Development Community, Sept. 26, 2008,
http://www.sadc.int/index/browse/page/54 [hereinafter SADC] (last visited Oct. 20, 2007).
99. Declaration by the Heads of State or Government of Southern African States Regarding the
Establishment of the Southern African Development Community, Aug. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 267 (1993).
100. Id. at preamble, art. 5.
101. The Treaty Establishing the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, Nov. 5, 1993,
33 I.L.M. 1067 (1994) [hereinafter COMESA Treaty].
102. The Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community, June 3, 1991 30 I.L.M. 1241
(1991); Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community, Nov. 30, 1999, entered into force
July 7, 2000 [hereinafter EAC]. The original East African Community (EAC) dissolved in 1977;
however, the member states continued negotiation and discussion, which led to the signing of the
Agreement for the Establishment of the Permanent Tripartite Commission for East African Co-
operation on November 30, 1993. Then, wanting to further consolidate regional co-operation, the
member parties engaged in making the Agreement a Treaty, resulting in the (re)creation of the EAC in
1999. See East African Community, History, http://www.eac.int/about-eac/eac-history.html (last visited
Feb. 10, 2009).
103. ECOWAS was originally established in Lagos on May 28, 1975; however, the parties revised
the founding treaty in 1993 to better incorporate and reflect the principles of the Banjul Charter and the
Declaration of Political Principles of the Economic Community of West African States (July 6, 1991).
See Articles of Association for the Establishment of an Economic Community of West Africa, May 4,
1967, 6 I.L.M. 776 (1967); Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS): Revised Treaty,
July 24, 1993, 35 I.L.M. 660 (1996) [hereinafter ECOWAS Revised Treaty].
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Each of these unions expressly state the important and central role women
have in development efforts, and contain at least one article addressing the specific
actions to be conducted regarding women's status. For example, Article 63 of the
revised ECOWAS treaty orders "[m]ember States undertake to formulate,
harmonize, coordinate and establish appropriate policies and mechanisms, for
advancement of the economic, social and cultural conditions of women." This is
to be done by, among other things, identifying and assessing constraints that inhibit
women's ability to contribute to development efforts and to provide a framework
within which to address these constraints. 
104
The articles addressing women's empowerment in the COMESA and EAC
documents are almost identical. They begin by asserting that "[t]he Partner States
recognise that women make a significant contribution towards the process of
socio-economic transformation and sustainable growth and that it is impossible to
implement effective programmes for the economic and social development of the
Partner States without the full participation of women."
10 5
These articles then continue by describing certain actions member state
governments must make through enacting or abolishing certain legislative and
other measures. The required measures include ensuring that women are more
involved at all levels of socio-economic decision-making, promoting programs
aimed at changing negative attitudes towards women, adopting or creating
technologies to increase women's employment stability and progress, and any
other measures to eliminate prejudices against women and promote equality.0 6
One provision of particular importance requires member states to abolish
discriminatory legislation as well as to discourage discriminatory customs. 1 7 The
provision requires abolishing legislations and customs that are discriminatory
against women, but does not address legislation and customs that are
discriminatory in favor of women.1°8 As mentioned previously, many of the
"traditional" customs, as codified during colonialism, disproportionately affect
women and their livelihood capabilities. For example, although women in many
"traditional" societies were not able to own land, they were assured support and
access to land by their husbands and husbands' families.' 09 When colonialists
codified this custom of male-dominated land ownership, they failed to factor in the
accompanying societal expectation of support of the woman. In doing so, and with
the disruption to societies caused by increasing industrialization and urbanization,
colonialists removed women's sense of security in their livelihoods and in their
104. ECOWAS Revised Treaty, supra note 103, art. 63(2)-(3).
105. COMESA Treaty, supra note 101, art. 154; EAC, supra note 102, art. 121.
106. COMESA Treaty, supra note 101, art. 154; EAC, supra note 102, art. 121.
107. COMESA Treaty, supra note 101, art. 154(b); EAC, supra note 102, art. 121(b).
108. For an interesting discussion of international affirmative action approaches to the gender
equality issue see Lia Hayes, International Affirmative Action: Current Gender Affirmative Action
Approaches in International Trade Serving as a Possible Model for Minority Groups, 12 CURRENTS
INT'L TRADE L. J. 78 (Winter 2003).
109. See, e.g., T.W. BENNETT, HUMAN RIGHTS AND CUSTOMARY LAW 124-28 (1999); Armstrong,
supra note 28, at 317, 346.
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ability to provide for their families. Therefore, by not only encouraging member
states to recognize and eliminate these customs, but by requiring them to, the
COMESA and EAC instruments provide a major move forward for women's
equality. As should be expected, however, there remains a lag between the written
aspiration and the daily reality.
One of the most recent regional organizations formed among African
countries is the Economic, Social and Cultural Council of the African Union
(ECOSOCC), which was established in March 2005. x0 ECOSOCC is an advisory
organ of the AU and is intended to facilitate the building of a strong partnership
between African governments and civil society.111 It is an organization composed
of various social, cultural, and professional groups.1 12  The importance of
promoting gender equality is referenced throughout the Statutes of ECOSOCC. 13
ECOSOCC Article 11 enumerates the Sectoral Cluster Committees, of which
the Committee on Women and Gender is one.1 14 It is interesting that although
gender is widely accepted as a "cross-cutting issue", ECOSOCC separates the two,
providing one committee for Women and Gender and another committee for
Cross-Cutting Programmes.' 15 One could argue that this indicates ECOSOCC's
dedication to promoting gender equality by establishing an entire committee that
will do nothing but focus on gender issues. Conversely, by separating gender from
other cross-cutting issues such as HIV/AIDS and international cooperation it
perpetuates the marginalizing practice of distinguishing "women's issues" from
"core" issues of international economy and politics.
C. International & Regional Development Agreements
In an effort to fulfill the obligations set out in the various international
declarations and founding documents of the institutions described above, as well as
to facilitate trade and capital flow generally, most African states have signed on to
various multi- and bilateral agreements. The most far-reaching of these
agreements in terms of trade and economic development has been African states'
membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the subsequent
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).'1 16
110. The Statute of the Economic, Social & Cultural Council (ECOSOCC), Assembly/AU/Dec.42
(III) was adopted by the Heads of State and Government at the Third Ordinary Session of the Assembly
in July 2004; however, the organization was not formally launched until March 2005. The Economic,
Social & Cultural Council (ECOSOCC) of the African Union, ECOSOCC as an Organ of the AU,
http://www.ecosocc.org/ecosocc-au.php (last visited Nov. 10, 2007).
111. African Union, Statutes of the Economic, Social and Cultural Council of the African Union
(ECOSOCC), at preamble, Assembly/AU/Dec.42 (III), (July 2004), available at
http://www.ecosocc.org/reports/24spt/ECOSOCCSTATUTES-English.pdf.
112. Id. art. 3.
113. See id. arts. 2, 3, 7.
114. Id. art. Il(i).
115. Id. art.11(j).
116. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
April 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/04-
wto.pdf; Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, January 1995,
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, signed as Appendix 1C , 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994),
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Just after independence many developing countries were "sponsored" into the
GATT (and subsequently the WTO) by their former colonial powers and,
therefore, did not go through the "full working party examination process" through
which current WTO-applicant states must go. 117 Many of these African states
became WTO members without really understanding the substance of GATT or
how to incorporate its trade mechanisms and provisions into their development
policies. 118  This initial lack of understanding regarding the international trade
regime at independence and the African states' relative lack of power to influence
policy still today has often resulted in unfavorable regulations. The brunt of the
burdens resulting from these unfavorable regulations has fallen disproportionately
on women. 
119
The oil crisis of the 1970s, coupled with a prolonged and severe drought
across much of the continent, and reduced global prices for agricultural goods
shocked the fragile, developing African economies, resulting in national economic
crises. 120  The response of the majority of these states was to accept foreign
assistance in the form of structural adjustment program (SAP) loans from the
World Bank. 121 SAPs promoted price liberalization and deregulation, trade reform,
and the privatization of state-owned enterprises. 122 Rather than boost the national
economies however, SAPs merely reinforced the colonial, export-oriented
structures of the state and the gatekeeper 123 role of the government.
124
Although some scholars claim SAPs were successful in transforming Latin
American economies, there is a growing consensus that they failed in Africa.
125
Not only did SAPs fail to transform African states' economies into robust capitalist
markets, there is also evidence they actually increased poverty, unemployment,
and wage reductions. 126 Additionally, in the social sector, SAPs have been linked
available at http://www.wto.org/english/docse/legal-e/27-trips.pdf [hereinafter TRIPS].
117. Mary E. Footer, Technical Assistance and Trade Law Reform Post-Doha: Brave New World,
in LAW AND DEVELOPMENT: FACING COMPLEXITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 108, 113 (John Hatchard and
Amanda Perry-Kessaris eds., 2003).
118. See id.
119. E.g., Ewelukwa, supra note 14, at 80.
120. See, e.g., NICOLAS VAN DE WALLE, AFRICAN ECONOMIES AND THE POLITICS OF PERMANENT
CRISIS, 1979-1999: POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INSTITUTIONS AND DECISIONS 1-10 (2001); LEONARD &
STRAUSS, supra note 72, at 23.
121. See JOHN MUKUM MBAKU, INSTITUTIONS AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 141-45 (2004). The
first structural adjustment loan extended to Africa was received by Senegal in 1979. VAN DE WALLE,
supra note 120, at 1.
122. VAN DE WALLE, supra note 120, at 8.
123. COOPER, supra note 13, at 5, (describing gatekeeper states as states without a strong national
economic base and economies that are externally-oriented. The state's economic power remains
concentrated at the gate between inside and outside.).
124. VAN DE WALLE, supra note 120, at 80-81.
125. See generally, e.g., id; LEONARD & STRAUSS, supra note 72, at 24-25; NEPAD, supra note
16, para. 24; Mutume, supra note 74, at 20 ("across Africa many incentives to promote industrial
development have been dismantled through structural adjustment.").
126. Nandini Gunewardena, Reinscribing Subalternity. International Financial institutions,
Development, and Women's Marginality, 7 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOR. AFF. 201, 213 (2003); Oduor
Ong'wen, The Political Economy of Regional Trade Agreements in Africa, 7 SEATINI BULLETIN
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to reductions in access to health care and education as well as an increased
prevalence of prostitution.1 27  In this manner, the World Bank's structural
adjustment programs contributed to the continued discrimination against women in
Africa because, in their attempts to reduce the effects of these adjustments on their
families, women disproportionately absorb the majority of the negative impacts. 128
The TRIPS Agreement is another example of a seemingly gender-neutral
policy that has a detrimental effect on women and the ability of African states to
engage in sustainable development strategies. TRIPS was created to "promote
effective and adequate protection of intellectual property rights" and to reduce the
possibility that intellectual property right protection would impede trade by
balancing Member states' rights and obligations.12 9
Article 27 describes the types of products and processes that are "patentable
subject matter." According to Article 27, patents should be granted to "subject
matter" that involves "an inventive step and are capable of industrial
application., 130  This definition ignores the possibility that, to foreign scientists
from industrialized nations, many of the "products and processes" used by people
in African states that incorporate native plants, for example, may involve an
inventive step for the foreign scientists.13 1 Once a patent is granted to the
industrialized scientist, it becomes protected and must, therefore, be imported and
bought through international trade.132 As noted in the Kurasini Declaration133, the
TRIPS Agreement "allows Northern companies and universities to claim exclusive
ownership over local resources and knowledge, often developed by women.,
134
Recognizing that the existing trade and development regimes were
inadequate, African leaders adopted the New Partnership for Africa's Development
(March-April 2004), available at www.bilaterals.org/article.php3?id-article=257.
127. Economic Justice Network of Fellowship of Christian Councils in Southern Africa, Kurasini,
Dar Es Salaam, June 24-28, 2002, Declaration on Gender and Trade, para. 4 (July 1, 2002) [hereinafter
Kurasini Declaration] ("social services have been depleted, unemployment is rife, international
commodity prices have fallen drastically, and farmers and producers no longer receive subsidies and
protection from unfair competition."); Cape Town Declaration, supra note 34, para. F; Gunewardena,
supra note 126, at 213.
128. See Kurasini Declaration, supra note 127, para. 5 ("Structural adjustment policies have been
imposed on the population at the expense of women's social and economic empowerment.");
Gunewardena, supra note 126, at 218 ("Emerging evidence now reveals that export-led growth is a
strategy that has hurt the poor, and poor women in particular.").
129. TRIPS, supra note 116, at preamble, art. 7.
130. Id. art. 27(1).
131. Id. art. 27(1), fn 5 ("For the purposes of this Article, the terms 'inventive step' and 'capable of
industrial application' may be deemed by a Member to be synonymous with the terms 'non-obvious'
and 'useful' respectively.").
132. See Kurasini Declaration, supra note 127, para. 7.
133. The Kurasini Declaration is the result of "the Economic Justice Network of FOCCISA
[Fellowship of Christian Councils in Southern Africa] and partner organisations from eleven countries
in southern Africa [who] gathered in Kurasini, Dar Es Salaam, from 24-28 June 2002 to reflect on and
address the marginalisation and injustices women face in [their] economies and societies as a result of
trade liberalisation." Rev. Malcolm Damon, Director of the Economic Justice Network of Foccisa (July
2002), available at http://www.igtn.org/pdfs/9 IKurasini.pdf.
134. Id.
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(NEPAD) in July 2001. This agreement affirms these leaders' dedication to
eradicating poverty, to placing their countries on a path of sustainable growth and
development and to participating in the world economy. 135  Unlike many
international agreements, NEPAD does not separate women and gender into its
own focus-category to achieve these aims; rather issues of gender equality are
addressed within the core sections of the agreement. For example, Article V (the
Program of Action) of NEPAD identifies the promotion of women in all activities
as a long-term objective and the elimination of gender disparities in education as
one of its top goals.
136
Another example of NEPAD's acceptance of gender equality as a core issue
in development is the focus given to improving land tenure security and the
productivity of agriculture, "with particular attention to.. .women farmers."
137
NEPAD further supports this effort to incorporate gender as a truly cross-cutting
issue by integrating it into the core issues of the agreement and establishing a
"gender task team" to ensure that poverty reduction strategies include specific
issues of concern to poor women. 138
The Cotonou Agreement similarly, and even more expressly, recognizes
gender as a crosscutting issue for any development or poverty reducing policies.
139
The Cotonou Agreement replaced the Lom& Convention in managing and
regulating relations between African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries and
the European Union.140 Article 9, which lays out the fundamental principles of the
agreement, reaffirms the equality of men and women. 14 1 Article 31 builds on this
principle and calls on the ACP governments to support and promote gender
equality through increased access to resources, such as land and education;
increased access to social services, such as healthcare; and increased involvement
of women at all levels of development policy-making. 42  Throughout the
135. NEPAD, supra note 16, at preamble.
136. Id. paras. 67, 68.
137. Id. paras. 154, 155.
138. Id. para. 116.
139. Partnership Agreement between the Members of the Group of African, Caribbean and Pacific
States and the European Community and its Member States, ACP-EU, Cotonou, Benin, June 23, 2000
[hereinafter Cotonou Agreement).
140. Id.
141. Id. art. 9.
142. The full text of Article 31 reads:
Cooperation shall help strengthen policies and programmes that improve, ensure
and broaden the equal participation of men and women in all spheres of political,
economic, social and cultural life.
Cooperation shall help improve the access of women to all resources required for
the full exercise of their fundamental rights. More specifically, cooperation shall
create the appropriate framework
to:
(a) integrate a gender-sensitive approach and concerns at every level of
development cooperation
including macroeconomic policies, strategies and operations; and
(b) encourage the adoption of specific positive measures in favour of women
such as:
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agreement, focus is given to strengthening technology, training, and investment in
both the formal and informal sectors. 143 Assuming the member states are willing
and able to incorporate gender equity within this structure of economic
development, the Cotonou Agreement could be a major stepping-stone for the
empowerment of African women.144
The initial provisions of the Cotonou Agreement provide for review and
revision of the agreement every five years.1 45 Accordingly, the parties met in 2004
and produced the first compendium to the agreement in February 2005.146 This
compendium reasserts Member states' dedication to promoting gender equality and
further defines the steps needed to ensure success in this area. 147 However, it may
still be too early to tell if the governments of those states will transform the words
in the document into transformative action.
D. The role of Governments in protecting and promoting women's equality
As the above discussion makes clear, African governments, like nearly all
governments world-wide, are becoming increasingly aware of the need to include a
broad spectrum of concerns in their process of reform. It is no longer enough to
support just the core market functions because in so doing, important components
of those structures will be neglected and the reforms will not be successful.
Therefore, it is necessary for these governments to expand their efforts to include
areas such as gender equality, land tenure, and equal opportunity.
148
The World Bank is also taking steps to incorporate a wider array of issues into
its development strategies. 149 For instance, in 2001 the World Bank published a
comprehensive policy research report with the intention of improving
(i) participation in national and local politics;
(ii) support for women's organisations;
(iii) access to basic social services, especially to education and training, health
care and
family planning;
(iv) access to productive resources, especially to land and credit and to labour
market; and
(v) taking specific account of women in emergency aid and rehabilitation
operations.
Id.
143. See Cotonou Agreement, supra note 139, arts. 21-23.
144. But see, APRODEV & AID TRANSPARENCY, ANALYTICAL REPORT ON GENDER DIMENSIONS
OF ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS 10-11, Dakar, Senegal, October 27-29, 2003, (Sept. 2004)
[hereinafter Dakar Report] (noting that although the Cotonou Agreement has clearly stated
commitments to gender equality, "it is a basis for major concern that gender issues are missing in
relation to the 'hard' areas of negotiations, especially trade and trade-related areas.").
145. Cotonou Agreement supra note 139, art. 95.
146. European Commission, Compendium on co-operation strategies: Partnership Agreement
between the Members of the Group of African, Caribbean and Pacific States and the European
Community and its Member States (Feb. 23, 2005).
147. Id. at 45-46.
148. Stewart, supra note 2, at 42-43.
149. Id. at 43 (referencing the World Bank's 2000/2001 World Development Report in which the
World Bank says that development strategies must consider social and political causes of poverty as
well as economic).
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understanding of the links among gender, development, and public policy.1 50 The
authors of the report observe that the effectiveness of development policies will
continue to be undermined by ignorance regarding the nature and costs of gender
inequalities to individuals' well-being and countries' potential for sustainable
economic growth.151 The report notes that while disparities in basic rights hurt
women and girls the most, such gender inequalities ultimately harm everyone.
152
Therefore, one of the primary themes the report hopes to convey is that "to
enhance development effectiveness, gender issues must be an integral part of
policy analysis, design and implementation."' 53
The combined awareness of international and national governing bodies
regarding the crucial role of women in development is beginning to slowly produce
tangible results. Numerous African states have enacted constitutions and
legislation promoting and protecting gender equity; however, customary laws are
more often followed in practice, denying women the equal rights promised in these
instruments.154 Women activists often find that state-based legal strategies make it
difficult to assert these constitutional rights, thereby exposing the gendered nature
of citizenship in many states.' 55 Similarly, States' attempts to facilitate global
economic liberalization policies can have an intense effect on social and political
relationships at a local level. 156 States often employ inconsistent approaches to
development as leaders attempt to legitimize their policies in the international
community while also attempting to maintain cultural hegemony. 157  This
inconsistent approach exposes women to additional dangers as they attempt to
realize equality. 1
58
Ugandan women have experienced this inconsistency first hand. In 1992 the
government implemented a broad-reaching policy of financial sector liberalization,
which was intended to spur economic growth and investment through lower
interest rates and deregulated credit.' 59 These policies failed to benefit women, in
large part because of the government's failure to account for women's unequal
starting position relative to men. Failing to realize the unequal starting positions
was primarily due to unquestioned acceptance of "traditional" culture. These
policies were based on the faulty assumption that women and men have equal
access to resources, such as upper-level education, ownership title to land, and the
150. WORLD BANK, ENGENDERING DEVELOPMENT: THROUGH GENDER EQUALITY IN RIGHTS,
RESOURCES, AND VOICES (2001).
151. Id. at xi, xiii.
152. Id. atxi.
153. Id. at xii.
154. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 11, at 307; S. AFR. CONST. (1996); compare CONSTITUTION, art.
23 (1979) (Zimb.) with Magaya v. Magaya [1999] 3 L.R.C. 35 (Zimb. Sup. Ct.).
155. Stewart, supra note 2, at 46.
156. Id. at 50.
157. Id. at 50-51
158. See id.
159. Enid Kiiza, Winifred Rwe-Beyanga, & Agnes Kamya, Accounting for Gender: Improving
Ugandan Credit Policies, Processes, and Programs, in DEMANDING DIGNITY: WOMEN CONFRONTING
ECONOMIC REFORMS IN AFRICA, supra note 38, at 47, 49.
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ability to establish long-term relationships with banks. 160 In response to a study
conducted to measure these differences, bank officials' articulated the reason for
this continued discrimination, namely "that women customers are not worth
making changes for."'
16 1
Another factor contributing to inconsistent or ineffective approaches to
addressing gender is lack of resources. Zimbabwe is one such example. In 2004
the government formulated a National Gender Policy coupled with a National Plan
of Action to guide its implementation.' 62 This policy is focused on eliminating
negative economic, social, legal, and political policies as well as cultural and
religious practices that contribute to gender inequality. 63 While the National Plan
of Action created ministries and commissions to focus solely on gender issues, the
national government lacks the resources to support and operate these departments.
Many of the departments, or "focal points," dealing with gender equity concerns
are staffed by individuals who have "no link with development policy formation
and implementation."' 164 Additionally, junior officers and women, who have no
real decision-making powers, staff many of the gender focal points. 165  Finally,
Zimbabwe has no system for monitoring and evaluating the changes in gender
equality resulting from the National Policy.' 66 This means that, in reality, the
government has likely done more harm than good by implementing a sham
institutional structure to promote and oversee the progress and development of
Zimbabwean women's equality.
Some African countries are making impressive progress toward
institutionalizing equality. One such country is Rwanda, which has the highest
representation of women in a house of parliament of any country in the world:
49%.167 Similarly, Liberia made international headlines in 2005 by swearing in
Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, Africa's first elected female head of state. 168 It may still be
too early to see how such female representation will affect trade and development
policies in these countries and across the continent, but one can assume gender
equality will play a more prominent role in policy discussions and formation.
160. Id. at 54.
161. Id. at 52.
162. Inter-Agency and Expert Group Meeting on the Development of Gender Statistics, United
Nations Secretariat Department of Economic and Social Affairs Statistics Division, The Development of
gender statistics: Zimbabwe's experience, 2, U.N. Doc ESA/STAT/AC. 122/14.1 (Dec. 2006) (prepared
by Joyce Malaba) [hereinafter Malaba Report].
163. Id. at 2-3.
164. Id. at 3.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 8.
167. Gordon, supra note 11, at 293-94; Gumisai Mutume, Women break into African politics, 18
AFRICA RECOVERY 4, Apr. 2004, available at http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/vol18nol/
181women.htm.
168. African first for Liberian leader, BBC NEWS, Jan. 16, 2006, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4615764.stm.
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E. Case Studies: Zimbabwe & South Africa
There are countless examples of the reaffirmation of both women's status as
equal to men and of women's inferiority to men. This section will briefly discuss
two notable examples from Zimbabwe and South Africa.
Let us begin with the controversial and infamous 1999 case from Zimbabwe's
Supreme Court, Magaya v. Magaya.169 The issue faced by the Magaya court
involved how to apply the customary law of inheritance in light of the
government's general acceptance of human rights norms of gender equality.
Although the court notes Zimbabwe's acceptance of various international human
rights instruments, it primarily focuses on domestic law in declaring its holding.
Specifically, the court states that the legislative intent in passing the Legal Age of
Majority Act (the Act) was that it should co-exist with customary law, not replace
it. Furthermore, while the Act was intended to remove certain legal disabilities, it
was not intended to "create positive new rights.'
170
The main argument in the Magaya case, however, is based on the Constitution
of Zimbabwe. The court notes that Section 89 of the Constitution sanctioned the
application of customary law.' 7' Customary law preferred male heirs above female
heirs upon an intestate's death.1 72 The court further supports its application of
customary law in this case, despite its discriminatory nature, by referencing
Section 23 of the Constitution. The court first notes that sex is not one of the
enumerated grounds for anti-discrimination protection in this section.173 Second,
the court says that even if sex is protected by international human rights
instruments, the Constitution expressly exempts both matters involving property
inheritance upon death and matters involving customary law issues of Africans.
174
Because the court ultimately held that customary law was exempt from
international human rights norms, the decision reinforced the inferior status of
women in Zimbabwe, especially in matters related to recognition of property
rights. 17
5
Conversely, however, was the South African Constitutional Court's 2005
decision of Bhe and Others v. The Magistrate, Khayelitsha and Others.'76 In Bhe
169. Magaya v. Magaya [1999] 3 L.R.C. 35 (Zimb. Sup. Ct.).
170. Id. at 37.
171. Id. at 36; see also CONST. art. 89 (1979) (Zimb.), amended by §13 of Act 25 (1981) ("Subject
to the provisions of any law for the time being in force in Zimbabwe relating to the application of
African customary law, the law to be administered by the Supreme Court, the High Court and by any
courts in Zimbabwe subordinate to the High Court shall be the law in force in the Colony of the Cape of
Good Hope on 10th June, 1891, as modified by subsequent legislation having in Zimbabwe the force of
law.").
172. Magaya, 3 L.R.C. at 36.
173. Id.
174. Magaya, 3 L.R.C. at 36.
175. Id. at 40-42.
176. Bhe and Others v. The Magistrate, Khayelitsha and Others 2005 (1) 580 1 (CC) (S. Aft.); see
also Ephraim v. Pastory (2001) AHRLR 236 (TzHC 1990) (going even further than the South African
court by holding that customary law had to accord with human rights norms despite the omission of sex
as a protected ground in the Constitution's non-discrimination clause).
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the court had to decide an issue involving the application of the customary law of
intestate succession as dealt with in the Black Administration Act 38 of 1927 and
the Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987.177
The court determined that the laws were discriminatory and, therefore,
unconstitutional. 178  Both domestic and international law support this
conclusion. 17 9 The court says the Acts violate Sections 9, 10 and 28 of the South
African Constitution. 180 The court also explicitly stated that "customary law is
subject to the Constitution."' 81 Farenda Banda argues that this is a "universalist"
construction of the Constitution, which makes both customary law and the right to
culture subject to the ideas of equality and non-discrimination before the law. 182
This is an important example for all African judicial systems to follow in not only
ensuring women's equality through respect for customary laws, but also the
recognition of the organic nature of law and its necessary evolution towards the
accepted international norms.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND STRATEGIES
Actually effecting change in the gendered effects of trade and development
policies will be difficult and will require great cooperation and effort, but it can be
done. Part of the problem with current policies is the gap that remains between
discussion and practice. Eliminating the gap between policy and practice will
involve a multi-dimensional approach and a serious effort aimed at gender
mainstreaming.183 The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) defines
gender mainstreaming as "being deliberate in giving visibility and support to
women's contributions rather than making the assumption that women will benefit
equally from gender-neutral development interventions.' 84  This means
governments will need to take the extra step to ensure that the legal rights that have
been created for women - such as access to education, health care, land, and
training - are enforced. 85 Without the ability to rely on the rights they have been
promised, women will not be able to reach their full potential or help their
countries to reach theirs. The three main areas where major changes can and
should be made are: Investment, Policy Discussions, and Enforcement.
Let us first talk about Investment. Addressing gender issues requires
investing in ways that have been shown to improve women's status and
opportunities and that have a positive impact on a nation's development. If we
177. Bhe, (1) 580 1 (CC) para. 1.
178. Id. para. 68.
179. Id. para. 55 ("In interpreting both section 28 and the other rights of the Constitution, the
provisions of international law must be considered.").
180. Id. para. 47; S. AFR. CONST. § 9 (equality), § 10 (human dignity), § 28 (rights of children).
181. Bhe, (1) 580 1 (CC) para. 44.
182. BANDA, supra note 63, at 34-38.
183. E.g., Int'l Conference on Population and Dev., Cairo, Egypt, Sept. 5-13, 1994 Plan of Action,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.171/13, § 4.1 (Oct. 18, 1994) [hereinafter Cairo Agreement] ("Experience shows
that population and development programmes are most effective when steps have simultaneously been
taken to improve the status of women.").
184. Gender Equality Practice Note, supra note 92, at v.
185. Gordon, supra note 11, at 311.
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truly want to design and implement laws and policies that are effective and
enforceable, they must be grounded in knowledge of the specific regions and
countries in which they are to take effect. This will require investing resources to
gain knowledge and understanding of local and national gender relations, practices,
and procedures, and then incorporating that knowledge into law and policy
development.
186
It also means that international agencies and organizations need to work with
national ministries and agencies to provide training and guidance on gender
mainstreaming - what it means, strategies for implementation, and education and
sensitization sessions on gender issues.' 87  Not only do we need to invest in
training and education on gender mainstreaming, we also need to invest financial
resources to support the governments that have implemented (or might attempt to
implement) agencies, departments, or ministries specifically focused on gender
issues. This financial investment should be narrowly targeted to the specific
gender agencies so they will have the capacity to carry out the work they were
created to do. Too many good ideas fail because they lack the financial resources
to succeed.
Another area where targeted investment could play a crucial role in improving
women's lives is education. The importance of investing in the education of
women and girls cannot be stressed enough. In fact, many scholars claim that
educating girls and women is the most important and effective investment a
developing nation can make.' 88  Educating women and girls improves the
productivity of the labor force (once they are allowed to participate), improves
family health and nutrition, improves the spacing of births and lowers infant and
child mortality.' 89 By improving the status of women and girls through improved
access to continuing education, a developing nation could improve its overall
social and economic development.
Next, we must talk about Policy Discussions. Mainstreaming gender means
that human rights law, and therefore women's rights law, needs to be more
expressly integrated into development agreements and policies. While there are
numerous agreements, some of which have been described in this paper, that imply
the need to invest in women in order to build successful sustainable development
policies, few expressly state this need. The agreements that do expressly mention
gender tend to separate these issues from the "more serious" development issues
like trade and investment, which serves to further marginalize women's role in the
economy and hinder efforts toward true equality. Formal economic modeling and
empirical studies have demonstrated that trade policies do not necessarily have the
same effect on men as they do on women; therefore, because gender relations can
186. See Stewart, supra note 2, at 38.
187, See Malaba Report, supra note 162, at 9.
188. E.g., Ilhan Ozturk, The Role of Education in Economic Development: A Theoretical
Perspective, 33.1 J. OF RURAL DEV. AND ADMIN. 39, 40 (2001), available at http://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/9023/.
189. See, e.g., id.
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affect trade policy outcomes, it is essential that these considerations be accounted
for from the beginning of any trade agreement or policy discussion. 190
The preamble of the WTO does not expressly reference women although it
does mention its goal of achieving sustainable development. 191 Despite the fact
that it is now well-accepted that sustainable development is not possible without
improving the status of women, by not expressly stating so, the WTO provides an
opening for member states to ignore women and the detrimental effects trade
policies can have, under a veil of ignorance. The WTO, as the primary body
governing international trade, must expressly include provisions through which the
important role of women in economic development can be accounted for and
incorporated into policy decisions.
Additionally, women should be included in policy discussions, both at an
international and a domestic level. Women are better equipped to understand the
daily demands on their resources than men; however, if they are to provide
meaningfil contributions to these discussions, they must be given the proper tools.
This means providing women and girls with educational opportunities. It also
means providing women with equal standing when they are included in the
discussion, which requires sensitization training for their male counterparts.
The final area where improvement and change must be made is in
Enforcement. Rather than maintaining separate spheres of law for human rights
and trade, human rights should form the basis for trade tribunal decisions. 92 Just
as environmental concerns are starting to be incorporated into trade and
development policy discussions, gender must be too. If trade tribunals were
required to consider human rights as well as potential profits in their decision-
making process, it would quickly become apparent that the current structures need
to be reformed.
A final option is to provide incentives for implementing gender-conscious
trade reforms, rather than punishments. Incentives could be offered to companies
and individuals from developed nations who are investing in, operating in, or
trading with developing nations. Such incentives could include tax breaks or
financial assistance from the developed nation's government when the company or
individual makes positive gender-conscious business decisions. It could also
include incentives from the developing nation to those same developed-nation
investors in the form of import tax breaks or some other financial guarantee for
their products or services. Finally, the incentives could run to the developing
nation itself, either from developed nations' governments, private investors, or
international organizations and agencies. These incentives could include financial
aid, training, medical and/or nutritional resources -- really almost anything
developing nations need, but all contingent on implementing gender-focused
development goals.
190. McGill, supra note 33, at 411.
191. Jarvis, supra note 8, at 233.
192. Id. at 223.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Africans must not be wards of benevolent guardians,; rather they
must be the architects of their own sustained upliftment. 193
Women comprise the majority of the world's poor yet the bulk of the work
they perform continues to be unaccounted for in national and international
economic development policies. 194  Women, particularly those in developing
countries, continue to have unequal and inadequate access to the resources
necessary to become viable players in the global market. In many African
countries, women, compared to men, receive less formal schooling, job training,
and opportunities for advancement within their jobs. Furthermore, women
generally have less access to land and property despite the expectation that they
will provide food, clothing, and healthcare for their families and regardless of the
level of support received from husbands, fathers, brothers, or other male relatives.
Until this discrimination against women is eliminated, the international
community will continue to see its trade agreements fail to achieve the desired
results and will continue to undermine any real hope of achieving sustainable
development policies for the developing countries of our world. That sustainable
development is impossible without investing in women's lives and opportunities is
a widely accepted fact. It is time to move beyond just stating the fact; it is time to
take action to make it happen.
193. NEPAD, supra note 16, 27.
194. Although this statement has been promoted throughout this paper and in numerous sources, for
a good summary of available statistics see UNIFEM, supra note 32.
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COMBATING CHILD SEX TOURISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA'
KELLY M. COTTER
2
"[I]f you choose to abuse children at home or abroad you will go to jail. The
miles you travel from your home to commit these crimes will not insulate you from
justice. "- Sharon Cohn Wu, attorney at International Justice Mission, Washington,
D.C.3
I. INTRODUCTION
Sexploitation, flesh peddling of minors, children for sale, child sex tourism
amongst the fancy phrases for the international market for child sexual abuse, it
boils down to a blatant "rape for profit" industry. According to the U.S. State
Department, each year more than two million children are exploited in the global
commercial sex trade.4 Before 2006, the top criminal industries in the world were
drugs, guns, and sex, ranked in descending order.5 Recently, illegal commercial
sex has surpassed guns and become the second largest black-market in the world -
drugs, SEX, guns - and the flourishing industry "shows little sign of abating.",
6
1. Coincidentally, after the first draft of this paper, Dateline NBC ran a TV special on the same
three perpetrators featured in this article, which allows the paper to have an outstanding multi-media
component. See Dateline: They Have a Future: New Developments in the Hidden Camera Investigation
Exposing a Child Sexual Slavery Ring in Cambodia, (NBC television broadcast Aug. 8, 2007),
available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/20186675/.
2. Kelly M. Cotter, J.D. University of Denver Sturm College of Law, 2008; B.S. Miami
University of Ohio, 2000. The author spent five months as a legal intern at International Justice Mission
during 2007. She wishes to thank IJM's Gary Haugen, Sharon Cohn Wu, Bob Mosier, Sean Litton,
Holly Burkhalter, and Bethany Hoang for their inspirational advocacy for children in sex tourism. Their
work galvanized her to write this article. This article reflects the opinions of its author and not
necessarily those of International Justice Mission.
3. Press Release, Int'l Justice Mission, Int'l Cooperation Results In Guilty Plea By Canadian
Tourist Who Sexually Abused Children 1 (June 2, 2005) available at http://www.ijm.org/releases/
2005/6.2.05_BakkerPleaRelease.pdf.
4. U.S. STATE DEP'T., OFFICE TO MONITOR AND COMBAT TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS,
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 24 (June 2008), available at http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/
tiprpt/2008/ (hereinafter Trafficking in Persons).
5. Nigel Morris, Boom in Sex Trafficking Prompts Charities to Demand More Safe Houses for
Victims, THE INDEPENDENT (UK), Oct. 14, 2004, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/
uk/crime/boom-in-sex-trafficking-prompts-charities-to-demand-more-safe-houses-for-victims-
535235.html.
6. Locals Fight Against Human Trafficking, WWAY NEWS, May 30, 2007,
http://www.wwaytv3.com/locals fight-against-human trafficking/05/2007; R. Barri Flowers, The Sex
Trade Industry's Worldwide Exploitation of Children, 575 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 147,
148 (May 2001) (documenting the growth in sex-trafficking).
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
A. Background
Many men purposefully go abroad to purchase sex acts believing they will be
able to remain anonymous.7 A Norwegian study of men's participation in buying
sex acts found that "80 percent of those who bought sex acts did so abroad." 8
Certain cities around the world have become notorious destinations for purchasing
sex with children. 9 Indeed, traveling for the purpose of purchasing sex acts is
known as sex tourism.10 The U.N. defines child sex tourism as "tourism organized
with the primary purpose of facilitating the effecting of a commercial-sexual
relationship with a child."1
Americans account for the largest group of foreign "tourists" in Southeast
Asia.' 2 , Around one-fourth of the 240 tourists who sexually abused and exploited
children in Asia between 1991 and 1996 and as a result faced arrest, imprisonment,
deportation, or fled the country, were American child sex tourists.' 3  The
economic relationship between Western men seeking children and the Asian
citizens who often run the supply remains a stronghold in this impervious illegal
market.
As the commercial sex industry becomes more widespread and profitable, it
enlarges the danger for women and children. One of the largest effects of this shift
is the plight of children kidnapped into the industry. 14 For instance, when the
tsunami hit South East Asia in 2005, sex traders preyed on the orphaned children
and kidnapped them.15 Although the Indonesian government issued a proclamation
that no Indonesian child was allowed to leave the country at that time, experts
believed it did not prohibit the traffickers, who often hold onto the "assets" for the
long haul.
16
Few campaigns aim at reducing the demand for victims, as many trafficking
groups focus on prevention campaigns and warning potential victims. Donna
Hughes, a prominent scholar on child-trafficking, purports that abolishing sexual
7. Sowmia Nair, Child Sex Tourism U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, CHILD EXPLOITATION AND
OBSCENITY SECTION (CEOS), http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/ceos/sextour.html; DONNA HUGHES,
BEST PRACTICES TO ADDRESS THE DEMAND SIDE OF SEX TRAFFICKING 30 (Aug. 2004),
http://www.uri.edu/artsci/wms/hughes/demand-sex trafficking.pdf.
8. HUGHES, supra note 7, at 30.
9. For example Svay Pak, Cambodia; Bankok, Thailand; Mumbai, India; Peking, China; San
Jose, Costa Rica, Tijuana, Mexico. See World Service: Trapping Cambodia's Sex Tourists (BBC radio
broadcast June 11, 2005), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/from our-owncorrespondent/
4078304.stm; Child Sex Tourism, Copper Wiki, http://www.copperwiki.org/index.php/Child-
Sex-Tourism; Sex Tourism, Wapedia, http://wapedia.mobi/en/Sextourism#l.
10. HUGHES, supra note 7.
11. Flowers, supra note 6, at 150.
12. Id. (quoting ECPAT Newsletter, 1996).
13. Flowers, supra note 6.
14. See Flowers, supra note 6, at 148 ("[T]here has been enough research ... to [reveal] that the
proliferation of the sex trade industry globally has resulted in an increase in the prostitution and sexual
exploitation of children").
15. The O'Reilly Factor: Transcript: Gary Haugen on Tsunami Children at Risk (FoxNews
television broadcast Jan. 6, 2005), http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,143643,00.html.
16. Id.
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exploitation will require stronger efforts to combat the demand in receiving
countries. 17  She thinks that a focus on the demand side means making men
personally accountable for their behavior that contributes to the sex trade. 18 This
article focuses on the demand side of sex tourism and what national and
international steps of enforcement are taking place. Specifically, this paper
reviews the recent publicized stories of three "johns" - men who traveled abroad
for sexual tourism - in order to show the layout, progress, and "play-by-play" of
U.S. and international laws toward perpetrators who seek criminal pedophilia in
Southeast Asia.
B. Factors That Make Southeast Asia a Predominant Location For Sex Tourism:
The Supply and Demand of Young Girls
According to the U.S. State Department, "Cambodia is a source, destination,
and transit country for men, women, and children trafficked for the purposes of
sexual exploitation."'19 Unfortunately, Cambodia is not an exception in Southeast
Asia.2 ° Sex trafficking also occurs rampantly in Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, and
Burma.21 Each of these countries has young children stolen across its borders for
the sex industry and each hosts brothels of young imprisoned girls.
In his book Not For Sale, David Batstone outlines that sex slavery thrives in
Southeast Asia because of four powerful factors: (1) devastating poverty; (2)
armed conflicts; (3) rapid industrialization; and (4) an exploding population
growth. 23 Political scientists and economists surmise that Southeast Asia's current
period of radical transition may be a dominant factor in sex trading's growth,
because during seismic societal changes, the powerless suffer the most.
24
The ground-breaking work Disposable People expounds on the surge of "new
slavery" around the world.25 Whereas in "old slavery" the owners regarded the
victims as valuable and expensive possessions of a family, in the "new slavery" the
victims cost little and are easily replaceable.26 Worldwide population growth has
produced a glut of impoverished people, which provides a steady supply of people
whom traffickers can manipulate and take advantage of.
27
Bales also writes about how rapid economic change produces an increase in
"modem slavery. ''28 As modernization in developing countries contributes to the
17. HUGHES, supra note 7, at 2.
18. Id.
19. U. S. DEPT. OF STATE, OFFICE TO MONITOR AND COMBAT TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 83 (June 2006), available at http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/
2006/index.htm; see also DAVID BATSTONE, NOT FOR SALE 21 (2007).
20. BATSTONE, supra note 19, at 21.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. KEVIN BALES, DISPOSABLE PEOPLE 12 (Univ. of Cal. Press rev. ed. 2004) (1999).
26. Id. at 14.
27. Id. at 12.
28. Id.
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immense wealth of the elite, it also comes with rapid social and economic change
that greatly effects the impoverishment of the poor majority. People may push
aside traditional ways of life for the cash crop and a quick profit.29 Modernization
and globalization may shatter traditional families and their small-scale subsistence
farming. The loss of common land, the shift from subsistence farming to cash-
crop demands, and new government policies end up bankrupting millions of
peasants and drive them from their land and sometimes into slavery.3 °
Modernization also brings a new pressure for consumer goods. 31  The
rationale behind a family selling their daughter into the sex trade has shown to be
changing. In Thailand, it had not been unheard of for parents to sell their
daughters into prostitution in response to a serious family financial crisis. A
family might sell a daughter in order to redeem debt on their rice fields and prevent
destitution. For the most part, daughters were worth about as much at home as
workers than if they were sold.33 Bales reports how modernization has made
selling a daughter into prostitution not just a response of desperation, but a means
to a coveted product.34 The sale of a daughter might buy a new television set.35 A
survey in the northern provinces of Thailand revealed that two-thirds of families
who sold their daughters "preferred to buy color televisions and video equipment,"
though they could afford to keep their daughters in the alternate.36
Police complicity ranks as another prominent roadblock to combating child
sex tourism in Southeast Asia.37 The officers who should stand as sentries to
protect young girls from these crimes often look the other way.38 The chimera of
poorly paid officials amidst opulent sex tourism operations remains an
indefatigable impediment to the implementation of Southeast Asian anti-trafficking
laws.39 While many Southeast Asian countries have shown improvement through
increased arrests and prosecutions, the U.S. State Department's "Report on Human
Rights Practices 2006" notes that in Cambodia corruption remains a significant
29. Id.
30. Id. at 13.
31. Id. at 13, 40.
32. Id. at 40.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.; Caught in Modern Slavery: Tourism and Child Prostitution in Thailand, Country Report
Summary prepared by Sudarat Sereewat-Srisang for the Ecumenical Consultation held in Chiang Mai,
May 1990.
37. Karoline Kemp, Rebuilding Cambodia: One Woman at a Time, THE TRAVEL RAG, 2007,
http://www.thetravelrag.com/docs/10112.asp; Press Release, Int'l Justice Mission, International Justice
Mission Urges Cambodian Police to Expand and Investigate charges of Police Misconduct 1 (June 18,
2008), http://www.ijm.org/releases/2008/06 18 08 Cambodia-releaseF[NAL.pdf; see Alien
Smuggling/Human Trafficking: Sending a Meaningful Message of Deterrence: Hearing before the U.S.
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2003) (testimony of M. Sharon Cohn, Senior Counsel,
Int'l Justice Mission), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=873&
witid=2467.
38. See Testimony of M. Sharon Cohn, supra note 37.
39. Id.
VOL. 37:3
COMBATING CHILD SEX TOURISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
problem.40 Laws are only as effective as the police and judges who enforce them.
The Report reviews that corruption and a weak judicial system hampered
Cambodia's anti-trafficking efforts stating: "It was widely believed that some law
enforcement and other governmental officials received bribes that facilitated the
sex trade.
' 41
C. Economics of Child Sex Tourism
According to INTERPOL, a woman can bring in from $75,000 to $250,000
per year for her sexual exploitation.42 Children often bring in more money because
their virginity may be sold at a high rate. 43 For example, a mama-san in Cambodia
can sell a virgin for $600. 44 Video evidence of children in Cambodia reveals that
one girl may sell for $30, two girls for $60.45
Kevin Bales also exhibits an extensive chart about the costs of brothels in
Thailand in Disposable People.46 He reviews that it costs about $2.00 to $3.20 a
day per prostitute for food and $8-$16 a day in bribes to the police.47 However, the
income monumentally exceeds the expenses. Each girl may have between ten and
eighteen clients for $50-$90 each, making a single day's return $1,000 to $1,800,
just on sex, as well as the other ways the brothel had incur fees, such as through
drink sales, condom sales, and rent the girl must pay.48 In total, the expenses for
running a brothel in Thailand average about 257,000 baht (about $10,280) a
month, while the total income raked in at about 2,289,000 baht, which is a monthly
profit of $81,280 - a huge return.49
The sex industries of Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines
account for two to 14 percent of these countries' gross domestic product. 50 In
Thailand, the yearly estimated income from prostitution between 1993 and 1995
was $22.5 billion to $27 billion.51 In Jakarta, the sex industry makes $91 million
per year and in Indonesia as a whole, the sex industry is estimated to bring in $1.2
40. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR,
CAMBODIA: COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES (2006), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/
hrrpt/2006/78769.htm
41. Id.
42. DONNA HUGHES, DEMAND FOR VICTIMS OF SEX TRAFFICKING 12 (June 2005), available at
http://www.uri.edu/artsci/wms/hughes/demand for victims.pdf.
43. Id. at 25; BALES, supra note 25, at 56.
44. Dateline NBC, Children For Sale: Dateline Assists International Justice Mission In
Investigating And Rescuing Children From Sexual Slavery In Cambodia (NBC television broadcast
Jan. 23, 2004); see also NBC News, Children for Sale: Dateline Goes Undercover with a Human Rights
Group to Expose Sex Trafficking in Cambodia, DATELINE NBC, Jan. 9, 2005,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4038249/.
45. Dateline NBC, supra note 44.
46. BALES, supra note 25, at 55.
47. Id. at 54.
48. Id. at 55.
49. Id.
50. HUGHES, supra note 42, at 12 (citing LIN LEAN LIM, THE SEX SECTOR: THE ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL BASES OF PROSTITUTION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (International Labour Organization) (1998)).
51. Id.
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billion to $3.3 billion per year.52 Prostitution in the Philippines is now the fourth
largest source of gross national product for the country.53 The production of child
pornography in the Philippines is a $1 billion industry. Understanding the
financial aspects of sex trafficking is a vital part in the strategies to disrupt the
market. In order for exploiters to lose interest in trafficking, the economic
incentive must decrease.54
II. CASE STUDIES: THREE WESTERN "TOURISTS" IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE
EFFECT OF THE LAW ABROAD
This section outlines the activities of a few of these sex tourists. By following
specific cases of tourists, this paper intends to show how U.S. laws, international
laws, and trans-national legal solutions can coordinate to suppress the rapidly
growing sex tourism industry. Mr. Albom, Mr. Bakker, and Mr. Smith all sought
child sexploitation in Southeast Asia, and for the most part, all were counting on
getting away with it. This section will illuminate how the laws against foreign
pedophiles abroad are getting stronger.
A. Jerry Albom
American doctor Jerry Albom commented that he came to Southeast Asia for
its "remarkable architectural finds," such as the temples of Angkor Wat.5' NBC
Dateline reporters recorded Albom's remarks during their initial footage of general
Phenom Phen tourism.56 The legendary temples were not the only things that drew
Dr. Albom to Cambodia, however.57 When Dateline moved its story to Svak Pak,
a smaller town seventeen miles from Phenom Phen and known for its specialty of
child-aged prostitutes, again they observed Dr. Albom at a local bar. It turned out
that Dr. Albom visited Cambodia for another kind of tourism.
In Svay Pak, Dr. Albom bragged about his exploits: "Usually I buy out three
girls for 50 bucks, take them for the whole night," he unknowingly informed an
undercover camera. 8 Dr. Albom described his covert plan for pedophilia abroad
he tells his American friends that he's traveling to Bangkok, so they won't be
suspicious of a Cambodia trip.59  Then, he crosses the border to Svay Pak,
Cambodia, where he buys 14, 15, and 16-year-old girls for the night.6°
In 2003, not much could be done to legally reprimand Dr. Albom's actions
with Cambodian child sex slaves. Unfortunately, Dr. Albom knew this as well,
and this is what drew him to a country like Cambodia, which has little enforcement
on its own anti-trafficking and anti-slavery laws. Besides poor enforcement and
52. Id.
53. Id. at 13 (citing Arnie C. Trinidad, Rapid Appraisal of Child Pornography in the Philippines,
PHIL. RESOURCE NETWORK, 2005).
54. See BALES, supra note 25, at 51-52.
55. Dateline NBC, supra note 44.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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police complicity in sex-trafficking rings in Cambodia, in general, the case against
Albom wasn't strong enough to begin with. Although undercover tape revealed
Albom talking about buying girls, this evidence was not strong enough: no
evidence had been obtained as to which girls, when, or other substantiation.
Prosecuting Albom was difficult for another reason, though. His actions
occurred before a U.S. law went into place that made sex tourism abroad illegal.61
Before the law, a U.S. citizen could only be prosecuted for sex tourism if he or she
traveled abroad with the intent for sex tourism. As revealed in the Dateline story
on Albom, he knew of this intent loophole.62 During the undercover Cambodia
footage, Albom told the investigator he took as another tourist, "[Y]ou don't get in
trouble unless they can prove that you traveled with the intent of having underage
sex .... If you did it by accident, it's OK .... It'd be hard to prosecute you.
You'd get the papers, but they'll hardly get a conviction.,
63
Although no Cambodian or trans-national legal reprimands were taken against
this man who bought underage girls, a few months later the Dateline producers
decided to follow-up with Albom to see what he had to say about his actions in
Cambodia. Journalist Chris Hansen found Albom in Guam and confronted him
about his trips to Cambodia.64 Albom responded that, yes, he had been to
Cambodia many times, but that he had not interacted with underage girls.65
Hansen showed Albom the video statements about "buy[ing] out three girls" and
66Albom denied any participation. Albom again repeated his intent defense: "I
don't go down there with the intent of trafficking or participating in sex with
underage girls.
67
Later in 2003, Albom's intent defense became irrelevant when President Bush
signed the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools Against Exploitation of
Children Today Act (PROTECT Act) into law.68 The PROTECT Act changed the
standard of evidence against foreign child-sex-crimes. 69 Prosecutors have to prove
that a traveler like Dr. Albom had sex with someone younger than 18, and intent
for traveling abroad is irrelevant. 70  Some worried that the extra-territorial
61. Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003,
Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003) [hereinafter PROTECT Act]; see also Press Release, Dep't of
Justice, Fact Sheet PROTECT Act (Apr. 30, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003/
April/03_ag_266.htm.
62. Dateline NBC, supra note 44.
63. Id. (emphasis added).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id (emphasis added).
68. PROTECT Act, supra note 61, § 105; Dr. Mohamed Mattar, Executive Dir., The Protection
Project: John Hopkins School of International Studies, Child Sex Tourism in Anti-Trafficking Laws:
Recent Developments at the Customs and Border Protection Stop Human Trafficking Symposium 4,
(Sept. 9, 2008), available at http://www.protectionproject.org/docs/Child%20Sex%2OTourism
%20Speech%20U.S.%20Border%200fficials%2OSept%202008.pdf; see also Dept. of Justice, supra
note 61.
69. Mattar, supra note 68, at 4.
70. Id. at 4, 8.
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jurisdiction allowed in the PROTECT Act may have constitutional concerns, but in
2006, the PROTECT Act was upheld as constitutional.7
B. Donald Bakker
During December 2003, Vancouver police received a call about a naked
woman crying, screaming, and running through a park.72 When the officers
arrived, the woman said that Donald Bakker had been following her, describing
him as a "bad date" who had videotaped an assault on her.73 The police arrested
Bakker, a 40 year-old hotel worker with a wife and young child, and found
videotapes in his bag and car.74 The footage showed hours of violent sexual
assaults in Vancouver and Cambodia.75 Bakker had attacked women with whips
and he repeatedly kicked one woman between her legs. 76 One video showed a
woman pleading with Bakker to remove alligator clips he placed on her genitals.
77
The police said the evidence contained more than 60 images, including videos
from Cambodia.78
After watching the confiscated videotapes that Bakker recorded of his abuses
with children in Cambodia, an officer saw the Dateline show and found similarities
between the Bakker case and the footage on the program. 79 The officials then
contacted International Justice Mission (IJM), whose investigation had been
featured on Dateline.80 The girls who appeared on Bakker's tapes matched up as
the same girls whom IJM had rescued at a later date. 8 With this evidence,
Canadian police were able to charge Bakker on multiple counts of sexual assault
on children, through the newly enacted Canadian Protect Act.
82
Bakker became the first person to face trial under Canada's newly amended
Criminal Code, which strengthened its "sex tourism" laws to enabled police to
prosecute sex offenses committed by a Canadian on foreign soil regardless of that
country's own laws.83 Bakker pleaded guilty in a Vancouver court on June 1,
2005, to 10 counts of sexual assault, seven counts relating to sex crimes against
71. Id. at 5.
72. Daniel Girard, First Conviction in Sex Tourism Case, TORONTO STAR, June 2, 2005, at A0 1.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Daniel Girard, B.C. Man Gets 10 Years for Sex Crimes, TORONTO STAR, June 3, 2005, at A03.
77. Id.; Girard, supra note 72.
78. Canadian Press, Sex-assault Suspect's B.C. Home Searched, TORONTO STAR, Jan. 20, 2004, at
A07.
79. Press Release, Int'l Justice Mission, International Cooperation Results in Guilty Plea by
Canadian Tourist Who Sexually Abused Children (June 2, 2005), available at:
http://www.ijm.org/releases/2005/6.2.05_Bakker Plea Release.pdf.
80. Id.; Dateline NBC, supra note 44.
81. Int'l Justice Mission, supra note 79.
82. Id.
83. Jennifer Wells, Canada's Offshore Child Sex Law Faces its First Test, TORONTO STAR, Aug.
29, 2004, at A02 (Bakker was the first prosecution under Section 7 (4.1) of Canada's Criminal Code,
which deals with offshore sexual offences against children or, as it's colloquially known, child sex
tourism).
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children in Cambodia. 84 Chief constable of the Vancouver Police Department,
Jamie Graham, commented that "[t]his conviction was obtained through the
combined efforts of our dedicated investigators and IJM's team [of law
enforcement officials]. 85  Sharon Cohn Wu, Senior Vice President of Justice
Operations for IJM remarked: "This case states it plainly - if you choose to abuse
children at home or abroad you will go to jail. The miles you travel from your
home to commit these crimes will not insulate you from justice., 86 Bakker began
serving a 10-year sentence on June 2, 2005. 87
C. Terry Smith
The Terry Smith investigation revealed another complex case of an American
sex offender fugitive. In 1984, fifty-four-year-old Oregon resident, Terry Darnell
Smith, was released from prison after serving 15 months for convictions of
multiple charges that he used children in displays of sexual acts. 88 To avoid arrest
and continue his patterns of abuse, Smith fled to the Philippines, and then to
Cambodia.89 In Sihanoukville, Cambodia, a destination known for international
sex tourism, Smith setup "Tramp's Palace," a place where he brutalized girls
himself, videotaped his sexual assault on young Vietnamese girls, and prepared
them to be sold for sexual assault to other foreigners. 90 The girls at Smith's bar,
estimated between the ages of 11 and 14 years olds, danced topless for the
customers and then were offered for sexual activity. 91
The detainment of Smith began with an undercover investigation by IJM.92 In
totality, Smith's capture required the international coordination of U.S. state laws,
U.S. federal laws, Oregon state police, Virginia state police, Cambodia laws,
Cambodia courts, Cambodia police, the U.S. Embassy in Cambodia, the U.S.
Marshals Service in Portland, and IJM. The investigation began when IJM
recorded undercover video of Smith compelling the girls to dance topless and offer
themselves for sexual activity.93  Confiscated videos also revealed Smith
videotaped every sexual act he had with the young girls.94 Based on the
investigation evidence, and led by the police chief of Sihanoukville's Anti-Human
84. Press Release, Int'l Justice Mission, Vancouver Police Department Recognizes International
Cooperation Resulting in Sex Tourist Conviction (Jul. 10, 2006), available at
http://www.ijm.ca/articles/VPD%2OPress%20Release.pdf.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Bryan Denson, Asian Bust Nets Oregon Fugitive, THE OREGONIAN, Sept. 21, 2006, at CO 1.
89. Id.
90. James Welsh & Prak Chan Thul, Suspected Pedophile Disappears, THE CAMBODIA DAILY,
Sept. 12, 2006, available at http://ki-media.blogspot.com/2006/09/suspected-pedophile-
disappears.html; Kevin Doyle, Cambodia's Child Sex Crackdown, TIME (World), Oct. 5, 2006,
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1543174-3,00.html.
91. Press Release, Int'l Justice Mission, International Collaboration Brings Down American
Pedophile (Sept. 20, 2006), available at http://www.ijm.org/releases/2006/9.20.06-SmithArrest
Release.pdf.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Welsh & Thul, supra note 90.
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Trafficking Bureau, Cambodian police arrested Smith on July 31, 2006.9" On
August 3, Cambodian police charged Smith with debauchery for having sex with
two girls, aged 13 and 14 years, at his bar in Sihanoukville. 96 Smith's Police also
charged Smith's Cambodian girlfriend with debauchery for allegedly procuring
and facilitating Smith's abuse of children at his establishment.97
Following the arrests in Cambodia, IJM's chief investigator called the Oregon
police to search Smith's records.98 Smith's sex-crimes charges had a familiar ring
to Oregon authorities.99 On August 5, 2006, Oregon officials reported that Smith
had active warrants: a total of thirteen charges of child sexual abuse in Oregon,
including sodomy, sexual abuse, and using child in a display of sexually explicit
conduct. 00 Five years earlier, Smith had served fifteen months in prison, and
when released he failed to register as a sex offender. 1 1  He fled to the
Philippines. 10 2 Armed with this new evidence, the fugitive task force in Oregon
secured jurisdiction and obtained a federal warrant to detain Smith and to prevent
him from unauthorized flight.
10 3
They were too late. Unexpectedly, on August 31, Sihanaukville's court
director quietly released Smith from his pre-trial detention. 0 4 The director issued
a "warrant of temporary release" based on a letter from a neurologist at a Phnom
Penh hospital. 10 5 The doctor claimed Smith suffered from a head injury sustained
when he was a marine in the late 1970s, which was now causing him headaches.
0 6
Cambodian papers released stories with the headlines: "Suspected Pedophile
Disappears,"'10 7  "Pedophilia Suspect Hurt Head: Doctor,"' 108 and "Pedophile
Missing; Ministry, Police Shed Blame."' 09 Many anti-trafficking NGOs on the
case assumed the release was a result of bribery, as Smith had posted a $20,000
bond, nearly every penny he had." 0
95. Id.
96. International Justice Mission, supra note 91.
97. Welsh & Thul, supra note 90.
98. The chief investigator had status as deputy sheriff in Virginia, which allowed him access to
Oregon records.
99. Denson, supra note 88.
100. Id; International Justice Mission, supra note 91.
101. Denson, supra note 88.
102. Id.
103. Id.; International Justice Mission, supra note 91.
104. Denson, supra note 88.
105. Welsh & Thul, supra note 90.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Prak Chan Thul & James Welsh, Pedophilia Suspect Hurt Head: Doctor, THE CAMBODIA
DAILY, Sept. 13, 2006, available at http:/Iki-media.blogspot.com/2006/09/pedophilia-suspect-hurt-
head-doctor.html.
109. James Welsh, Pedophile Missing; Ministry, Police Shed Blame, THE CAMBODIA DAILY, Sept.
14, 2006, available at http:/Iki-media.blogspot.com/2006/09/pedophile-missing-ministry-police-
shed.html.
110. Denson, supra note 88.
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In a maelstrom of finger-pointing, Cambodia's Minister of Justice, the court
director, and the hospital all rejected responsibility for the disappearance of
Smith.111 We didn't ask for the release," the neurologist stated, "but he should
receive treatment when he gets sick." The neurologist added that he had no idea
why the court's director released the suspect from prison.' 12 The court director
said she had "no choice but to release [Smith] and his girlfriend .... If we kept
him, it would have been dangerous to him and would even have been dangerous to
me," she said without elaborating. 13 The court director denied receiving any
money to grant the release.' 14 She said that if Smith were to flee Cambodia it
would be the failing of the country's border police for letting him escape. 115 The
chief of Sihanoukville's Anti-Human Trafficking and Juvenile Protection Bureau
stated that police were not looking for Smith, adding that it was up to the court to
decide whether to arrest him again: "The onus is on the court, it is out of our hands
already."'1 16 Cambodia's Minister of Justice emphasized that the case no longer
"concem[ed] the Ministry of Justice, it concerns the police,"'1 17 and he thought the
police should track him down if Smith did not return on his own.' 18 Cambodia's
former minister of women's affairs stepped up to say that everyone involved was
responsible for Smith's disappearance. 19
On September 20, 2006, Smith appeared at the U.S. Embassy in Phnom Penh,
hoping to replace the passport Cambodian police had confiscated in July. 120 Aware
that Smith might show up, the U.S. State Department summoned Cambodian
police, who arrested Smith outside. 121 Smith was flown back to Oregon in
handcuffs to face his charges.
122
In spite of the Cambodian governmental finger-pointing around Smith's case,
The Cambodia Daily released a story the next day, September 13, 2006,
celebrating Smith's arrest and reviewing that Smith's was at least the ninth arrest
that year of foreign men on charges of child sex abuse ("Arrests of Suspected
Pedophiles Reflect New Will"). 123  The U.S. also celebrated the global efforts
involved in this arrest. Bob Mosier, chief investigator IJM who worked with the
initial investigation, the Cambodian authorities, the U.S. Embassy, and the U.S.
Marshall Service to obtain the necessary federal warrant, stated that "Cooperative,
global law enforcement community efforts drove this arrest. Smith believed he
111. Welsh, supra note 109.
112. Thul & Welsh, supra note 108.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.; Welsh, supra note 109.
117. Welsh, supra note 109.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Denson, supra note 88.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Prak Chan Thul & Adam Pire, Arrests of Suspected Pedophiles Reflect New Will, THE
CAMBODIA DAILY, Sept. 13, 2006.
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could flee the U.S. to escape conviction and continue abusing children in
Cambodia. He believed the Cambodian authorities would allow this. But he was
very wrong."'124 In Oregon, Smith faced two counts of first degree sodomy, first-
degree sexual abuse, using a child to display sexual conduct related to photographs
he took, and two counts of failure to register as a sex offender. 125 On July 7, 2007,
Smith was sentenced to more than twenty-two years in prison.
126
Smith's case highlights a success of global legal cooperation, but it also
brings forth the reality that Cambodia remains a place where pedophiles hoping to
find anonymity might find a new start.12 7 Many instances of corruption almost
barricaded Smith's capture. It is most likely that Smith's $20,000 bought off the
Cambodian court director who released him because of his "headache." In another
Cambodian case in August 2006, evidence emerged strongly suggesting that
Cambodia had granted citizenship to Thomas Frank White, a U.S. multi-
millionaire currently in a Mexican prison on charges of child abuse. 128 White
received citizenship without meeting any of the official criteria required of
foreigners wishing to hold a Cambodian passport. 129 "The policies are improving,
but the court is still very weak," said a worker from the anti-trafficking
organization Action Pour Les Enfants (APLE). 13 ° Cambodia's authorities worry
that pedophiles will become "smarter and [also] harder to track, as they branch out
of Phnom Penh and Sihanoukville and into the provinces, such as the tourist towns
of Siem Reap and [free-wheeling] Koh Kong and Poipet on the Thai border." 131
The executive director of the Cambodian Women's Crisis Center fears that foreign
pedophiles will still find ways to enter Cambodia for purposes of sexual tourism.'
32
III. TRANS-NATIONAL EFFORTS AGAINST CHILD SEX TOURISM
When asked why he thought laws against child sexual tourism were
important, then Secretary of State, Colin Powel, responded: "Because it's the worst
kind of human exploitation imaginable. Can you imagine young children .... being
used as sexual slaves for predators? It is a sin against humanity, and it is a
horrendous crime."' 13
3
As shown in the situations with perpetrators Jerry Albom, Donald Bakker,
and Terry Smith, the legal remedies against "sex tourists" can be complex,
incomplete, and difficult to orchestrate. The efforts to combat sex tourism take
place at three broad levels: globally, nationally, and locally. 134 Further efforts to
124. International Justice Mission, supra note 91.
125. Paris Achen, Sex Offender Brought to Justice, MAIL TRIBUNE, July 7, 2007, available at
http://www.mailtribune.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID-/20070707/NEWS/707070313/-1 /rss01.
126. Id.
127. Thul & Pire, supra note 123.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Kevin Doyle & Phnom Penh, Cambodia's Child Sex Crackdown, TIME, Oct. 5, 2006,
available at http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1543174,00.html.
132. Id.
133. Dateline NBC, supra note 44.
134. See ECPAT INT'L, QUESTIONS & ANSWERS ABOUT THE COMMERCIAL SEXUAL
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tackle child sex tourism will include enforcing current laws and strengthening
these laws legislatively.1 35 Additionally, NGOs should fortify their international
cooperative action and organize their grassroots efforts. 13 6 This section outlines
some of the legal provisions that attempt to battle the continual growth of child
sexploitation.
A. Laws In The United States
1. TVPA and TIP Report
In 2000, the 106th Congress passed the Trafficking Victims Protection Act
(TVPA) to specifically address the problem of human trafficking.137 TVPA's
approach focuses on prevention, prosecution, and protection. 138 The Act allows the
U.S. to impose sanctions and withhold non-essential foreign aid for those countries
that fail to show "significant efforts" to eliminate trafficking in their countries. 139
The Act created the State Department's annual Trafficking in Persons Report (TIP
Report), which evaluates government responses in each country with severe forms
of trafficking in persons. 140  Countries are rated in tiers, based on government
efforts to combat trafficking.
141
* Tier 1 countries fully comply with the Act's minimum standards for the
elimination of trafficking.
* Tier 2 countries do not fully comply with the minimum standards but are
making significant efforts to bring themselves into compliance.
* Tier 3 countries neither satisfy the minimum standards not demonstrate a
significant effort to come into compliance. 1
42
EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN 32 (4th ed. 2008), available at http://www.ecpat.net/El!Publications/
AboutCSEC/FAQ.ENG_2008.pdf; See also ECPAT INT'L, COMBATING CHILD SEX TOURISM:
QUESTIONS & ANSWERS 27 (2008), available at http://www.ecpat.net/El/Publications.asp?grouplD=5.
135. See, e.g., Polaris Project, Strategies, http://www.polarisproject.org/content/view/37/55/ ("We
work to protect all victims of human trafficking by advocating for stronger federal and state laws and
supporting legislators with research, training, and technical assistance.").
136. Id.
137. Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, P.L.106-386, §§ 101-113, 114 Stat 1464, 1467-91
(codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 7101-110 (2000)) [hereinafter TVPA]; see also Polaris Project,
Trafficking Victims Protection Act Fact Sheet, http://www.polarisproject.org/images/docs/newest
%20tvpa%20fact%20sheet%20july%202008.pdf (describing key provisions of the Victims of
Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000 and subsequent additions and amendments)
[hereinafter Polaris, TVPA Fact Sheet].
138. Stephanie Richard, Note: State Legislation and Human Trafficking: Helpful or Harmful? 38
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 447, 451-53; Polaris Project, Trafficking Victims Protection Act Fact Sheet,
http://www.polarisproject.org/images/docs/newest%20tvpa%20fact%20sheet%20july%202008.pdf.
139. TVPA, supra note 137, § 110, 114 Stat. at 1482-83 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C § 7107).
140. TVPA, supra note 137, § 1 I0(b)(1), 114 Stat. at 1482 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C §
7107 (b)(l)).
141. OFFICE TO MONITOR AND COMBAT TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS, THE FACTS ABOUT HUMAN
TRAFFICKING, (Dec. 7, 2005), available at http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/fs/2005/60840.htm.
142. Id.
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Congress defines sex tourism as part of the definition of "trafficking."' 143
TVPA's "minimum standards" insists that countries should prescribe "measures to
reduce the demand for commercial sex acts and for participation in international
sex tourism by nationals of the country," and mandates measures to ensure that
nationals who are deployed abroad do not engage in or exploit victims of
trafficking. 44 Additionally, an Interagency Task Force must "[e]xamine the role
of the international 'sex tourism' industry in the trafficking of persons" in each
country. 1
45
In 2003, 2005, and 2008 the Act was reauthorized, amended and
strengthened. 146  For instance, in 2005, the three-tier system was elaborated to
include a "Tier 2 Watch List" for countries requiring special scrutiny because of a
high or significantly increasing number of victims, failure to provide evidence of
increasing efforts to combat trafficking in persons. 147  In 2008, the TVPA
reauthorization strengthened protections for children and their family members.148
It also authorized new studies and reports to assist in understanding human
trafficking globally. 1
49
The TVPA tier system had a direct effect on Cambodia's willingness to
prosecute sex-traffickers within its own country. During 2002, when Cambodia
was placed on Tier 3 and faced sanctions, the new U.S. Ambassador to
Cambodia 150 began to proactively work with the senior Cambodian authorities on
U.S. policy toward trafficking. 151 This direct work with Cambodian authorities,
along with two years of investigative evidence already acquired by IJM, made it
possible for a team of eighty Cambodian police to conduct a raid and rescue of
thirty-seven minor victims of commercial sexual exploitation in Svay Pak,
including about a dozen children between the ages of five and ten.152  Gary
143. TVPA, supra note 137, §103(9) (defining sex trafficking broadly as the -recruitment,
harboring, transportation, provision or obtaining of a person for the purpose of a commercial sex act").
144. TVPA, supra note 137, § 106(b)(3) (repealed and cited language removed at Pub. L. 110-457
§ 106(2)(C), 122 Stat 5044, 5049 (2008)).
145. TVPA, supra note 137, §105(d)(5).
146. In 2008, TVPA was renamed the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act, P.L. 110-457, 122 Stat 5044 (2008). Polaris Project, The Trafficking Victims
Protection Reauthorization Act Passed Congress, http://actioncenter.polarisproject.org/take-
action/advocate-for-policy/35-action/217-advocate-for-policy [hereinafter Polaris, TVPRA Passed
Congress]; see also TVPA Fact Sheet, supra note 138.
147. U.S. State Dept., Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, Trafficking in Persons
Report, Tier Placements (June 5, 2006) http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2006/65985.htrrL
148. Polaris, TVPRA Passed Congress, supra note 147; International Justice Mission, IJM
President Joins Anti-Trafficking Leaders at White House as TVPRA is Signed into Law (Jan. 6, 2009).
http://www.ijm.org/ijmnews/ijmpresidentjoinsanti-
traffickingleadersatwhitehouseastvpraissignedintolaw.
149. Polaris, TVPRA Passed Congress, supra note 147.
150. Ambassador Charles A. Ray
151. Trafficking in Women and Children In East Asia and Beyond: A Review of US Policy: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. On Foreign Relations, 10 8th Cong., (2003) (statement of Gary Haugen, President
& CEO, International Justice Mission), available at http://foreign.senate.gov/hearings/2003/
hrg030409p2.html [hereinafter Trafficking in Women].
152. Id; Press Release, International Justice Mission, International Women's Day is an Opportunity
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Haugen, president of IJM, testified in Congress that he thought the advocacy of the
U.S. Embassy with the Cambodian authorities was an "indispensable and decisive
factor in generating effective law enforcement cooperation. ' 153  Additionally,
about twelve suspects were arrested and charged, along with continued
investigations on additional suspects.1 54  One of Cambodia's most notorious
brothel owners received a sentence of twenty years in prison for trafficking-related
crimes. This was the strongest sentence ever handed down by the Cambodian
court in reference to trafficking. 55 Most notably, the senior police commander
who had been involved in a lot of the corruption of protecting the trafficking
crimes was fired. 56 Some of the best news in the case was that one Internet chat-
room frequented by sexual tourists of Svay Pak now broadcast: "The party in
Cambodia is over!'
157
As Haugen reviewed the raids during his Senate Foreign Relations testimony
in 2003, he stated:
Cambodia has had a very poor record of tolerating sex trafficking
(especially among very young children) and such a record cannot be
turned around overnight .... We believe these encouraging events help
to serve as a model for what can be achieved when there is transparent
reporting through the TIP Report, a meaningful application of the tier
rating system, direct advocacy by U.S. authorities at the highest levels
of government, and tangible, practical assistance to foreign
governments in bringing rescue to trafficking victims and justice to
perpetrators.' 5
8
2. PROTECT Act
In 2003, the United States strengthened its ability to fight child sex tourism by
passing the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of
Children Today Act (PROTECT Act).'" The PROTECT Act increased penalties
to a maximum of thirty years in prison for engaging in child sex tourism.
60
3. Review of TVPA and Protect Act
As seen in the specific arrest of Terry Smith in 2006, TVPA, the PROTECT
Act, and other U.S. state and Federal laws can be very important in prosecuting
those who commit sexual tourism abroad. Without the U.S. federal warrant for
to Focus on Bringing Help to Victims of Sexual Exploitation and Trafficking (Mar. 7, 2005), available
at www.ijm.org/releases/2005/3.7.05_InternationalWomen'sDay-Release.pdf [hereinafter IJM 2005].
See generally GARY HAUGEN & GREGG HUNTER, TERRIFY NO MORE (2005).
153. Trafficking in Women, supra note 151.
154. Id.
155. Gary Haugen, The Cambodia Story, THE OTHER JOURNAL, Jan. 12, 2004,
http://www.theotherjournal.com/article.php?id=37. See generally HAUGEN & HUNTER, supra note
153.
156. Haugen, supra note 156.
157. Id.
158. Trafficking in Women, supra note 151.
159. PROTECT Act, supra note 61 (relevant sections codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2423).
160. PROTECT Act, supra note 61, §105(b).
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Smith's arrest, and follow-up by the U.S. Embassy and officials, Smith may have
permanently disappeared and started another "Tramp's Palace." Additionally, the
U.S. State Department's TIP Report and its tier rankings continued to be
instrumental in getting Southeast Asian countries to enforce their own laws against
sex tourism. Again, in 2005 the U.S. State Department relegated Cambodia to its
lowest tier three rating on the global trafficking report, alongside Burma, Cuba and
North Korea.161 The U.S. threatened sanctions against Phnom Penh for its inability
to comply with "minimum standards" to combat human trafficking and convict
officials involved.162 Soon after, Cambodia's police started to make a number of
high-profile arrests. By September 2006, Cambodia police arrested nine foreign
men on charges of sexually abusing children. 163 Cambodia was taken off the tier 3
standing, as the U.S. saw these arrests as a sign of Cambodia's "political will" to
eliminate sex tourism, when Cambodian police had for years faced accusations of
looking the other way. 164  In terms of the PROTECT Act, according to a
September 2006 article, Cambodia had arrested and departed at least six
Americans to face charges under the PROTECT Act's provisions against sex
tourism, and the Americans face penalties high as thirty years in prison.
165
The TIP Report 2007 ranked Cambodia on the "Tier 2 Watch List,"' 66 a
precarious status. In its country's narrative, Cambodia reported the updates on
child sex tourism, stating that thirteen foreign child sex tourists were arrested, three
were convicted (sentences ranging from one to eighteen years imprisonment); one
American citizen charged with pedophilia was released on bail in Sihanoukville
(Terry Smith, but as discussed above, he was later arrested and deported to
Oregon); continued assistance with U.S. law enforcement to transfer U.S. custody
of Americans who have sexually exploited children in Cambodia; deported one
American national who was accused of child sex tourism in the U.S. under
extraterritorial provisions of the U.S. PROTECT Act; and the deportation of two
other American nationals with outstanding U.S. charges for child sexual
exploitation and child pornography. 1
67
Cambodia did make some progress, however. TIP 2007 reports that the
Ministry of Social Affairs and Youth Rehabilitations (MOSAVY) worked with
International Organization for Migration (IOM) to repatriate trafficked children. 168
MOSAVY repatriated 1,273 children, victims, and those vulnerable from Thailand
and Vietnam to Cambodia, and from Cambodia to Vietnam.169 In terms of other
161. See Doyle, supra note 132.
162. Id.
163. Thul & Pire, supra note 123.
164. Id.; See also CAMBODIA COUNTRY REPORT 2006, supra note 40.
165. Thul & Pire, supra note 123.
166. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, OFFICE TO MONITOR AND COMBAT TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS,
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 20 (2007) available at http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2007/
82805.htm [hereinafter TIP 20071.
167. Id.
168. CAMBODIA COUNTRY REPORT 2006, supra note 40.
169. Id.
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South East Asia countries, TIP 2007 ranked Burma on Tier 3, Laos on Tier 2,
Vietnam on Tier 2, and Thailand on Tier 2.170
4. State laws
Additionally, many U.S. States have anti-sex-trafficking criminal provisions
(thirty-nine states).' 17  Of these states, some also have a statewide task force, a
trafficking research commission, and/or law enforcement training (twenty
states).172 For example, Colorado has anti-trafficking criminal provisions, a task
force, and victim protection laws. 173 U.S. States with no existing law or pending
legislation on human trafficking include: Alabama, Delaware, District of
Columbia, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming. 1
74
B. International Protocol
At the First World Congress in Stockholm in 1996, and five years later at the
Second World Congress held in Yokohama, Japan, participants representing
governments, non-governmental organizations, UN agencies and other
stakeholders, committed themselves to a global partnership against commercial
exploitation of children. This commitment "was manifested in the Stockholm
Agenda for Action."' 75 In addition, "there are several international conventions
containing articles that offer protection to children from commercial sexual
exploitation, and states that ratify these conventions are legally bound to comply
with their provisions.' ' 176 The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child (CRC), entered in September of 1990, has been adopted and ratified by
almost every country in the world.
177
C. National And International Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)
Many NGOs play a crucial role in providing resources for enforcement
against sex tourism. Additionally, some NGOs rescue and care for those children
kidnapped into the industry.
1. International Justice Mission (IJM)
International Justice Mission (IJM) is an international human rights agency
that rescues victims of violence, sexual exploitation, slavery and oppression. 178 It
170. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, OFFICE TO MONITOR AND COMBAT TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS,
Trafficking in Persons Report: Tier Placements, http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2007/82802.htm.
171. POLARIS PROJECT, U.S. POLICY ALERT GRAPHICAL ALERT SNAPSHOT - JUNE 2008 1
(2008), available at http://www.polarisproject.org/content/view/149 [hereinafter Polaris Snapshot];
POLARIS PROJECT, U.S. POLICY ALERT ON HUMAN TRAFFICKING: SUMMARY OF U.S. POLICY ACTIVITY
2 (2008), available at: http://www.polarisproject.org/content/view/149 [hereinafter Polaris Summary].
172. Polaris Snapshot, supra note 171; Polaris Summary, supra note 171.
173. Polaris Summary, supra note 171.
174. Id. at 2-3.
175. ECPAT INT'L, QUESTIONS & ANSWERS ABOUT THE COMMERCIAL SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF
CHILDREN, 31 (2006) (2001).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. IJM, Who We Are, http://www.ijm.org/whoweare. International Justice Mission, Mission
Statement: "International Justice Mission is a human rights agency that secures justice for victims of
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is a global organization of lawyers and investigators that works with local
authorities to stop illegal abuses such as sex trafficking and forced labor slavery. 
179
Based on referrals of abuse received from relief and development organizations,
IJM conducts professional investigations of the abuses and mobilizes intervention
on behalf of the victims. IJM has twelve world offices, including offices in
Cambodia, Thailand, and Philippines, and has rescued children trapped in sex
tourism in all of these Southeast Asian countries. i 0 In 2003, IJM worked with
local authorities in Cambodia to facilitate raids of several brothels that resulted in
the rescue of thirty-seven girls, the youngest of whom was five years old.'81
2. ECPAT International
ECPAT International (End Child Prostitution, Child Pornography and
Trafficking of Children for Sexual Purposes) is "a global network of organizations
and individuals working together to end child prostitution, child pornography, and
the trafficking of children for sexual purposes.', 182  "It seeks to encourage the
world community to ensure that children everywhere enjoy their fundamental
rights free and secure from all forms of exploitation."' 183 ECPAT provides helpful
educational materials about eliminating child sex tourism, including its Questions
and Answers about the Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children handout. 184
3. Action Pour Les Enfants (APLE)
Action Pour Les Enfants (APLE) is an international NGO operating in
Cambodia (Phnom Penh, Sihanoukville and Siem Reap). 185 APLE focuses on
protecting Cambodian children from child sex offenders and preventing street-
based child sexual exploitation. APLE's objectives include:
" Intervention and aftercare: To emancipate victims from child sexual abuse
and reduce the effects of trauma caused by such abuse.
* Legal protection: To increase the level of access to legal protection
afforded to victims of child sexual abuse.
" Breaking the cycle: To lessen the likelihood of vulnerable children
becoming victims, and victims becoming recurring victims through
awareness and active social care.
slavery, sexual exploitation and other forms of violent oppression. lJM lawyers, investigators and
aftercare professionals work with local governments to ensure victim rescue, to prosecute perpetrators
and to strengthen the community and civic factors that promote functioning public justice systems." Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. "IJM's justice professionals work in their communities in 12 countries in Asia, Africa and
Latin America to secure tangible and sustainable protection of national laws through local court
systems." Id.
181. George Gedda, In One Girl's Story, Picture Emerges on Human Trafficking, BOSTON GLOBE,
June 15, 2004, at 1.
182. ECPAT, Vision and Mission, http://www.ecpat.net/El/Ecpat-vision.asp.
183. Id.
184. ECPAT, supra note 175.
185. Action Pour Les Enfants, About Us, http://www.aplecambodia.org/about-us.php.
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0 Criminal accountability: To improve current conditions of impunity and
legal accountability of child sex offenders in Cambodia through
cooperation with Cambodian and international law enforcement officials
and bodies and through awareness raising on child sexual abuse issues.
186
D. Other Strategies and Solutions
1. Prosecutions
Prosecutions can be one of the most effective tools of deterrence. As IJM
witnessed in their work in Southeast Asia, even a few judicial convictions and jail
sentences for perpetrators can have powerful ancillary benefits. Convictions send
a clear message to all criminals that breaking the law will not go unpunished.
"Convictions change the fear equation: The criminals are now afraid, so victims
and potential victims don't have to be," says Sharon Cohn Wu, Senior Vice
President of IJM's Justice Operations, who oversees all of IJM's investigative and
intervention strategies.187  "Each arrest by Cambodian police of Western
pedophiles reinforces an important message: "Pedophiles are not welcome in
Cambodia and they will go to jail if they assault Cambodian children."''' i8
Prosecutions can be a controversial strategy. Other organizations criticize
that convictions will not deter perpetrators when the "real issues" lie in the poverty
and social structure of a problematic country. 189 IJM's strategy of prosecution is
only part of a 4 fold purpose that involves: (1) victim relief; (2) perpetrator
accountability (prosecutions); (3) structural prevention; and (4) victim aftercare.' 90
Hopefully, prosecutions of both the traffickers and the corrupt officials who aid
trafficking will help keep those in Southeast Asia more accountable to these sexual
crimes against children. Prosecutions show that the country's laws are more than
lines on paper.
2. Police Training
The role of the police officer stands out as a crucial piece of managing sex
tourism cases and preventing them. By increasing police awareness of commercial
sexual exploitation, providing strategies on how to manage sex tourism cases, and
training police to serve as trusted adults in the presence of victimized children, the
steps of prosecutions and victim relief will be greatly enhanced.' 91 As ECPAT
emphasizes, "The healing process for children begins the moment that they first
come into contact with a trusted adult: typically this will be a police officer."', 92
IJM holds specific sex tourism training classes for Cambodian police.' 93
186. Id.
187. International Justice Mission, supra note 91.
188. Id.
189. See Samantha Power, The Enforcer, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 19, 2009, at 59, available at
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/01/19/090119fa-fact.power.
190. International Justice Mission, What We Do, http://www.ijm.org/ourwork/whatwedo.
191. ECPAT, supra note 175, at 32-33.
192. Id.
193. Power, supra note 190, at 53.
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3. Advertising Efforts Geared At Anti-sex-tourism
The tourism and travel industry is gradually responding to the problem of
child sexual exploitation in tourism by raising awareness among staff and tourists
through leaflets and posters, setting up focal points for reporting instances of
abuse, promoting the ECPAT - WTO Code of Conduct, formulating industry
declarations, creating in-flight videos as part of education campaigns, and
providing training in tourism schools and to tourism personnel on ways to identify
and deal with child sex tourists. 194
In Cambodia, posters at the airport warm foreign visitors that abusing children
will be paid for with any many as twenty years in prison. 195 Some slogans tout:
* "Turn a sex tourist into an ex-tourist;" and
* "Abuse a child in this country, go to jail in yours.' 196
4. Websites And Hotlines
The advertising strategies may be working, as child predator message boards
on the Web have taken note. The Web sites now identify Cambodia as a risk for
child predators, said an IJM investigator who had been tracking the sites. 197 Two
great sites are:
" Child Sex Tourism Resources:
http://www.vachss.com/helptext/sextourism.html, and
* Child Wise Tourism:
http://www.etravelblackboard.com/index.asp?id=66266&nav=48
IV. CONCLUSION
The effective elimination of child sex tourists takes the cooperation of global
laws and organizations. A new "political will" must be created in a country with a
poor sex tourism record, and this political will is usually the result of diplomatic
incentives and pressures. 198 For example, "the carrot[] of intemational donors and
the stick of [the] U.S. State Department" sanctions has been proven effective in
getting some Southeast Asian countries to act, as seen with TVPA and the
PROTECT Act.' 99 Investigative anti-child sex tourism NGOs often play a vital
role in capturing Western sexual pedophiles abroad by coordinating key
enforcement officials from Western and Asian countries as well.
In 2008, the U.S. recognized the bicentennial of its outlawing the transatlantic
slave trade, yet modem day slavery such as child sexploitation still exists. 200 In the
Trafficking in Persons Report 2008, Ambassador Mark Lagon exhorts: "Those
culpable in this crime-traffickers, . . . child sex tourists, and corrupt government
officials-must be held to account.",
20 1
194. ECPAT, supra note 175, at 34.
195. Doyle, supra note 132.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Trafficking in Persons, supra note 4.
201. Id.
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